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Abstract 
The Salisbury Street Foundation (SSF) currently operates as a Residential Community 
Centre in Christchurch, New Zealand. The history of this programme, however, dates 
back over 23-years to its inception in 1979. Due to its extensive past, SSF has the ability 
to provide a valuable contribution to literature surrounding community corrections in 
New Zealand. As little has been previously published about SSF, this thesis offers the 
most comprehensive document compiled regarding the Foundation. It explores the history 
of SSF and then analyses the programme in terms of rehabilitation, and organisation and 
management. 
In the completion of this research, an extensive search of archival material relating to SSF 
as well as 13 semi-structured interviews was undertaken. When obtaining information on 
SSF from these sources, a focus on five main areas of interest was maintained. These 
were (1) the personality of each programme director and the influence he/she had on the 
running of the programme; (2) operational philosophies and strategies; (3) the role of the 
Board of Trustees; (4) the effect of legislative changes; and (5) the impact of critical 
events and incidents. 
Overall, my findings diverge from previous studies which largely measure the success of 
rehabilitative programmes solely in terms of reducing recidivism. Instead, I suggest that 
the success and longevity of SSF has had more to do with the organisation and 
management of the programme, than its ability to reform every individual whom attends. 
Therefore, while some observations can be made in relation to recidivism at SSF, the 
Foundation more importantly provides a valuable example of what works in the 
management of nonprofit, community-based residential programmes, and what does not. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction and Methodology 
Introduction 
The Salisbury Street Foundation (SSF) m Christchurch is one of three Residential 
Community Centres currently operating in New Zealand. 1 At present, the programme 
accommodates a maximum of eleven residents at a time, most of whom generally arrive 
as a condition of their parole or release from prison, and remain in the programme for 
between syc\and twelve months. A block of flats has also recently been purchased 
i 
accommod,ating for up to seven graduates of the programme. Monetary support for SSF 
comes largely from the Department of Corrections. The organisation is in a good 
financial position and its assets include two mortgaged properties worth approximately 
half a million dollars. The programme continues to develop and further expansions are 
being considered. 
SSF's transition to a Residential Community Centre occurred with the deletion of 
habilitation centres under the Sentencing Act 2002. Prior to this, the Foundation had 
become New Zealand's first pilot habilitation centre in April 1996 and operated as one of 
four community-based habilitation programmes following the introduction of this new 
initiative under the 1993 Criminal Justice Amendment Act. The history and development 
of SSF, however, extends back well before its establishment as a pilot habilitation centre. 
1 The other two centres are Montgomery House in Hamilton, which is run by the New Zealand Prisoners 
Aid Rehabilitation Society, and Te Ihi Tu in New Plymouth, which is a kaupapa Maori programme that, 
along with SSF, had previously operated as a pilot habilitation facility (Ministerial Briefings 2002). 
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The programme was initially introduced in 1979 and inspired by the Delancey Street 
Foundation, a self-help residential facility situated in San Francisco. Since its 
establishment, SSF has experienced many changes and endured a variety of difficulties. It 
provides a pertinent example of a community-based organisation, illustrating 'what 
works' and 'does not work' in relation to rehabilitation, and organisation and 
management, while also reflecting shifts in correctional policy in New Zealand since the 
late 1970s. 
Prior Research 
Due to its extensive history, SSF has been an important experiment in community 
corrections in New Zealand. Despite this, there has been almost nothing published about 
it. This thesis offers the most comprehensive document yet compiled regarding the 
Foundation. Other material on SSF includes a few Department of Corrections Reports 
and some newspaper articles. These, however, only offer limited and select amounts of 
information. Prior to this study, the principal document regarding SSF's history is a 
Master of Arts thesis completed by Kath Jamieson in 1991. As we shall see, though, a 
variety of difficulties surrounded the production of this work, which ultimately resulted in 
it being embargoed for five years. Since Jamieson completed her research on SSF a 
number of crucial changes have occurred as a result of the Foundation's transition to a 
habilitation centre. This thesis covers SSF's entire history up until early 2003, 
considering changes both prior to, and following, the programme's inception as a pilot 
habilitation centre. 
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Objectives 
This thesis has two key objectives. The first is to compile a comprehensive history of 
SSF from its introduction in 1979 through to its current existence. In order to 
contextualise this, however, it is first important to reflect upon the processes responsible 
for the inception of SSF. Consequently, chapters two and three will discuss the 
international rise in community corrections and the role of the halfway house and more 
specifically the Delancey Street Foundation in San Francisco. 
SSF's history can be separated into two principal periods: pre-habilitation centre, and 
habilitation centre and beyond. Chapters four and five will consider each of these 
intervals respectively. In order to give consistency to the analysis, throughout discussion 
on SSF's history, a focus on five main areas of interest will be maintained: (1) the 
personalities of the directors and the influence they had on the running of the programme; 
(2) operational philosophies and strategies; (3) the role of the Board of Trustees (BOT); 
(4) the effect of legislative changes; (5) the impact of critical events and incidents. 
The second key objective of this research is to discuss and analyse the role and impact of 
SSF in New Zealand. The themes of this analysis are: a) to consider the notions of 
habilitation and rehabilitation, and the debate surrounding these ideas, including "what 
works" and where SSF fits into this discussion; and b) to discuss the importance of 
organisation and management in SSF's long term success, as well as its near failures, 
during both its pre-habilitation and habilitation phases. Chapters six, seven and eight will 
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consider the significance of each of these areas and the role they have played in the 
success and longevity of SSF. 
Method 
The methodology for this study incorporated both written and oral components. Initially 
it began with a literature review focussing on the areas of correctional policy and 
community corrections both internationally and in New Zealand, management of not-for-
profit organisations and theoretical concerns relating to rehabilitation and punishment. 
Publications consulted included books, journal articles, newspaper articles, reports and 
New Zealand Parliamentary Debates. Following the completion of this general 
investigation, the focus of research narrowed. An exploration and examination of SSF's 
written archival material, dating from 1979-2002, was undertaken. Information on SSF's 
first decade was held in the University of Canterbury's MacMillan Brown Library,2 while 
all subsequent information was situated at SSF's residence in Merivale, Christchurch. 
Written material considered included annual reports and their minutes, minutes of BOT 
meetings, correspondence (both incoming and outgoing), Department of Justice and 
Department of Corrections reports, and a small amount of published material on SSF and 
other community-based alternatives. 
In addition to the consultation of written archival material, a series of 13 interviews was 
carried out with key personnel who had been involved with SSF at different stages 
throughout its history. These interviews were semi-structured, based on questions and 
2 In order to gain access to this material, consent had to be given by SSF (see appendix A). 
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ideas that bad emerged from the written material, while also allowing room for :further 
discussion relating to SSF and key individuals (see appendix B). Interviews generally 
lasted between 45 and 90 minutes and all participants made themselves available for 
further questioning if needed. 
Those interviewed were: 
1. Dave Robinson, a probation officer, who co-founded SSF and was involved with 
the programme for over ten years both as a therapist and Chairperson/member of 
the Board of Trustees. 
2. Geoff Samuels, a clinical psychologist, involved with SSF during its formative 
years both as a therapist and member of the Board of Trustees. 
3. Kevin Butson, a former resident, who became SSF's first Director between 1983-
1986, and remained involved with the programme until mid-1988. 
4. Ken Turner, a former resident, who was Director at SSF between 1987-1990. 
5. Anni Brown, one of the few female residents during the 1980s, who continued her 
involvement with SSF as a member of the Board of Trustees (Chairperson 1992-
1993) and became interim Director for a brief time in 1991-1992. 
6. Meladie Bras, who joined the Board of Trustees in the late 1980s and was 
Chairperson in 1991-1992. She withdrew from the Board soon after this time. 
7. Genevieve Strang, who has been involved with SSF since 1988, although she left 
for a brief period early in the 1990s. Genevieve's role has been primarily as a 
counsellor but she has also become Acting Director at certain stages when the 
programme was in between managers. 
11 
8. Greg Newbold, who has been a member of SSP's Board of Trustees since 1989. He 
was Chairperson for a year during 1990-1991. 
9. Kathy Dnnstall, a member of the Roper Committee, who joined the Board of 
Trustees in 1990. She stood down for a brief period in the mid-1990s in protest of 
the conditions involved with SSF becoming a habilitation centre but later rejoined 
the BOT and was involved with SSF until her resignation in 2001. 
10. Colin Elliot, who was the Director of SSF in 1993-1994. 
11. Glenn Newman, who was Director of SSF between 1994-1997 and was largely 
responsible for establishing the programme as New Zealand's first pilot habilitation 
centre. 
12. David Coom, who had been the Director of SSF since 1997. He recently resigned, 
in February 2003, to take up a position at the Christchurch City Council. 
13. Jeff Cooper, who was a resident at SSF during 1999 and is now working as a 
member of the staff both supervising residents at the St Albans Street house as well 
as at the new flats on Manchester Street 
Henry 'Skip' Crossen was also approached but was reluctant to be involved with the 
research and refused to be interviewed. 
Ethical issues 
Human Ethics Committee approval was not necessary for this research because those 
involved did so in a professional, rather than a personal, capacity. Consent was, however, 
gained from SSP's Director and select BOT members in order to access written archival 
material. Throughout the thesis the names of the professionals that have been involved 
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with SSF, including directors, Board members and staff, are genuine. Pseudonyms have 
been used in certain circumstances, particularly when referring to incidents involving 
residents, in order to protect their privacy. 
Scope of Research 
When considering SSF's history, certain factors have guided my research. As mentioned, 
they are the personalities of the directors, the role of the BOT, operational 
philosophies/strategies, legislative changes, and critical events. The reason for focussing 
on these aspects is that although a lot has happened to SSF during its 23-year existence, 
they have had the greatest impact on the development and functioning of the Foundation. 
Along with this, the decision to focus on these areas was based on the practical 
consideration that those I had interviewed had been professionally involved with SSF and 
therefore they were the factors most strongly related to their experiences. 
During SSF's history and analysis both pre-habilitation and habilitation centre phases are 
taken into account. At times, however, the second period tends to dominate discussion. 
The reasons are twofold. First, following SSF's establishment as a habilitation centre the 
documentation and evaluations available on the organisation increased considerably. 
Second, as a habilitation centre SSF experienced its most stable and prosperous period. 
Therefore, when analysing reasons for the success of SSF this period is the most 
significant. 
13 
Relevance of Research 
A history and analysis of SSF provides a comprehensive and valuable contribution to the 
literature on community corrections in New Zealand. This is because, as compared with 
so many organisations of this type which have failed, SSF has been a prominent 
community-based facility in Christchurch for the past 23 years. As mentioned, SSF's 
longevity allows the programme to offer a practical example of how changes in 
correctional policy in New Zealand have impacted on the development of one particular 
community-based residential facility. For instance, SSF's history is reflective of the 
changing relationship between government and community-based organisations in New 
Zealand. These developments are important ?c:oatJSe they display a notable shift in both 
the desire of the Department of Corrections ~o~ as the Dep.-ent of Justice before 
,_/ 
1995) to be formally involved with community-based organisations, and in SSF's initial 
determination to be independent of formal correctional authorities. 
Analysing SSF in relation to the principle of rehabilitation, also provides an opportunity 
to assess the Foundation and frame it within the context of the "what works" debate. 
Many of the difficulties with assessing the rehabilitative "success" of residential 
programmes are highlighted by SSF. Most of these problems revolve around the focus on 
recidivism as the primary measure of rehabilitative success. As we shall see in later 
discussion, attempting to measure the rehabilitative "success" of SSF continues to 
reinforce the complexities surrounding recidivism. 
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An examination of SSF illustrates the factors important to the successful continuation of 
community-based facilities. Although SSF's history has not been smooth and the 
programme has endured numerous difficulties, it has consistently managed to overcome 
its dilemmas. For example, up until their deletion under the Sentencing Act 2002, SSF 
was the only habilitation centre established under the 1993 Criminal Justice Amendment 
Act which operated with any degree of success. One purpose of this research is to find 
out why SSF has survived when numerous other similar organisations have collapsed. 
The relevance of completing a history and analysis of SSF, therefore, is greater than 
offering a historiography about the organisation. It provides insight into a variety of areas 
including rehabilitation, the organisation and management of not-for-profit facilities, and 
the development of community corrections in New Zealand. SSF illustrates many of the 
difficulties commonly faced by rehabilitative programmes, as well as indicating how 
these concerns can be remedied. This is essential because as has been seen with the recent 
experiment of habilitation centres, these types of facilities frequently struggle to survive 
long-term. Overall, SSF is a unique community-based organisation because of its 
longevity and, as such, has a lot to offer discussion relating to criminal justice. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Community-based Alternatives to Custody 
Introduction 
The treatment of criminals is a complex issue that has been debated throughout history. A 
great area of contention, which has surrounded the prison since its introduction in the late 
18th Century, has been its inability to reform criminal offenders. It has been repeatedly 
asserted that the coercive, sterile and artificial regime of the prison is inconsistent with 
the notion of rehabilitation. Instead, rehabilitation has been argued to require a degree of 
voluntarism and a minimum of oppression which is more reflective of life in open 
society. It has also been increasingly claimed that crime is a reflection of societal 
problems and as such, criminals should be dealt with in the community. It was as a result 
of these changing perceptions that "intermediate sanctions" or "community corrections" 
grew in popularity throughout the Western world during the twentieth century. 
This chapter has two key objectives. The first is to consider some of the major critiques 
of imprisonment. These have focussed on contradictions within penal philosophy 
including the incompatibility between the ideology of imprisonment and its practical 
existence, and contradictions between the goals of incarceration as being able to both 
punish and rehabilitate criminal offenders. The second objective of this chapter is to 
outline the rise of, and rationale behind, the development of community corrections, 
particularly following World War Two. Internationally, America was at the forefront of 
developments in non-custodial alternatives. Some leading examples from the U.S.A 
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include the Chicago Area Projects, the Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study, the 
Highfields programme, the Provo Experiment and the California Community Treatment 
Project. In New Zealand, the post-war popularity of community corrections followed 
international progressions. These initiatives incorporated the promotion of alternatives 
such as probation, home leave, work release, work parole hostels, and periodic detention. 
As we shall see, the establishment of the Salisbury Street Foundation (SSF) in 
Christchurch in 1979 occurred as a direct result of these international and local processes 
and developments. 
Criticisms of Imprisonment 
Criticism of incarceration is almost as old as the prison itself. Early skeptics emerged 
despite a general approval of imprisonment amongst early commentators (Newbold 
2002). Detractors argued that the humanitarian principles upon which the penitentiary 
had been based were failing to be adhered to. They alleged overcrowding, inhumane and 
unsanitary conditions, and psychosis and depression caused by solitary confinement 
(Newbold 2002). Novelist Charles Dickens was one of the earliest cynics of the prison 
system. In 1842, during a visit from England to America, he claimed, "You know of 
course that we adopted our improvements in prison-discipline from the American pattern; 
but I am confident that the writers who have the most lustily lauded the American prisons 
have never seen [them]" (Dickens cited in Forster, 24/07/2002). 
Other early critics of the penitentiary system included Henry Mayhew, a well-known 
social enquirer, who asserted in 1862 that, "[I]t is plain ... that our treatment of criminals 
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neither deters nor reforms" (Mayhew and Binny cited in Rawlings 1999: 94). The editor 
of London's Daily Chronicle, Henry Massingham, also embarked upon a damaging 
campaign in the early 1890s, alleging overcrowding, dehumanising conditions, 
understaffing, poor discipline and a lack of productive work within most pnsons 
(Rawlings 1999). He declared, 
Our prison system is the worst in the world. It is the least successful. It starves them, it crazes 
them, it makes brutes of them. It is a mere criminal factory, which pours out of it gates every 
year an increasing mass of people who will be in and out of the cell for the greater part of 
their lives (Rawlings 1999: 105). 
During the twentieth century, criticism of imprisonment intensified and developed. Frank 
Tannenbaum contributed to ongoing debate, publishing Crime and the Community in 
1938. He considered how an individual came to be labelled as 'deviant' and how this 
process, referred to as the 'dramatization of evil', was justified and reinforced through the 
criminal justice system and incarceration.3 He alleged that imprisonment was problematic 
for a number of reasons: overcrowding, idleness, poor sanitation and health, and a lack of 
education within the prison (see Tannenbaum 1938: 296-303, 310-313). The fundamental 
nature of the prison and its impact on the individual was, however, deemed to be the most 
detrimental aspect. According to Tannenbaum (1938: 478), "There is not a shred of 
evidence that punishment . . . has beneficial effects on the future lives of the men 
punished . . . All we know about prisons indicates that punishment merely confirms the 
criminal in his career". Instead, he suggested that the criminal was a product of the 
3 While Tannenbaum (and also Clemmer) tended to focus on men, their ideas have since been applied to 
other criminal groups. 
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community and as such, the maintenance of contacts and associations with free society 
was essential if the offender was to be rehabilitated. Therefore in order to address the 
incidence of crime, the criminal needed to be dealt with within the community rather than 
in an environment totally inconsistent with open society. 4 
The first comprehensive study of prison society, The Prison Community, was published 
by Donald Clemmer in 1940. He introduced the notion of 'prisonization', described as 
"the taking on in greater or lesser degree of the folkways, mores, customs and general 
culture of the penitentiary" (Clemmer 1958: 299). Clemmer proposed that every 
incarcerated individual experienced a certain level of 'prisonization'. Of the 2,300 men 
involved in his study, he alleged 20 percent were "completely prisonized" and that "most 
men in penitentiaries have no chance of being salvaged if they become prisonized to any 
appreciable extent" (Clemmer cited in Newbold 1978: 155). He contended that the 
influence of prisonization was "sufficient to make a man characteristic of the penal 
community and probably so disrupt his personality that a happy adjustment to any 
community becomes impossible" (Clemmer 1958: 300). Any reformation that occurred, 
therefore, happened not because of influences of prison but in spite of them (Newbold 
1978). Clemmer concluded, "prisons work immeasurable harm on the men held in them" 
and that "it is impossible to view the immediate future [of corrections] with much 
optimism" while prisons dominate correctional policy (Clemmer 1958: 316, 319). 
Instead, alternatives needed to be found, preferably in open society, where the processes 
4 Tannenbaum's suggestion that crime was a product of society emerged contrary to the beliefs of earlier 
criminological theorists, such as Cesare Lombroso, who had asserted that criminal causation was based on 
biological and psychological inferiority (Clemmer 1958). 
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of prisonization would be irrelevant and the potential for readjustment significantly 
improved. 
As the twentieth century progressed, sceptics increasingly argued that the nature of the 
prison was paradoxical, that there were fundamental contradictions within the goals and 
objectives of incarceration. It was suggested that the two key aims of the prison, 
protection of society and reformation of criminals, were counter-productive and mutually 
exclusive (Ayllon and Milan 1979, Newbold 1978). As Newbold (1978: 31-32) suggested 
"one of the major difficulties faced by prison systems is that they lack any unilaterally 
consistent set of goals . . . Punitive custody and progressive reform have long been 
considered by social scientists to be irreconcilable with one another". The U.S. Federal 
Bureau ofPrisons recognised these incongruities in 1948, asserting that, 
Our modem prison system is proceeding in a rather uncertain course because its administration 
is necessarily a set of compromises. On the one hand, prisons are expected to punish; on the 
other they are supposed to reform. They are expected to discipline rigorously at the same time 
they teach self-reliance (cited in Ayllon and Milan 1979: 7). 
The contradictions between these two principles arguably ensured that the focus and 
value placed upon them was not equitable or balanced (Dodge 1975a). 
The underlying ideology of imprisonment was impugned for focusing on punishment and 
confinement rather than correction and rehabilitation (Dodge 1975a). It was suggested 
that the incompatibility of these two objectives negated any attempts at effective 
rehabilitative programmes (Ayllon and Milan 1979, Dodge 1979, Newbold 1978). The 
inability of prison to reform, therefore, both resulted from, and enabled, the dominance of 
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pllllishment to continue (Dodge 1975a). The disintegration of the perceived potential of 
the prison to rehabilitate reinforced its role as being the protection of society from the 
most dangerous and violent of offenders. This view was reflected in 1973 by America's 
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (President's 
Crime Commission). This Commission stated that, "[p]risons should be repudiated as 
useless for any purpose other than locking away persons who are too dangerous to be 
allowed at large in free society" (Haas and Alpert 1986: 357-358). 
The prison environment was rebuked as contradictory to life in free society, a situation 
that restricted an ex-inmate's ability to make a successful transition back into the 
commllllity. As Ayllon and Milan (1979: 258) suggested, 
It is as if the correctional institution, with its emphasis upon obedience, passivity, 
punishment, and aversive control procedures, is 'well designed', albeit unintentionally, to 
instill dependence, helplessness, lack of initiative, resentment, and aggression traits that 
most would agree are maladaptive both within the institution and broader context of society. 
A major aspect of the discrepancy between life in prison and in the community was the 
denial of the basic democratic rights of prisoners, which were guaranteed to other 
citizens. Hickey and Scharf (1980: ix) contended that, "Prisoners are the most powerless 
of people. Legally, historically, and in popular mind, they are noncitizens, nonpersons. 
From the society, they can demand nothing, not even minimal conditions of respect and 
safety''. Inmates, it was argued, were denied even the most basic human comforts, 
including "a wife's kiss on return from work, a choice of food, a leisurely cup of coffee, 
and opportllllity to withdraw from llllpleasant associations" (Johnson 1968: 499). In order 
to overcome these problems, critics suggested that democratic rights needed to be 
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extended to convicts and criminals m~ed~d b{ dealt with in the environment where the 
offence had occurred; within the community (Hickey and Scharf 1980). 
Another factor determined as negatively affecting an individual's transition back into the 
community, was the stigmatising effect of incarceration. The notion of stigmatisation and 
labelling was popularised by Howard S. Becker in Outsiders (1966). In this book, Becker 
(1966) argued that once detected, convicted and sentenced for committing a criminal 
offence an individual was rejected by larger society and labelled an 'outsider'. The 
impact of the stigma placed upon a 'labelled' individual hugely restricted his/her ability 
to reintegrate into society and as a result often served to confirm the offender in their 
criminal career (Newbold 2000). Other authors later reinforced the ideas of Becker, 
asserting that the stigma attached to imprisonment, or alternatively the labelling of 
prisoners as undesirable or untrustworthy, tended to override whether or not they had 
been rehabilitated and hence limit their options once released from prison (see Dodge 
1979, Tomasic and Dobinson 1979). 
Numerous commentators continued to reiterate the idea that prisons confirm offenders in 
their criminal careers. It was alleged that prisons were doing more harm than good 
because they were serving "as sophisticated training centers for the criminals among us" 
(Dodge 1975a: 234). Seen as crucial to the reinforcement of criminal behaviour was the 
existence of a largely universal informal system of values amongst prisoners. Sykes and 
Messinger (1975) completed an important investigation into the inmate culture, 'The 
Inmate Social System', originally published in 1960, which established the major aspects 
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of the inmate social code. According to Dodge (1979: 253), the overall impact of the 
inmate culture was to create an environment that was "self-defeating" and "reinforce[ d] 
negative social values" because "It is, most often, the informal inmate society of the 
institution that is the socialization mechanism and shapes the prisoner's reaction to 
confinement". 
Recidivist rates have been consistently used to illustrate the failure of imprisonment. This 
reflects a general assumption that recurrences of offending behaviour are a measure of the 
relative success or failure of treatment (Johnson 1968). The focus on reconviction as the 
best way of evaluating a rehabilitative programme has remained despite the difficulty of 
assessing recidivism (see Johnson 1968, Walker 1968).5 Internationally, high levels of 
recidivism reinforced the impression that prisons were failing (Hirst 1994, Dodge 1979, 
Ayllon and Milan 1979, Newbold 1978, Martinson 1974). It was claimed that anywhere 
between 50 and 85 percent of released offenders would be subsequently reconvicted 
within a few years of release (see Ay1lon and Milan 1979: 8, Newbold 1978: 392, 
Johnson 1968: 644). As a result, the popular conception of a criminal career as occurring 
"consistently, continuously, and progressively" appeared vindicated (Johnson 1968: 648), 
and the inability of prisons to reform accurate (Hirst 1994, Dodge 1979, Ay1lon and 
Milan 1979, Newbold 1978, Martinson 1974). Recidivist rates, therefore, served to 
reinforce the numerous other critiques of imprisonment and strengthen the suggestion that 
alternatives to custody needed to be found. 
5 The problems with relying exclusively on recidivism as a measure of success including the difficulties 
with accurately predicting recidivist rates will be discussed in-depth in chapter six. 
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Allegations of overcrowding and poor conditions within prisons also persisted 
internationally throughout the twentieth century. Prisons were frequently accused of 
being a "convenient dumping ground" for criminals (Vass 1990: 183) and indeed prison 
populations throughout the world continued to soar (see Duff and Garland 1994, Call 
1986, Newbold 1978). The result of these unprecedented increases in prison populations 
saw overcrowding become a more serious problem than it ever had been before (Dodge 
1979). Even the opening of a multitude of new prisons in many Western countries could 
not keep up with the influx of prisoners (Newbold 1978). Community-based facilities 
were, therefore, promoted as a "means of relieving the prison from further crowding 
pressure and the need to spend more on refurbishment and construction [of prisons]" 
(Vass 1990: 34). 
Despite increased criticism of prisons it has rarely been suggested that incarceration 
should be disposed of completely and support for the prison system has remained. Dodge 
(1975a) alleged continuing approval has been based on the prison serving two legitimate 
functions. First, a Government has a duty to protect its citizens from the most dangerous 
of offenders necessitating that the prison be reserved as a treatment of last resort. Second, 
while imprisonment should not be the basis of the law, it is important that those who have 
broken the law and harmed other citizens be punished. Accordingly Dodge (1975a: 248) 
concludes that incarceration should remain for the "incurably criminal" as a means of 
protecting society, but that the vast majority of offenders would be better placed in 
community-based treatment programmes. Perspectives such as this proved influential in 
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an international movement towards the expanded use and development of community-
based alternatives to custody. 
THE RISE OF COMMUNITY -BASED ALTERNATIVES TO CUSTODY 
International Developments Pre-WWII 
Growing disenchantment with imprisonment was essential in the expansiOn of 
intermediate sanctions during the twentieth century. The underlying philosophy of 
community corrections, however, has a long history that dates back well before this. Most 
early examples of community-based correctional facilities were not part of official penal 
policy and therefore did not flourish (Fox 1977). It was not until the 1930s, with America 
at the forefront of development, that community involvement in crime prevention and 
correction increased. A number of initiatives were influential in recognising crime as a 
social problem and investigating whether criminals would be more efficiently dealt with 
in the community than in prison. The Chicago Area Projects and the Cambridge-
Somerville Youth Study are two such examples. 
Chicago Area Projects 
The Chicago Area Projects were established in 1932 by a group of sociologists from the 
University of Chicago and the Institute for Juvenile Research. These investigators were 
interested in testing the hypothesis that community disorganisation caused high crime 
rates (Fox 1977). Focusing on locations where the Great Depression had left 
concentrations of underprivileged people in large urban areas, the researchers considered 
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how deviant behaviour and social and environmental conditions were causally related. 
They discovered that areas with high crime and arrest rates also had large numbers of 
welfare recipients, limited infrastructure, poor sanitation and considerable health 
problems. This led the Chicago academics to conclude that crime was one index of social 
breakdown, especially in slum areas of cities. The researchers surmised from their 
findings that it would, therefore, be futile to remove offenders from the community and to 
isolate them with similarly disadvantaged individuals. This would merely serve to 
perpetuate criminal behaviour by congregating criminals and allowing them few non-
criminal contacts. 
The Chicago Area Projects offered a number of opportunities to those living in poor 
neighbourhoods. Those responsible for heading the Projects attempted to mobilise 
individuals living in slum areas and provided counselling in order to encourage non-
criminal behaviour through improving self-esteem and providing youth with skills and 
status. They also encouraged people residing in areas with high crime rates to develop 
organisations and strengthen groups which would potentially reduce crime, including the 
church, welfare agencies and civic groups. This was promoted because it was assumed 
that if community disorganisation caused crime then organising the community would 
reduce crime by offering incentives and rewards for conforming behaviour (Fox 1977). 
The Chicago Area Projects were considered very successful despite the fact that no 
independent scientific evaluation of the programmes had been undertaken. It was 
believed that these Projects reduced delinquency in the communities into which they 
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were introduced and as a result, by 1959, twelve similar projects had been established in 
Chicago and other American cities. By the 1970s, however, criticisms began to emerge. It 
was suggested that there were many uncontrolled variables in assessing community-based 
programmes and that many delinquency prevention programmes, such as the Chicago 
Area Projects, lacked a rigid research methodology. One critique was that many 
programmes established themselves in an experimental neighbourhood without providing 
a control setting (Fox 1977). As a result, in spite of initial optimism, the Chicago Area 
Projects were eventually abandoned. 
Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study 
The Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study was another of the earliest studies undertaken 
concerning the treatment of delinquents within the community. It was based in Boston, 
America and began in 1935 under the leadership of Dr. Richard Cabot. The research 
studied a sample of delinquents in order to test the efficiency of treatment in the 
prevention of delinquency (Fox 1977). Six hundred and fifty boys, aged eleven years on 
average in 1939 and from working-class areas, were selected by teachers and social 
workers as being at high risk for potential future delinquency. The boys were 
subsequently separated into two matched cohorts. Between 1937 and 1945, the first group 
received a fairly intensive programme of treatment and counselling over a period of two 
to eight years, while the 'control' group received no treatment at all (Newbold 2002). The 
Second World War and other disruptions meant that the programme was not as 
consistently intensive as had originally been intended, but it was still arguably far more 
than the 'control' boys received from the educational and welfare services available to 
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them. Each boy involved in the treatment group, for instance, was allotted a counsellor, 
someone who could offer active advice, help and direct therapy for personal problems. 
Counsellors also helped bring the boys into contact with Scouts, Y.M.C.A., or other 
youth organisations and enabled more than half to receive special scholastic tutoring 
(West 1967). 
The results of the Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study have been widely discussed. To 
many, including those involved with the study, it was apparent that intensive treatment 
was no more effective than the educational and welfare services in place within the 
community in preventing boys from becoming involved in delinquent behaviour (Fox 
1977). This evaluation focused on the "interchangeability" of penal measures, both 
custodial and non-custodial, and was later used as an example by cynics of 
'rehabilitation' (Newbold 2002).6 William and Joan McCord, however, found more 
optimistic results in 1959 when they re-examined more than 500 boys who had 
participated in the study (McCord and McCord 1959). They conceded the treated group 
had just as many convictions as the untreated group, but also alleged that more in-depth 
investigation showed about a dozen boys who had received very intensive counselling 
that did better than the same number of matched controls. The general consensus, 
however, was that the intensive treatment had proven largely ineffective. 
International Developments - Post-WWII 
\ 
Modem developments in international community corrections did not begin to emerge 
6 The impact of cynicism surrounding the notion of rehabilitation will be discussed in chapter six. 
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substantially until the 1950s and 1960s (Fox 1977). The post WWII economies of many 
countries were experiencing rapid growth and high employment after a period of 
sustained economic uncertainty. As a result of these flourishing conditions, more state 
money was available to be spent on the correctional system. There was also increased 
pressure for a review of the correctional system as disenchantment towards imprisonment 
continued to grow. This was especially relevant following the war as many countries 
experienced huge surges in crime rates, particularly amongst juveniles, but there was 
reluctance to incarcerate youth for what were generally petty crimes (Yska 1993).7 
General perceptions surrounding crime and the treatment of criminals were changing. 
The perspectives of prison critics resulted in an increasing recognition of crime as a 
reflection of society and as such a problem that should be dealt with within the 
community. As Montilla (1977: 5) stated, 
Crime and corrections exist not as independent forces within the community but as 
manifestations of the community itself. Crime reflects the mores of the community, its missed 
opportunities, its social, racial, and economic problems, its willingness to tolerate deviant 
behavior, its ability to absorb deviants, and its ability to manage itself. 
Consequently, it was frequently claimed that the primary focus of correctional policy 
must become decarceration (Byrne and Y anich 1982). 8 The introduction of community-
based programmes was crucial to this movement towards decarceration and a shift away 
from custodial measures (Chan 1992). 
1 Escalations in juvenile delinquency were the direct result of the increased affluence that developed in 
many Western countries following the war. This enabled youth a greater disposable income, which 
provided juveniles with a greater opportunity to display independence and/or resistance (Y ska 1993). 
8 Decarceration, the opposite of incarceration, was defined by Scull (1984: 1) as "a state-sponsored policy 
of closing down asylums, prisons and reformatories" so that individuals convicted of criminal offences 
could be dealt with in the community. 
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As a result of these changing attitudes a multitude of community-based alternatives 
developed internationally during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. While it is not possible to 
consider all of these they included probation, day parole (otherwise known as work and 
study release schemes), attendance and training centres, diversionary programmes 
including community service, therapeutic communities, residential programmes and 
halfway houses9 (see Carlson 1976, Fox 1977, Miller and Montilla 1977a, Dodge 1979, 
Tomasic and Dobinson 1979, Vass 1990). Three leading American examples of this trend 
are the Highfields programme, the Provo Experiment and the Community Treatment 
Programme (CTP). 
The Highfields Programme 
Established in 1950, the Highfields programme m New Jersey was a pioneering 
community-based alternative aimed specifically at youth. Targeting male juvenile 
delinquents aged 16 and 17 years this short-term, non-custodial facility focused on 
developing a resident culture and encouraging self-rehabilitation, responsibility, support 
and control amongst those involved (Weeks 1958). It employed a social-psychological 
approach using frequent, long and intensive group discussions to deal with the reasons 
behind a young person's delinquent behaviour (Burgess 1958b, Weeks 1958). Residents 
were also expected to work during the day at an adjacent mental institution. Throughout 
their stay at Highfields, the boys were given numerous opportunities to maintain their 
contacts with the community. These included frequent shopping and movie visits to local 
9 Halfway houses including Synanon and the Delancey Street Foundation will be considered in depth in 
chapter three. 
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towns and allowances for home leave at regular intervals (McCorkle, Elias and Bixby 
1958). 
Evaluation was a critical component in the development of the Highfields experiment. 
According to Burgess (1958b: xviii) the programme was "notable as the first major effort 
to measure the effectiveness of a project for the rehabilitation of delinquents". Research 
undertaken on the programme indicated that it was successful, with residents released 
from Highfields being found to have a lower rate of recidivism than comparative control 
groups who had been confined in a regular reformatory (see Burgess 1958a, Weeks 1958, 
McCorkle, Elias and Bixby 1958). McCorkle, Elias and Bixby (1958: 113), for example, 
alleged that of those involved in the programme since its introduction, 83 percent (199 
boys) had succeeded and 17 percent ( 41 boys) had failed to successfully adjust to life in 
the free community. 10 As a consequence of its perceived success, the Highfields project 
became a prototype for many other residential treatment centres and community projects, 
involving both juvenile and adult offenders. These included residential programmes in 
Essexfields in Newark, New Jersey, Southfields in Louisville, Kentucky and the 
Minnesota Training School in Red Wing. 11 
The Provo Experiment 
Based in Utah, The Provo Experiment in Delinquency Rehabilitation was initiated in 
1959. It was claimed to be "one of the first efforts to provide a community alternative to 
10 Successful adjustment was measured based on whether a released resident was still living in open society 
on June 30, 1955 when McCorkle, Elias and Bixby's study began. 
11 Although an extensive search was undertaken, I was unable to find out what happened to the Highfields 
Programme after this point. 
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incarceration for persistent delinquent offenders" (Fox 1977: 23). The Provo Experiment 
was based on three basic assumptions. The first was that group techniques were necessary 
because delinquent behaviour was a community/group problem and needed to be treated 
as such. This approach disregarded the medical model which had previously treated a 
criminal as 'sick' and instead delinquents became both the contributors and recipients of 
group decision-making. Secondly, it was believed that the delinquent must be perceived 
as part of a "delinquent social system" (Fox 1977: 23). Thirdly, it was asserted that in 
order to resolve the conflicts imposed on them by both 'conventional' and delinquent 
social systems, delinquents must be involved with the community. Crucial to all of these 
assumptions was the use of the peer group as a resource for perpetuating the norms and 
imposing the sanctions of the 'conventional' community system. 
The Provo programme revolved around two key phases. These were the focus on 
intensive group therapy and the maintenance of connections and employment 
opportunities within the community (Fox 1977). In order to ensure community ties 
remained those assigned to the programme lived at horne and spent only part of the day at 
the treatment centre. The Provo Experiment was abandoned after only five years due to 
the expiration of funding from the Ford Foundation. While little evidence was 
accumulated throughout the duration of the Provo Experiment, a four year follow-up 
study showed that Provo boys, when compared with a control group of incarcerated 
individuals, had fewer arrests and when reconvicted, committed less serious offences 
both prior to, and following, release from the programme. When contrasted with the 
outcomes of individuals released from regular probation, however, the results of the 
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Provo Experiment were not so promising. The outcomes of these two community-based 
initiatives were found to be comparable with the rates of rearrest and reconviction for 
Provo boys being only slightly lower than those released from probation (Empey 1977). 
The California Community Treatment Project 
The California Youth Authority (CY A) established the Community Treatment Project 
(CTP) in Sacramento in 1961. Anticipating that the public might hinder movements 
towards community alternatives for adult offenders, the CY A believed they needed to 
develop a successful project in order to reduce public resistance (Jamieson 1991). The 
project they fostered was called the Pilot Intensive Counselling Organization (PICO). It 
drew upon an experimental group of juvenile delinquents from offenders administered by 
the California Department of Corrections. This group was released to parole supervision 
immediately, while a control group was sent to youth prisons for eight to nine months. 
During their involvement with PICO, participants were classified according to their 
"interpersonal maturity" and a controlled treatment programme of intensive counselling 
was developed and implemented in accordance with the needs of each individual (Fox 
1977: 231). 
The results of CTP and the PICO project have generated much discussion. One follow-up 
study contended that individuals released to the PICO project were less likely to be 
reconvicted than the control group (Palmer cited in Jamieson 1991). Other findings, 
however, suggested that while 90 percent of eligible CTP youths were at least as 
effectively dealt with in the community-based environment, less than 50 percent were 
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handled more effectively than in traditional, custodial-based programmes (Fox 1977). 
Despite contentions relating to the overall success of CTP, the project was influential in 
subsequent developments of community corrections in America. In 1965, for instance, 
advocates of community-based facilities used the PICO project to persuade the 
Californian legislature to embark upon a large Probation Subsidy Program (Irwin cited in 
Jamieson 1991). 
The Highfields project, the Provo Experiment and CTP were important post-WWII 
community-based programmes in the treatment of juvenile offenders. While discussion 
surrounding the overall effectiveness of these programmes was contentious, these 
American initiatives attracted a lot of attention and had a profound influence upon the 
subsequent development of community corrections for youth and adults not only in the 
United States but throughout the Western world. A crucial aspect in all of these 
alternatives was the use of group therapy in non-custodial residential settings, a focus 
which will later be established as being essential in the initial philosophy of SSF. These 
programmes also continued to reflect the ideas of prison critics and penal reformists who 
had suggested that imprisonment could not be expected to help rehabilitate criminals. The 
continued reinforcement of these notions ensured that the search for non-custodial 
alternatives to incarceration persisted. 
Community Corrections in New Zealand 
Advancements in community corrections within New Zealand during the post-war era 
generally imitated broader international shifts, especially those occurring in America and 
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Great Britain. Influenced by global criticisms of imprisonment and the widespread 
implementation of non-custodial alternatives, community corrections in New Zealand 
began to expand and develop during the 1950s and 1960s. Initial efforts towards the 
implementation of community-based alternatives were primarily aimed at diverting 
young offenders from jail. This was in reaction to a huge surge in juvenile delinquency in 
New Zealand post-WWII, as had been experienced internationally (Yska 1993). 
Alternative methods were, hence, sought to deal with this unprecedented phenomenon. 
The Criminal Justice Act 1954 recognised it was important for young and inexperienced 
offenders to be intercepted and dealt with within the community, whenever possible. This 
was based on the rationale that recidivism would be curtailed by keeping young people 
away from the influence of established criminals and by providing them with training and 
rehabilitative programmes (Newbold 1989). Imprisonment was, therefore, promoted only 
as a last resort and practical steps were taken to redirect young and first time offenders 
from further criminal behaviour (Webb 1982). These steps initially included the 
implementation of borstal training, detention centres and corrective training, which 
although still custodial sentences, were offered as alternatives to imprisonment and/or 
enabled the separation of young and first time offenders from experienced criminals. In 
conjunction with, and subsequent to, the emergence of these custodial measures other 
community-based sentences were implemented and/or more extensively developed. 
These alternatives included the expansion of probation, home leave, work parole hostels, 
work release and the introduction of periodic detention. 
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Probation 
Probation was initially implemented in New Zealand, under the First Offenders Probation 
Act of 1886, as a cost-effective alternative to prison. Following the introduction of 
probation a number of amendments and changes were made to its provisions, the most 
significant of which occurred in The Criminal Justice Act 1954. This Act aimed to 
develop probation more extensively (Webb 1982). The primary reason for emphasising 
probation was to reinforce imprisonment as a last resort and promote community-based 
alternatives to purely custodial and punitive measures. According to the United Nations 
(UN), "The aim of probation is social rehabilitation without punishment" (Webb 1982: 
173, emphasis in original). This focus reflected the ideas of prison critics and their 
concerns regarding the contradiction between the goals of imprisonment, punishment and 
rehabilitation, and the impact of prisonization on inmates. The Department of Justice 
(1954: 6) in New Zealand supported these claims, asserting that, "a developed and fully 
efficient Probation Service . . . offers the only continuing form of penal treatment that 
leaves the offender within the community under supervision". 
The expansion of probation under the Criminal Justice Act 1954 was largely based 
around the principles developed in a United Nations Department of Social Affairs report, 
Probation and Related Measures, published in 1951. In New Zealand, a probation order 
was established as consisting of a term between one and three years (Webb 1982). It was 
available for individuals convicted of an offence punishable by imprisonment and the 
consent of the offender was not required. The probationer was required to report regularly 
to an approved probation officer, notifying him/her of any change of address, and 
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complying with the directions of the officer in regards to place of residence, employment, 
and personal associations. In the advent of a breach of any of the conditions of probation, 
the probationer was faced with a fresh summary offence and the possibility of up to three 
months imprisonment or a fine of up to $200. 
Probation was claimed to be an important aspect of custodial after-care as well as a non-
custodial option. The Criminal Justice Act 1954 made substantial provisions for post-
release probation (Webb 1982). It was promoted as providing offenders with supervision, 
advice and assistance in order to prevent further offending. This was perceived as crucial 
because, 
The step from the restrictions of imprisonment to the freedom of community life is a difficult 
one ... If it is accepted that a prisoner on his release is to be given the opportunity to take his 
place again in the community, then he is entitled to reasonable assistance to enable him to 
achieve this objective (Department of Justice 1954: 24). 
Probationary supervision was initially available for at least one year in every case where 
an individual was liable for over a year in prison (Webb 1982).12 This changed in 1967, 
however, when the Supreme Court was empowered to specify a different period of 
probation if the offender had been sentenced to over four years imprisonment. Post-
release probation also enabled the courts to recall an offender back to prison as long as 
he/she was still under supervision and his/her sentence had not expired. 
12 Statutory supervision provisions were not seen as appropriate for those serving a prison sentence of less 
than one year. 
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Home leave 
Home leave was introduced as an option for inmates approaching the end of their 
sentence under the Penal Institutions Act 1954. It was based on British initiatives, which 
enabled prisoners serving sentences of over three years to visit their homes for five days 
within four months of their release (Webb 1982). In New Zealand the scheme began 
cautiously with only six inmates being given compassionate or temporary leave in 1956. 
By 1969, the schemes had begun to gain momentum, with adult inmates who were 
serving their first sentences being able to spend up to three days at home every four 
months. Home leave was further extended to apply to all prisoners in minimum-security 
prisons who had a suitable family member or sponsor in 1974, and in 1975 to inmates in 
medium-security institutions in special circumstances towards the end of their sentence. 
These schemes were also later expanded to include release based on recreation and 
education (Newbold 1989) as well as leave for community rehabilitation centre 
assessments (New Zealand Ministerial Committee of Inquiry 1989). 
Home leave was advocated as a constructive and necessary step in penal practice. The 
rationale behind this scheme was that it could help with the transition from prison to life 
in the community (Webb 1982). This was viewed as essential because, as critics 
suggested, adjustment "From an ordered and controlled existence to a free life with all its 
temptations is a great test for any person" (Webb 1982: 121). Home leave was promoted 
as enabling inmates to re-establish networks, including family relationships and 
employment prospects, prior to their official release from prison. It was also perceived as 
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being able to boost a prisoner's self-confidence and self-respect by placing trust and 
confidence in him/her to spend time away from the confines of jail. 
Work Parole 
The concept of work parole was enacted under the Penal Institutions Amendment Act 
1961 (Dodge 1979). This voluntary programme enabled prison inmates to be released 
during the day for work in private employment, returning to the penal institution in the 
evening (Webb 1982). Most of those released to work, as was the case with temporary 
release, were nearing the end of their sentences and considered a low risk to public safety. 
Although it was not always easy to find work, many inmates were able to benefit from 
the introduction of this scheme during the 1960s and 1970s. In 1977 and 1978, for 
example, 559 and 445 individuals respectively were approved and able to find 
employment (Webb 1982). 
Individuals involved in work parole were expected to contribute part of their wages 
towards their prison accommodation and an additional portion to pay back any fines 
imposed by the courts (Dodge 1979). The remaining funds were available to be used to 
support dependents or to be placed in a personal savings account. The advantages of these 
work parole schemes were promoted as once again including the assistance provided in 
the transition from incarceration to life in the community and the enhancement of an 
individual's self-respect through the ability to support himself/herself and their family 
(Webb 1982). Another suggested benefit was the reduction of the burden on the taxpayer 
through the inmate's partial contribution to his/her accommodation. 
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Work parole hostels 
Work parole hostels, established in New Zealand at the beginning of the 1960s, 
reinforced and continued the ideals of work parole and home leave. They aimed to 
provide support for long-term inmates and to assist them in the transition from 
confinement to the freedom of open society (Webb 1982). A small group of individuals 
were selected for these hostels, where they resided under minimum supervision and could 
go out and work daily in the community. 
The first work parole hostel was opened on the first of September 1961 in Invercargill, 
after public opposition halted the construction of one planned for Auckland. Following 
the introduction of the first hostel a number of others were established throughout New 
Zealand. They emerged both as part of existing penal institutions and as separate 
facilities. This was problematic particularly in relation to the authorisation of home leave 
as compared with work parole hostels. The appointment of officers and clarification of 
conditions surrounding the transfer of inmates to work parole hostels and their return to a 
penal facility in certain circumstances, including breach of conditions, was instituted in 
the Penal Institutions Amendment Act 1978. 
Periodic Detention 
Periodic detention was introduced under the Criminal Justice Amendment Act in 1962 as 
a new experimental sentencing option for juvenile delinquents, aged 15 to 21. The 
sentence of periodic detention was instituted as a way of bridging the gap between 
complete custodial sentences and lesser alternatives such as fines and probation (Webb 
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1982). Its main aim was to give 'undisciplined' youth a taste of detention, without 
interfering in their normal lives (Department of Justice 1968). New Zealand's first 
periodic detention centre was established in Auckland in 1963, and then expanded to 
include Christchurch in 1964, and Lower Hutt and Invercargill in 1965. 
The Secretary for Justice, Dr. John Robson, proclaimed periodic detention to be a 
"pioneer New Zealand treatment" and a "milestone in the development of a new attitude 
in the treatment of offenders" (Robson 1970: 9). In actuality, although not identical, it 
was partially based on British attendance centres and the work of the Boston Citizenship 
Training Group (see Webb 1982, Robson 1987). British attendance centres, for example, 
were implemented for young offenders who could be ordered to attend for certain periods 
typically during the weekend. The rationale behind these centres was "punishment 
through the deprivation of leisure" (McClean and Wood 1969: 204). They were seen as 
giving juvenile delinquents a taste of institutional life and therefore acting as a deterrent 
to further offending as well as providing educational and reformative aspects rather than 
simply a punitive focus (McClean and Wood 1969). Many of these objectives also 
existed within periodic detention in New Zealand. 
Work was central to the sentence of periodic detention for juveniles (Robson 1987). 
Work centres were established and run under the control of a Warden and an Advisory 
Committee, consisting of a Stipendiary Magistrate, and representatives from the church 
social services, the police, the trade union movement, the Child Welfare Division and any 
other interested groups. Detention at one of these centres could occur during the 
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weekends, for any term up to a maximum of one year. The goal of work centres was 
"inculcating in the offender a sense of consideration for others through the performance 
of tasks for the benefit of the community, or, more especially, to those members of the 
community who can benefit with some help" (Webb 1982: 185). As well as attendance 
during the weekend, those involved were also expected to report to a supervisor at 
specific times, one or two evenings per week. 
Periodic detention was extended to incorporate adult males in 1966 with the upper age 
limit being removed from the provisions of the sentence. At the end of 1974 female 
periodic detention was also introduced, being available for women offenders aged 16 
years and over. The first centre for adult males was opened in Auckland early in 1967 and 
for females in Auckland in 1974. By the time periodic detention was implemented for 
women, the work element had ceased to be an essential feature of the sentence, with the 
focus being on "achievement goals and social maturity" (Webb 1982: 188). Also the 
centres established for adults did not provide overnight accommodation and, as time 
progressed, non-residential facilities became increasingly available for juveniles as well 
(Webb 1982). Consequently, the use of non-residential centres increased from the mid-
1970s. In 1976, amending legislation allowed for the establishment of reporting centres in 
suburban areas, and then in 1980 'Saturday only' periodic detention was introduced 
(Webb 1982). 13 
13 The sentences of community service and community care (later renamed community programme) will be 
dealt with later within discussion on the history and development of SSF. 
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Residential periodic detention experienced a very different fate from its non-residential 
counterpart. Despite Robson proudly asserting in 1970 that of those who had been 
involved with periodic detention since its introduction, 67 percent had not been 
reconvicted by the end of 1969, five years later, the tone was not so positive (Robson 
1970). The concern was that those who were being sentenced to periodic detention were 
not only those who would have otherwise received a custodial penalty, but also those who 
would previously have been fined or placed on probation. Residential facilities were also 
expensive compared with non-residential alternatives, especially when the number of 
residents attending the centres was on the decline (Webb 1982). As a result of these 
factors, in 1980 it was decided that over the following five years residential periodic 
detention centres would be progressively closed (AJHR14 1980, vol. 2, E-5: 20) and by 
the end of the decade only a small number were still being used (AJHR 1987-1990, vol. 
6, E-5: 47). 
Overall, the key themes of New Zealand correctional policy during the 1950s, 1960s and 
1970s focused on the creation of goodwill within the community and a 'firm resolve' to 
deal with offenders without removing them from society, whenever possible (Department 
of Justice 1964). These themes reflected an international shift in penal policy following 
increased scrutiny of imprisonment, its negative outcomes and ineffectiveness, by many 
commentators and suggestions that community-based alternatives needed to be found. 
The perspectives of prison critics influenced the implementation and/or development of 
community-based alternatives in New Zealand, including probation and periodic 
detention, and for those who still received custodial sentences, pre and post-release 
14 Appendix to the Journal of the House of Representatives (AJHR). 
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options were instigated to help inmates in their transition back into society. The goals 
largely initiated in the 1954 Criminal Justice Act continued throughout the 1960s and 
1970s and in 1967, for example, the 1954 Act was amended further to limit the number of 
short custodial sentences that could be passed by the courts, once again strengthening the 
formal acceptance of community initiatives for non-serious offenders (Criminal Justice 
Amendment Act 1967 s.lO). 
Conclusion 
The increased popularity of community-based alternatives to custody during the twentieth 
century emerged out of growing disenchantment with the prison system. Critics of 
imprisonment established that incarceration was largely ineffective at rehabilitating 
criminals. The artificial environment and coercive regime present within the prison 
clearly impeded, rather than promoted, its ability to reform. Incarceration existed, 
therefore, simply as a means of confining and punishing criminals, not rehabilitating 
them. The failure of imprisonment was obvious through its constant inability to reduce 
recidivism, the principle goal of the criminal justice system. Consistently a majority of 
those released from prison were returning within a short space of time. As a result, prison 
populations soared and conditions within custodial facilities deteriorated. Hence, by the 
mid-twentieth century, correctional administrators and penal reformers throughout the 
Western world had little option but to investigate alternative, non-custodial options. 
Community-based sentences, in theory, were based around significantly different ideals 
than imprisonment. They focused on providing a certain level of voluntarism and a 
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minimum of coercion and isolation. Responsibility for dealing with offenders was also 
extended from those working within the criminal justice system to the wider community. 
This reinforced the belief that crime was a reflection of society and societal problems and 
as such an issue that would be best dealt with in the community. As a result of these 
changing perceptions, a variety of community-based programmes were introduced 
internationally. Despite high expectations, however, community-based alternatives to 
custody did not eliminate prior difficulties with reforming criminals. Once implemented 
many non-custodial facilities often proved as ineffective as imprisonment. Criminals 
were not necessarily rehabilitated and rates of recidivism frequently remained high. 
Developments in penal policy and correctional practice occurred as part of an enduring 
learning process into how best to deal with offenders and how to most successfully 
intervene and prevent further criminal activity, a process which still continues today. The 
increased use of intermediate sanctions, while not resolving issues surrounding 
rehabilitation, significantly altered the environment of corrections. Community-based 
facilities widened the scope of responsibility for criminal activity from formal custodial 
structures to the wider community. As a result, both residential and non-residential 
programmes emerged, and were run, outside of official correctional administrations. As 
we will later observe, these changes were influential in the inception, and introduction, of 
the Salisbury Street Foundation in Christchurch 1979. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Halfway House 
Introduction 
The inception of the Salisbury Street Foundation (SSF) was directly related to the general 
development of the halfway house. Although halfway houses have assisted criminal 
offenders in the community for over 200 years, it has been since the 1950s that they have 
experienced their most significant period of growth. Of particular interest is the 
development of one specific halfway house, the Delancey Street Foundation (DSF). This 
self-help residential facility was instituted in San Francisco, California in 1971 and when 
SSF emerged eight years later, it was modelled on this programme. Therefore, in order to 
understand SSF and the influences responsible for its introduction, it is important to 
consider the background and functions of halfway houses and, in particular, the 
development ofDSF. 
THE HALFWAY HOUSE 
Historical Origins 
Community-based facilities known as halfway houses have existed for over 200 years. 
Throughout this time they have incorporated a wide range of programmes, both 
residential and non-residential, and have been available to not only criminal offenders, 
but also to youth-at-risk, the homeless and the mentally ilL The precise origins of the 
halfway house are not entirely known. One of the pioneer efforts was undertaken by the 
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Philanthropic Society of London in 1788, when, appalled by the number of children 
begging and stealing to live, purchased three small cottages to house young people and 
juvenile delinquents picked up off the streets (Keller and Alper 1970). These children 
were then taught skills including gardening, tailoring and shoemaking by the craftsmen 
and their wives who lived in the cottages. 
The halfway house concept for adult offenders originated in England, Ireland and 
America in the early 1800s. In America, the first halfway house was established in 
Massachusetts in 1817 and others soon followed in New York and Pennsylvania during 
the 1820s (Latessa and Allen 1997). Perceptions influencing such developments were 
reinforced _by the Massachusetts Commission in the early 1820s. This Commission 
prom~:' e)smof halfway houses as a way for individuals to overcome the difficulties ~-----/ 
they faced following their release from prison, including stigmatization and trouble 
finding employment (Keller and Alper 1970). The halfway house, in this circumstance, 
literally stood for 'halfway' between the prison and the community. 
Despite these early developments, the existence of halfway houses was sporadic until the 
late nineteenth century. Strong community opposition to the existence of halfway houses 
prevailed within both the public and private spheres. The American Prison Association, 
for example, claimed that halfway houses would "perpetuate prison stigma and create a 
permanent class of undesirable citizens" (Keller and Alper 1970: 7). This hostile climate 
meant that only a few institutions, primarily stemming from private and/or religious 
sources, managed to survive through the nineteenth century (Champion 1996). Some 
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American examples include a halfway house opened by a group of Quakers in New York 
City in 1845 and a 'House of Industry' established in Philadelphia in 1889. 15 The first 
halfway house for women emerged in Boston in 1864, over 40 years after the 
recommendations of the Massachusetts Commission, and operated there for over 20 
years. 
In the late nineteenth century, the spread of a group of halfway houses known as the 
Hope Halls was important to the establishment of the halfway house as a community 
alternative (Keller and Alper 1970). The development of the Hope Halls began in 1896 
when Maud Booth and her husband rented a large house in Manhattan. As a result of 
community opposition, however, they were forced to move to Long Island two years 
later. In 1903, they opened a second Hope Hall in Chicago and then subsequent facilities 
in San Francisco, CA; New Orleans, LA; Hampton, FLA; Waco, TX and Columbus, OH. 
While some of the early Hope Halls only lasted for short periods, others continued for 
many years, providing temporary shelter in amiable surroundings and enhancing 
perceptions of the halfway house. Ironically it was parole, itself a liberal development, 
which was primarily responsible for the discontinuance of many of these halfway houses 
when parole emerged in the early twentieth century. 
Recent Developments 
It was in the 1950s that the 'halfway house' experienced its most significant period of 
growth (Miller and Montilla 1977b). As discussed in the last chapter, increased criticism 
15 This halfway house was still receiving parolees from Pennsylvania prisons over 80 years later in 1970 
(Keller and Alper 1970). 
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surrounding the prison and its ensuing high rates of recidivism, and a growing awareness 
of the problems faced by released prisoners enhanced the profile and popularity of 
community-based facilities such as the halfway house. Alternatives to imprisonment were 
promoted as efficacious and as a result, the scope of the halfway house was widened. 
During the 1960s in the U.S, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy recommended 
government funding for halfway house facilities and in 1965 the Prisoner Rehabilitation 
Act was passed, authorising the establishment of community-based institutions, including 
halfway houses, for both adult and juvenile offenders (Champion 1996). 
Internationally, one of the most significant events in the promotion of state-operated 
halfway houses was the creation of the International Halfway House Association (IHHA) 
in Chicago in 1964 (Champion 1996). As a result, the number of p blicly operated 
halfway houses increased dramatically. For example, in the United States and Canada, the 
number of functioning halfway houses rose from 40 to 1,800 between 1966 and 1982 
(Champion 1996: 363). These figures are possibly lower than the actual number of 
halfway houses in existence, because the statistics relied upon affiliation with the IHHA. 
Other researchers have suggested that as many as 2,300 halfway house programmes 
existed in 1981 (Champion 1996). 
The nature of many halfway houses underwent a significant change by the late 1970s. 
They became increasingly developed as alternatives to incarceration, catering for 
probationers in need of limited residential confinement. Their role, hence, emerged as a 
"halfway-in" type of facility rather than the "halfway-out" of custody approach which 
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had dominated previously (Champion 1996). According to Latessa and Allen (1997), the 
notion of the 'halfway house' has also largely been rendered obsolete since the 1990s and 
replaced by other terms including 'community-based residential facilities' and 
'residential treatment centres'. Despite the change of name, however, the basic 
correctional and theoretical philosophy of the 'halfway house' has remained largely 
unaltered. 
Definition 
Establishing a comprehensive definition of a 'halfway house' is difficult. The third 
annual meeting of the International Halfway House Association in 1967, for instance, 
could not agree on either an official name or on what the key aspects of the facilities 
should be (Keller and Alper 1970). These definitional difficulties are due to the immense 
diversity that has existed amongst institutions that refer to themselves as halfway houses 
and the like (Champion 1996, Keller and Alper 1970). Considerable variety and even 
disparity can be found in regards to location, staffing patterns, treatment goals, array of 
services, resident numbers and profiles, and cost-effectiveness. 
Despite significant variations, there are some basic elements that are common to the 
notion of the halfway house. These include their existence within the community and the 
absence of the restrictions of prison. Halfway houses also tend to be relatively small, 
either privately owned or part of the criminal justice system, and to incorporate 
programmes that include a work and/or study release scheme and some degree of group 
therapy and/or individual counselling (Fox 1977, Champion 1994). Individuals who 
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participate in a halfway house programme either volunteer to attend or are sentenced as 
the result of a court order or a parole condition following release from prison. 
The Functions of Halfway Houses 
The general role of, and rationale behind, the 'halfway house' is similar to that of most 
other community-based programmes. On the whole, they aim to bridge the gap between 
open society and the traditional institution, reduce the ill-effects of imprisonment, and 
emphasise the responsibility of the community for the phenomenon of crime (see Dodge 
1975b, Miller 1977, Keller and Alper 1970). More specific functions of halfway houses 
tend to vary according to the individual goals of institutions. Champion ( 1996), however, 
summarises the fundamental functions of all halfway houses into seven categories. These 
are (1) parole rehabilitation and reintegrati n intn the community; (2) provision of shelter 
and food; (3) vocational training, employment advice and job placement; ( 4) client-
specific treatments; (5) reducing prison overcrowding; (6) supplementing the supervisory 
roles of probation and parole agencies; and (7) monitoring probationers, work and study 
releasees, and other individuals, with special programme requirements. While it is not 
possible to consider each of these aspects in detail, the overall role of these functions can 
be outlined in relation to both "halfway-out" and "halfway-in" types of facilities. 
The traditional "halfway-out" house was designed to provide assistance and support to an 
offender following their release from prison and during their readjustment back into the 
community (Miller 1977). Reflecting perspectives of numerous prison cynics (see chapter 
two), Keller and Alper (1970) suggested that this period was critical. They asserted, 
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The first few months represent the most difficult time in the life of the released offender. Yet he 
is sent out into the world with many unreal expectations as to the possibility of subsequent 
adjustment, given the problems he brought with him to the institution, and the sizable residuum 
still unresolved when he leaves. Adjustment to any social situation requires a natural 
endowment, a set of skills and above all an attitude. For the returning inmate, this adjustment is 
rendered all the more difficult when it is realized that in preparation for his return to society, he 
has, in the process, been shut up away from it (Keller and Alper 1970: 172). 
Historically, many "halfway-out" institutions simply offered food, clothing and a 
temporary place to stay for those recently released from prison (Champion 1996). More 
modem facilities have, however, increasingly incorporated a more comprehensive 
programme including counselling, vocational skills training and employment advice 
(Champion 1994). 
"Halfway-in" houses are a more contemporary development than their "halfway-out" 
counterparts. These facilities provide a residence for those in need of some restricted 
confinement without completely removing them from the community (Champion 1996). 
The lives of probationers ordered to a "halfway-in" house are structured in various ways 
through programme requirements. These include curfews, random and compulsory 
drug/alcohol testing, restricted interaction with family and friends in the community, and 
high levels of supervision. Travis (cited in Champion 1996) suggested that these 
restrictions were designed to make life uncomfortable for residents. This is because 
"halfway-in" facilities exist as a form of punishment and therefore need to maintain 
punitive elements, whereas "halfway-out" houses aim to provide "homelike and 
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supportive environments" focussed on readjustment into society through the principles of 
rehabilitation and reintegration (Champion 1996). 16 
Effectiveness 
The overall effectiveness of the 'halfway house' is difficult to evaluate. There is a dearth 
of published material investigating the relative successes and failures of this community-
based alternative (Champion 1994). Reasons for the lack of research are complex and 
vary between publicly and privately owned institutions. Miller and Montilla (1977c) 
argue that performance evaluation of public community corrections, as with the wider 
criminal justice system, has historically been given a low priority. They describe how 
privately administered programmes may not have the financial resources over and above 
basic operating costs to undertake research and also that private facilities are not 
obligated to 'prove themselves' to the government or the general public so choose not to 
1 h . 17 eva uate t etr programmes. 
Results from studies that have been completed into halfway house programmes are mixed 
(see Bennett 1995, Fox 1977, Miller and Montilla 1977c, Keller and Alper 1970). This is 
partially reflective of the immense variety that prevails amongst halfway houses. They 
are based upon, and run according to, different philosophies and ideologies, utilise 
different strategies, and target different groups, hence making it difficult to assess these 
programmes as a whole. Inconsistencies also exist in approaches to, and methods of, 
16 The principles of rehabilitation and reintegration are to be discussed in greater depth in chapter six. 
17 A greater consideration of the issues surrounding the evaluation of community-based programmes 
(particularly in relation to SSF) will be dealt with in chapters six and seven. 
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evaluation. Research often focuses on different components of a programme and rates 
them according to varying measures of success. By being aware of these problems, 
however, it is possible to reflect on the debate surrounding halfway houses with regards 
to their positive and negative aspects. 
Two basic factors have been argued to be crucial to the evaluation of community-based 
programmes such as halfway houses. The first is a consideration of the processes 
involved in the programme, the "mechanics of the operation", and the degree to which 
policies and procedures are being carried out (Miller and Montilla 1977c). An assessment 
of these factors, however, can only be established in relation to specific programmes and 
not within a general discussion on halfway houses. The second aspect relates to overall 
outcomes including cost-effectiveness, recidivist rates both during and following the 
completion of a programme, and community responses to halfway house facilities. These 
factors are more conducive to a broad analysis of halfway houses than precise operational 
issues. Therefore, the areas of effectiveness to be considered are: cost effectiveness, 
recidivism and the reintegration of offenders back into the community, and community 
responsibility and support. 
According to Champion (1996) cost-effectiveness of halfway houses is largely 
undisputed. They tend to be comparably less expensive than prisons, operating at a 
"fraction of the cost required to incarcerate [offenders]" (Champion 1996: 372). This is 
especially true in regards to public funds because halfway houses are often private, or 
only partially funded by governmental sources (Latessa and Allen 1997). Critics, 
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however, allege that many halfway houses have been initiated as 'window dressing' and 
are therefore inexpensive because they lack direction and resources (Fox 1977). They 
also argue that a lack of funding impacts on the competency of personnel, causing many 
programmes to stagnate or exist only temporarily due to incompetent and/or poorly 
trained staff. Halfway houses are also more expensive than two of their alternatives, 
namely straight parole or outright release from prison (Champion 1996). 
The role of halfway houses in the reintegration of offenders into the community cannot 
easily be assessed. The measure made use of most frequently is recidivism. This is 
problematic, however, because as noted, methods of gauging recidivist rates vary greatly 
among studies (Champion 1996). For instance, does recidivism simply mean re-arrest or 
does it mean reconviction? And what if an offender is released without any charges being 
filed? Moreover, assessing what level of recidivism should be considered comparatively 
better than other alternatives or no intervention at all, is complex. This is because 
establishing control groups that are similar in nature to those being evaluated is difficult, 
and if variations exist, results may be influenced especially in regards to factors 
acknowledged as increasing the likelihood of reoffending. The complex nature of 
measuring levels of recidivism (to be discussed in chapter six) makes it difficult to lmow 
conclusively the impact of halfway houses on reducing involvement in criminal 
behaviour. These difficulties become obvious once studies assessing recidivism are 
compared. While one study states that research indicates that halfway house residents 
perform better than offenders who receive other sanctions (Carlson and Seiter cited in 
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Champion 1996); another asserts "one look at the extremely high recidivism rates ... is 
indicative of the failure of current attempts" (Miller and Montilla 1977c: 266). 
Halfway houses are frequently assessed through the general perceptions and opinions of 
those involved in and around the programmes. Overall, community support for halfway 
houses has been sporadic and often limited (see Fox 1977, Champion 1996). Many 
members of the general public fear halfway houses pose a threat to public safety and that 
crime rates are higher in neighbourhoods housing such programmes, despite a lack of 
evidence to reinforce such beliefs (Champion 1996). Even citizens who favour 
community-based sentences tend to want them situated "on the other side of town" (Fox 
1977: 263). This has made it difficult for many programmes trying to achieve stated 
objectives that include the maintenance of community ties and accessibility of 
community resources. Promoters of halfway houses have claimed that objections can be 
reduced through effective public relations and education (Champion 1996). They also 
suggest that simply by having these types of facilities in the community it places subtle 
pressure on the public to take responsibility for the restoration of an offender to ''useful 
citizenship" (Fox 1977: 285). 
Synan on 
A pertinent example of a halfway house, which also has direct relevance to upcoming 
discussion on DSF, is Synanon. Synanon was one of the pioneer therapeutic communities 
established in the late 1950s to deal with drug offenders outside of prison. An ex-
alcoholic, Charles E. Dederich, set up this residential drug treatment programme in Santa 
Monica, California, in 1958. Its primary aim was to help clients stay off drugs through 
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the principles of self-help and self-reliance (Shaffer 1995). Prisons and traditional mental 
health services had largely failed many of these individuals who had extensive histories 
of crime, imprisonment, and drug and alcohol addiction and so they voluntarily attended 
the Synanon in order to assist each other with their drug withdrawal and rehabilitation. 
Synanon was well known for its unconventional methods including a controversial 
counseling style, called attack therapy or 'The Game'. Graduation from the programme 
consisted of residents progressing through a series of stages until they were allowed full 
community responsibilities (Jamieson 1991). 
Many criticised Synanon's unorthodox approach. A number of citizens and government 
officials living in the communities where Synanon had housing were fearful of the 
criminals and addicts living nearby, and through public protests attempted to remove the 
programmes from their neighbourhoods (Shaffer 1995). They were especially concerned 
by the notion of former addicts treating recently-arrived addicts, which varied 
significantly from the traditional medical approach of 'experts' and 'patients'. 
Synanon's popularity suffered a significant decline from the late 1970s. The leaders of 
the programme, exercising strict control over its followers, slipped into cult-like 
behaviour and became involved in highly publicised violent actions. In 1978, for 
example, a rattlesnake was placed in the mailbox of a Los Angeles-area attorney who had 
sued Synanon. The attorney was bitten but not killed in the incident. Consequently, 
Dederich was arrested and charged for his involvement but missed a jail sentence by 
pleading no-contest to charges that he had conspired to murder the lawyer and by 
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relinquishing control of the group. This incident was followed in 1979 by a small weekly 
newspaper in Northern California, the Point Reyes Light, winning a Pulitzer Prize for its 
investigative series on Synanon, making the group's name synonymous with paranoid 
cults. As a result Synanon lost its tax exemption and was finally disbanded in 1991 
(Jackson 2002). 
Despite criticisms and its ultimate decline, Synanon also gained a large amount of 
support from the general public, especially in its early years. Well-known individuals 
including Hollywood actors and other celebrities promoted the programme. Over 25,000 
people were members of the programme at various times including thousands of non-
addict clients attracted to Synanon by its unconventional methods and becoming involved 
with various aspects of the programme (Shaffer 1995). As a result of this support 
Synanon was extended to other locations both in the United States and overseas. It 
became a model for other community-based facilities and halfway houses such as 
Odyssey House, Daytop Village and the Delancey Street Foundation. The example of 
greatest relevance to future discussion is DSF. 
DELANCEY STREET FOUNDATION 
Introduction 
The Delancey Street Foundation was established in 1971 in San Francisco, California. It 
was founded by John Maher, an ex-heroin addict, and his girlfriend (who later became his 
wife) Mimi Silbert, a psychologist and criminologist at the University of California, 
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Berkley. DSF emerged, and still exists, as a residential rehabilitation programme 
dedicated to the principles of self-help and self-reliance. Its primary focus has been on 
helping ex-offenders and drug addicts by encouraging them to confront their problems 
and take personal responsibility for initiating change in their own lives (Hampden-Turner 
1976). 
History 
Before founding DSF, John Maher, was a former resident of the pioneer therapeutic 
community, Synanon. After leaving Synanon early in 1971, Maher was followed by a 
number of individuals who had also left and were looking for further assistance. Maher 
believed residents were leaving Synanon because the programme had largely failed them 
(Jamieson 1991). This was due to its perspective that addicts needed to be protected from 
the community, thus creating a culture of dependency on the organisation. 18 Alternately, 
Maher wanted to establish a programme that made ex-addicts and ex-offenders 
accountable for their actions and responsible for reintegrating themselves back into the 
community. Maher approached Mimi Silbert at the University of California to help him 
develop a suitable programme for ex-Synanon clients. As a result, Maher and Silbert co-
founded and presided over DSF. 
The programme was named the Delancey Street Foundation after a district in New York 
City. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Delancey Street, situated on Manhattan's 
Lower East Side, was where immigrants had first settled in search of a better life (Karol 
18 Maher was, however, impressed with its administrative practices and therapeutic techniques, utilising 
some of these later within DSF. 
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1990). Here, "in a spirit of cooperation", immigrants from all countries and backgrounds 
are remembered as having lived and worked together in order to strive towards one goal, 
achieving "success" for themselves and their children (Karol 1990: 1). The reasons for 
choosing the name, "Delancey Street Foundation", were twofold. First, it was a reflection 
of Silbert's own family roots. As Silbert (1997: 1) claims, 
I grew up in an immigrant family in a ghetto. My family moved out of the ghetto and into the 
American dream. I went through school and graduate school . . . [I obtained] three masters 
degrees and two doctorate degrees. I left behind close friends who ended up in prison or dead, 
many of whom had more talent or brains that I did. It became my life's dream to get in and help 
the people I had left behind. 
Second, Maher and Silbert saw their residents as 'immigrants', coming to Delancey 
Street in order to begin new lives. According to Silbert (cited in Jamieson 1991: 305), 
"They are a group of people who don't know how to make their way in American society. 
Like immigrants, they have to band together, to get strength from supporting each other". 
Hence, the goals from the community of immigrants in old New York were fundamental 
to the rationale behind DSF. 
Initially, DSF was run out of Maher's San Francisco home and composed of "four 
residents and a $1,000 loan, from a loan shark" (Silbert cited in Karol 1990: 2). As 
Maher's house grew more crowded, however, he and 40 to 50 ex-addicts moved into 
three mansions (which had previously been the Russian and Egyptian consulates) atop 
Pacific Heights, "the most posh section of San Francisco" (Silbert 1997: 2). Maher's 
rationale for establishing in this area was that, "All social problems should move to where 
rich people live - that way the problems can receive attention from the sector which has 
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most control over the system that produced them" (Maher cited in Hampden-Turner 
1976: 62). 
Philosophy 
Maher and Silbert utilised many ideologies within the early administration of DSF. 
fuitially, it developed as adaptation of the Kibbutz, basing itself on the principles of self-
reliance and self-sufficiency present in the communal settlement in Israel (Wilentz 1996). 
The rationale behind focussing on the principle of self-help was that Maher and Silbert 
believed that for change to occur, those with problems needed be responsible for altering 
their own lives. This was viewed as essential if the cycle of addiction, offending and 
imprisonment was to be broken. In the words of Maher, 
... most convicts are scum. Of course social conditions made them that way. They've been 
fucked over, and they fuck each other. Point is, that's never going to change, until we take 
responsibility for our condition. To see that we're such is to realize that we don't have to be! 
Recognition clears the way for change (Maher cited in Hampden-Turner 1976: 134, emphasis in 
original). 
Maher alleged that prisons and traditional therapy had largely failed in this regard and 
that DSF would be able to offer what they had not. Therefore, the Foundation's overall 
goal was "for the addict to achieve independence not only from his habit but also from 
the institution that rehabilitates him" (Silbert 1989: 2). Other aspects deemed important 
included a work ethic and focus on the importance of business activity, a need for strong 
leadership, and a reliance on the local community (Jamieson 1991 ). 
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The Early Programme 
The programme that originally developed at DSF was based around a unique combination 
of group therapy, residential rehabilitation, education, and community work. Residents 
were expected to commit to the programme for at least two years, during which time the 
programme was designed to alter the individual's customary 'anti-social' patterns of 
interaction with the community through methods of goal attainment and action. The 
purpose of the programme was not only to separate individuals from their destructive 
lifestyles but also to assist them into more challenging life directions (Delancey Street 
Foundation 1987). The basic guiding principles ofDSF were, and still are, accountability, 
responsibility and residents taking pride in what they do (Silbert 1997). 
Combative Therapy: 'The Game' 
Throughout DSF's history, the focus of the programme content has changed and 
developed. During the 1970s DSF was renown for its Synanon-style combative group 
theory technique, which was also known as 'The Game'. 'The Game' was played three 
times a week and involved residents verbally taunting each other and making usually 
grossly exaggerated allegations in order to release their frustrations and hostilities 
(Hampden-Turner 1976). As well as Games, Dissipations or marathon Games were held. 
These marathon Games usually lasted at least 45 hours and residents were required to 
have been playing Games for a year before they were allowed to watch or participate in a 
Dissipation because it was a lot more serious and intense than 'The Game'. 
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The theoretical rationale behind Games was that they were necessary and important in the 
prevention of more destructive behaviour and as a way of getting residents to consider 
their faults (Hampden-Turner 1976). By learning to withstand provocative behaviour, 
Maher claimed, residents could learn to deal with problems in their lives and to accept 
responsibility (Fox 1977). Maher recognised, however, that Games were not useful in 
isolation but rather as a key ingredient of the overall programme of DSF. He stated, 
"Games make little sense when looked at in isolation from their context . . . I doubt 
people are healed or grow in Games so much as they grow between the Games and the 
contrasting worlds of work, politics and in-house socializing" (Maher cited in Hampden-
Turner 1976: 27). 
'The Game' generated a lot of public opposition in relation to the dilemma it posed to the 
issue of violence versus non-violence. DSF was dedicated to a programme of non-
violence and yet in many regards 'The Game' elicited violence and the substitution of 
physical violence for verbal violence (Jamieson 1991). Maher's retort to this was, 
We got some squares who think the Game is 'cruel' and 'hard' on people, 'cause we yell at each 
other and discourage sniveling. But there ain't nothing cruel about Games for someone who's 
lived in East Oakland, or for someone who's been in jail, where half the people are looking to cut 
you and the other half to fuck you (Maher cited in Hampden-Turner 1976: 19). 
Despite Maher's explanations, the paradox surrounding combative-group therapy was the 
main reason for a change in emphasis that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s. 
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Funding 
DSF was established as a private organisation. According to Silbert (1997: 1), the 
decision was made that "We'd start something with no staff or funding, and we'd rely on 
the people who were the problems to become the staff and to make each other's lives 
work". Hence, throughout its history, DSF has displayed a unique ability to feed off 
itself. DSF has never received any state or federal government grants and has instead 
financed itself through numerous business enterprises. The rationale behind remaining 
self-sufficient has been to avoid the restrictions and focus on 'one-issue solutions' that 
accompany funding (Silbert 1997). As Silbert explains, "One of the joys of being an 
unfunded program is that you don't have to gather phony statistics to send to people who 
are funding you, provided you have 98.2 percent success every year" (Silbert 1997: 2). 
By alleviating these pressures the programme has been subsequently able to accept 
whomever they deemed worthy. As Silbert (1997: 2) asserts, 
We didn't take the cream of the crop. Instead, we took the bottom 2 percent of the population. 
Today, as when we started, Delancey Street's population represents every social problem in 
America. Our average resident is violent, has been in a gang, has been in and out of prison a 
number of times, has felony convictions, is illiterate, unskilled, has never worked even at an 
unskilled job for as long as six months, and has no work habits. 
Graduation Process 
DSF has always been based upon a very clear hierarchical structure. In many regards, its 
operation has been almost military in nature. When a resident first arrives he/she is called 
an 'immigrant' and stripped of his/her former status and identity. Maher described this as 
symbolising a new beginning (Hampden-Turner 1976). Each new arrival has their hair 
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cut short and personal items including jewelry and make-up removed. Since its 
introduction, residents of DSF have been allowed only very limited interaction and 
communication with others for the first twelve months. They have been supervised 24-
hours a day and expected to perform janitorial duties including cleaning and gardening 
for at least three months or until they are seen to have "develop[ ed] self-respect and a 
sense of responsibility toward the House" (Jamieson 1991: 307). 
Over time, individuals move up the DSF hierarchy. Gradually they are able to develop 
relationships, firstly on the 'inside' and then on the 'outside'. Many gain employment in 
one of the Foundation's businesses while others become staff members, assisting 
newcomers and helping in the administration of the organisation (Jamieson 1991 ). The 
progression of clients up this hierarchy has always been essential to the functioning of 
DSF, as the Foundation relies heavily on its residents to organise and run the programme. 
Discipline 
Since its inception, DSF has revolved around three cardinal rules: no drugs or alcohol, no 
violence, and no threats of violence. Violation of any of these rules has resulted in instant 
expulsion, no exceptions. The President of DSF has always been ultimately responsible 
for all resident dismissals. According to Silbert (cited in Jamieson 1991: 311), the 
reinforcement of such strict rules has been essential because, "I know I can never allow a 
violent atmosphere to develop, and that begins with threats. I can't bend". Despite the 
necessity of these stringent rules, however, Silbert continues to find it difficult asking an 
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individual to leave, knowing the likelihood may be that they will return to criminal 
behaviour, addiction, prison and even death (Jamieson 1991). 
Along with the three cardinal rules, numerous other in-house rules have also existed. As 
Silbert (cited in Wilentz 1996: 22) describes, "Really, we have millions of rules but only 
three are inviolable". Throughout its history, much of the disciplining that has occurred in 
regards to these less rigid rules has come from the residents themselves. The rationale 
behind resident-led discipline is explained by Frank Schweikert, a former armed robber 
and heroin addict, who is now an assistant to Silbert. He suggests that, "Delancey Street 
makes a commitment to put up with you. But everybody is watching everybody else. 
Unlike, prison, here you're accountable" (cited in Wilentz 1996: 22). Hence, violators of 
rules have their heads shaven and are relegated back to the beginning of the graduation 
process. An example is made of them in order to reinforce the necessity of conforming 
and committing to the Foundation's principles. 
Maher's Decline 
In the early 1980s, John Maher began to drink again. His behaviour became "erratic and 
destructive", and he made inebriated speeches to DSF residents and suggesting that he 
wanted to destroy the Foundation (Wilentz 1996: 20). As a result, Maher was forced to 
resign from DSF in 1984. Greg Silbert, Maher and Silbert's son, describes what happened 
to his father, 
He was extremely intense, and there's a way in which people who function with that level of 
intensity are amazing and captivating, but sometimes frightening. As we got older, you could see 
a frightening side of him become more dominant ... He hated injustice. Eventually, he began to 
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see it everywhere, and took it rather personally ... He saw enemies everywhere ... He saw the 
world against him ... He couldn't manage Delancey Street anymore (Wilentz 1996: 20). 
Following his resignation, Maher returned to the street and lived the rest of his life as an 
addict before dying of a heart attack in 1988 (People Weekly 1998). 
Delancey Street in Recent Times 
Following Maher's resignation in 1984, Silbert took over as President and Chief 
Executive Officer of Delancey Street and remains in these roles today. She is a nationally 
recognised expert in the field of criminal justice and is well known as the 'driving force' 
behind DSF. Silbert continues to put an immense amount of time and energy into DSF. 
She is unreservedly dedicated to the programme. Her personal life is there and she has 
little contact with anyone outside of the Foundation. She dominates every encounter and 
aspect of the programme, including businesses, therapy and education. The almost 
'divine' presence of Silbert within DSF is reminiscent of cult leadership. As one author 
describes, "Walking with Silbert around Delancey Street premises, you feel as if you're 
accompanying a kind of savior. Grown men ... [and] women ... run over to say, "Hi, 
Mimi," in excited, timid teenage voices filled with a mixture of worship and fear" 
(Wilentz 1996: 11). 
Throughout the 1980s, 1990s and into the 21st century, the reputation of DSF has 
continued to expand and the demand for the programme has escalated. As a result, the 
range of facilities and services has been extended to cater for the increased demand. Now 
the Foundation provides for more than 700 residents in institutions in upstate New York, 
Santa Monica, California, North Carolina, and New Mexico, in addition to San Francisco 
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(Karol 1990). The centralised residence in San Francisco Bay has also been further 
developed. Known as the Embarcadero Triangle, it is now a four storey, 350,000 square 
foot complex worth 14 million dollars. It contains 177 apartments which are built above a 
ground floor of restaurants and small shops including shoe repairs, a delicatessen and a 
vegetable market. The facility also includes a recreation area, a computer learning centre 
and several classrooms. Despite all of these extensions, however, DSF is still continually 
forced to turn away a large percentage of potential applicants (Jamieson 1991). 
DSF continues to accommodate a very diverse range of individuals, most of whom have a 
long history of drug addiction and/or incarceration. In fact, the average resident at DSF 
has a ten-year history of drug abuse and has experienced four or more terms of 
imprisonment (Wilentz 1996). Of those referred to the programme, approximately half 
arrive following the completion of a prison term. The remainder of DSF residents come 
either directly from the courts (20 percent) or off the streets in order to avoid problems 
such as drug addiction, prostitution, and/or homelessness (30 percent) (Newbold: 
personal communication). A two-year commitment is still expected of all DSF residents, 
although during the 1990s the average length of stay increased to four years (Silbert 
1997) with most residents staying on for longer than ever previously before "testing the 
real world waters" (Wilentz 1996: 9). 
Organisation and Management 
Today, DSF remains completely self-sufficient. The Foundation continues to be very 
much been based on a system of one member teaching another. The older clients are 
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expected to assist the newcomers and courses within the programme are taught by 
residents. Every resident works and the only individual to get paid is the President. A 
Board of Directors, associate directors, volunteers, and invited experts are also 
responsible for the management ofDSF, although always on a voluntary basis. 
DSF also continues to develop many businesses as a very successful means of supporting 
itself. The first business established, a moving company which emerged as the result of 
the programme donating their services to their local community in Pacific Heights in 
order to alleviate fears that crime would go up and property values down, on its own 
earned two million dollars in 1997 (Silbert 1997: 2). Other businesses that have emerged 
include a gourmet restaurant, print shops and a division of market items emblazoned with 
college logos. All of these ventures have proven extremely profitable. For example in 
1997, business ventures grossed Delancey Street 15 million dollars (People Weekly 
1998). 
A key reason why DSF continues to avoid any external funding is that it does not want to 
be identified as a drug programme. This is because, while residents are very often drug 
addicts, no drug counselling is offered as part of the agenda. As Silbert (cited in Wilentz 
1996: 10) explains, "We are not therapeutic, we do not provide services to our people. 
We have no program model and no medical model". Instead, DSF focuses on developing 
its numerous business enterprises and fostering a work ethic amongst its residents. In the 
words of Silbert (cited in Wilentz 1996: 10), "We work and we expand. We are 
entrepreneurs ... We are immigrants into the American mainstream". 
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Programme Content 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the aspects of programme content that were emphasised 
changed. 'The Game' was rejected due to its combative and often cruel nature and hence 
therapeutically, the focus shifted to interpersonal communication rather than 
confrontation through the involvement of residents in group sessions and daily seminars 
(Silbert 1997). Alternative aspects of the programme, including education, vocational 
training and community service, were also increasingly prioritised and further developed. 
Currently at DSF, there is an emphasis on education. All residents must now receive a 
high school equivalent education before they are able to graduate from the programme 
(Silbert 1997). A range of in-house classes, taken by ex-residents and covering a wide 
range of topics including medicine, arts and technical training, are offered providing 
individuals with the ability to improve their knowledge. Also a compulsory cultural 
education programme has been developed in order to expose individuals to the middle-
class world of museums and theatres. 
DSF provides vocational training schools in order to give residents the opportunity to 
gain work experience. Each resident is trained in three skills: one manual, one clerical 
and one in public service (People Weekly 1998). Residents are given the opportunity to 
run a number of businesses, from car repairs to restaurants, although, as mentioned, they 
earn no wages and instead all earnings are pumped back into the organisation. The aims 
of vocational training include enabling individuals to repay their debt to society and 
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providing them with a means to earn a legitimate income in the community when they 
leave the programme (Jamieson 1991). 
An intensive programme of community service has always been an important part of the 
programme at DSF. It continues to occur in a number of areas including youth drug 
prevention, family counselling and crime prevention. The rationale behind the 
programme's involvement in community work is that it helps Delancey Street to establish 
and sustain validity and credibility in the community (Silbert 1997). This was especially 
important during the early stages of the programme as there was a large amount of public 
opposition. Another purpose is, once again, the repayment of debt to society. 
Effectiveness 
When assessing DSF, it is important to recognise the origins of the information 
promoting the programme's success. No independent, systematic study has ever been 
completed on recidivism at DSF. In fact, Silbert asserts that the main reason for being 
self-sufficient and maintaining independence is to avoid having to be accountable in this 
way to alternative funding sources (Silbert 1997). The information received about DSF, 
therefore, generally comes directly from those in charge of running it. Hence, it is rarely 
mentioned that although the rate of recidivism among DSF graduates is extremely low, a 
high percentage of those admitted leave in the first three months and overall 
approximately 20 percent leave after this, and before they have finished their initial two-
year "commitment" (Wilentz 1996). 
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High rates of defection, especially in the initial stages of involvement, are directly related 
to the rigid structure of the programme. The clearly established authoritarian structure of 
DSF has seen the programme become almost monastic in orientation and cult-like in 
status (Newbold: personal communication). Colleen Costa, a San Francisco parole officer 
who sends about a quarter of her clients to DSF, claims that while she respects the 
programme, she wavers on its overall value. She suggests, 
It's a good program, but it's very strong stuff. Basically, they brainwash you and break you 
down, so unless you have something hanging over your head, like a 1-o-o-o-o-o-n-g prison 
sentence, you're not going to make it ... There are eyes watching you 24 hours a day. That's 
why such a high percentage leaves ... They can't put up with it because it's too stringent ... 
For those who do manage to remain at DSF, the rigorous nature of programme, in many 
regards, inhibits the possibility of high levels of recidivism. According to Costa, "You go 
in and they constantly yell at you, they make you seem like you're nothing, and only 
then, they start to build you up. The image you had ofyourselfbefore, it's gone" (cited in 
Wilentz 1996: 12-13). The conditions, therefore, are so tough they largely restrict the 
possibility of failure. Also for many there are no other alternatives but to complete DSF's 
programme. As Costa explains, "That's one reason Delancey takes only the worst of the 
worst. The worst ones have a reason to succeed there. People with an option ... they 
won't stay" (cited in Wilentz 1996: 13). 
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Consequently, DSF has been able to boast a list of remarkable successes: 
1. By 2001 more than 14,000 former convicts, drug abusers and homeless men and 
women had graduated from the programme (Ascribe Higher Education News 
Service 2001 ). 
2. A number of those who have graduated from DSF have subsequently been 
successful in becoming lawyers, sales people, and policemen and policewomen. In 
fact, according to Silbert, 90 percent of those who have completed DSF's 
programme now lead law-abiding lives (People Weekly 1998). 
3. During its first 19 years of operation there was not one incident of physical violence 
and no arrests (Jamieson 1991).19 
4. According to Silbert ( 1989), the overall retention rate for those who remained in the 
programme for longer than three months hovered at approximately 80 percent 
throughout the 1980s.20 
The harshness of DSF, combined with its resultant successes has led to substantial 
discussion surrounding its methods of criminal rehabilitation. While some commentators 
maintain the programme is too stringent, overall DSF has raised questions in regards to 
the comparative inability of more traditional and 'softer' approaches to reform criminals 
and addicts. These suggestions have been consistent with the "hard line" approach taken 
towards criminal offenders in the United States, especially since the 1990s (see 
Schmalleger 2001, Silverman 2001, Inciardi 1999). In fact, according to Irwin and Austin 
(1994: 1), America has been engaged in an ''unprecedented imprisonment binge" which 
19 These were the most recent statistics available. 
20 These were the most recent statistics available. 
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has seen the prison population increase by 168 percent between 1980 and 1992. As a 
result of this 'just deserts" mentality regarding the treatment of criminal offenders, DSF 
has gained significant support through its rigid approach. For instance, a Solano County 
probation officer, Terry Watkins, asks, "What's wrong with washing all the s--- out of 
your brain? Delancey Street just doesn't feel sorry for anyone" (cited in Wilentz 1996: 
16). 
Reasons for Success 
Despite debate and criticisms surrounding its effectiveness, Delancey Street has 
frequently been acclaimed as one of the most unique and successful residential 
institutions in America. The programme currently caters for over 1000 residents in five 
locations across the U.S and its popularity continues to grow. It has received widespread 
recognition and media attention, both in the U.S.A and internationally. This began with 
the publication of Sane Asylum by Charles Hampton-Turner in 1976, which gained a 
significant readership worldwide, and has continued with numerous other articles and 
publications. DSF drew praise from American Presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan 
and Bill Clinton (People Weekly 1998) and the U.S Department of Justice also made use 
of it as a model for the development of their federal rehabilitation programmes (Jamieson 
1991). Factors offered as being responsible for the overall success of DSF as a 
community-based residential facility include leadership, financial success and programme 
structure. 
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DSF gained a lot of support through the skills of the founders, John Maher and Mimi 
Silbert. As Beals (1978) summed up, they were "the perfect yin and yang combination". 
These two individuals were very highly regarded and the nature of the two, Maher as the 
aggressive ex-addict and Silbert as the intelligent and ambitious academic, were 
complementary. Maher (prior to his relapse) and Silbert have also been completely 
dedicated to the programme and vehemently believe in its ability to reform addicts and 
offenders. This is reflected in Maher's assertion that, "The very contrast between prior 
'fuck-ups' and their present achievements jolts the audience into admiration" (Maher 
cited in Hampden-Turner 1976: 147), and Silbert's declaration, "I absolutely adore my 
life ... For 27 years, I've seen the lowest 10 percent come through the door. But a few 
years later, strong decent human beings walk out" (Silbert cited in People Weekly 1998: 
3). 
As mentioned, a key to DSF's financial success is its numerous business ventures. 
Substantial profits, now in excess of 15 million dollars per year, is why the programme is 
fully self-sufficient. Also, having residents as unpaid staff has meant no payroll and, 
hence, the ability for all profits made by DSF businesses to be placed back into the 
institution. As a result, the programme has flourished and been able to further develop its 
facilities, including the luxury expansion ofDSF's main premises in San Francisco Bay. 
The nature and structure ofDSF's programme has also been advocated as contributing to 
its overall success. As a voluntary organisation, residents choose to attend DSF and are, 
therefore, arguably more motivated to change than those sentenced to residential or non-
75 
residential facilities. In most cases, offenders would rather attend DSF than accept the 
alternative, which in California is primarily a lengthy prison sentence or life without 
parole due to its three strikes laws for repeat felons and especially violent offenders (see 
Silverman 2001, Inciardi 1999). Subsequent to an individual making the decision to 
attend Delancey Street, the programme provides all of the resources and support residents 
require in order to successfully achieve change (Silbert 1997). This incorporates not only 
therapeutic measures but also a focus on more practical skills such as education, work 
and vocational training. Through targeting these aspects residents are able to gain work 
experience and the possibility of financial security once they graduate. This in tum helps 
self-esteem because often, for the first time, residents have acquired skills that they can 
use out in the community. 
Conclusion 
The 'halfway house' is not a recent development in community corrections. These 
community-based facilities have existed for criminal offenders for over 200 years. 
Throughout this time, they have evolved according to a range of differing ideas and 
philosophies ensuring that great variation has always existed between halfway houses and 
their accompanying programmes. As a result of this immense diversity, it has been 
difficult to succinctly define what a 'halfway house' is, or clearly establish their functions 
and overall effectiveness. The overriding rationale upon which halfway houses are based, 
however, remains largely the same. These factors, comparable to those of other 
community-based alternatives, include a recognition of the role of the community in the 
production and resolution of crime, an aim to bridge the gap between incarceration and 
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open society) and a need to overcome the ineffectual nature of the prison. It was in light 
of these principles that programmes such as Synanon and DSF were able to develop and 
due to the flexibility the title 'halfway house' offered they were able to employ their own 
unique, and often unorthodox, approaches. 
While the unconventional nature of DSF has generated both immense support and strong 
criticism amongst commentators, its overall success is difficult to measure conclusively. 
As suggested, this is because it has always been very insular and, hence, no independent 
research has been undertaken. Despite this, DSF's influence as a community-based 
facility cannot be dismissed. The programme has thrived and expanded significantly over 
the past 30 years, evolving in conjunction with current trends and philosophies 
surrounding the treatment of criminal offenders. Today, DSF continues to flourish. It 
remains fully self-sufficient and for those who manage to stay in the programme long-
term, future prospects generally appear positive. It has prompted the development of 
numerous facilities worldwide, including SSF, and based on its current popularity, DSF 
looks certain to maintain its influence in the near future. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SSF History - The Pre-habilitation Centre Phase 
Introduction 
The history of the Salisbury Street Foundation can be separated into two distinct periods: 
pre-habilitation centre and habilitation centre. This chapter deals with the former of the 
two, which extends from SSF's inception in 1979 up until preparation began towards its 
establishment as a habilitation centre in 1995. During this time, SSF' s programme 
developed through four significant phases. The first was an introductory or ad hoc phase, 
when, between 1979 and 1980, the programme worked to establish itself. From 1981 to 
1985, the second phase occurred, which focused on changing offenders' criminal 
propensities through psychotherapy. The third phase ( 1986-1989) was centred on 
encounter recreation and enhancing self-esteem through challenging recreational 
situations. Finally, during the fourth phase ( 1990-1995), the programme incurred 
numerous changes and developed a broader and more comprehensive overall approach. 
Throughout discussion on SSF's pre-habilitation centre history, a focus on five main 
areas of interest will be maintained. These are (1) the personality of each programme 
director and the influence he/she had on the running of the programme; (2) operational 
philosophies and strategies; (3) the role of the Board of Trustees; (4) the effect of 
legislative changes; and (5) the impact of critical events and incidents. Each of these 
aspects is crucial to understanding SSF's past and reasons behind the directions it took, as 
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well as leading into discussion on issues of rehabilitation, and the organisation and 
management of not-for-profit organisations. 
PHASE ONE: 1979-1980 
Inception of SSF 
Early in 1979, David Hall, an inmate serving time at Christchurch Prison (locally known 
as Paparua Prison) read a copy of Sane Asylum (1976), the book Charles Hampden-
Turner had written about the Delancey Street Foundation in San Francisco, California. 
Intrigued by the American programme and believing there was value in its approach 
towards ex-prisoners and former addicts, Hall passed the book on to a fellow inmate, 
Robert Armstrong, who subsequently agreed with his view. The two prisoners realised 
that there was very little support in New Zealand for offenders following their release 
from prison. In fact, one of the facilities that had been available in Christchurch, the 
Prisoners' Aid and Rehabilitation Society (PARS) hostel, had just closed after allegations 
of embezzlement of PARS funds by an official within the organisation. To Hall and 
Armstrong, therefore, the implementation of a programme similar to DSF in Christchurch 
seemed a logical alternative that would be able to provide help to those wanting to make 
a change in their lives. 
David Hall was responsible for taking the first step towards establishing a facility similar 
to DSF. He approached Dave Robinson, a Christchurch probation officer and 
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psychologist who was counselling inmates at Paparua Prison, with the idea. In the words 
of Robinson, 
There was a guy called David Hall, who was on the debating team, and he came up to me ... and 
said about setting something up for 'us' for when we get out of prison ... He said I think you 
better come out on your own to the prison 'cause there are a couple of guys I'd like you to talk 
to. So a couple of days later I met Robert Armstrong who had this article about Delancey Street 
in San Francisco ... and [eventually] I said to these guys I will help you establish a programme. 
Robinson's agreement to help the inmates establish a post-release facility occurred 
despite early misgivings about the ability for a programme with such extreme methods to 
be successful in New Zealand. Robinson, who was originally from Canada, was skeptical 
about whether New Zealanders would be receptive to the idea. As Robinson explains, 
"We were pushing the envelope. We were asking people to do some major paradigm 
shifts in their heads and it took a while to convince New Zealanders who were by and 
large conservative and didn't change their views easily". Another concern Robinson had 
related to the mindset of prospective clients. His opinion was that, ''New Zealanders are 
not cut from the same fabric (as Americans). In those days all New Zealanders had been 
brought up under the welfare system and they actually believed that somebody owed 
them something". This worried Robinson because he feared it would be difficult to 
promote DSF's values of self-help and self-reliance if the majority of those who were 
going to be involved ''were still playing the major victim". 
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Along with Robinson, another probation officer and a colleague from the Department of 
Justice21 became involved in investigating further the possibility of setting up a 
programme similar to DSF in Christchurch. They organised a meeting at Paparua Prison, 
which ascertained that inmates were interested in the idea. Subsequently, a series of 
groups were established with inmates in the prison. These groups helped in the 
development of a rationale for the ensuing organisation, which was to remain similar to 
DSF but be adapted to New Zealand conditions. The initiators then gained support from 
the Department of Justice which viewed the prospective facility as innovative and 
potentially beneficial to the after-care of ex-prisoners. 
New Zealand's Legal Structure 
At the time of SSF's inception, criminal justice in New Zealand was largely structured 
around the Criminal Justice Act 1954, its subsequent amendments, and accompanying 
legislation. Prior to the introduction of SSF in 1979, the most recent legislative changes 
had been implemented in the Criminal Justice Amendment Act 1975. Under this Act, 
one-third remission was established as standard for all minimum-security prisoners. 
Parole eligibility at half sentence was made available to those serving five years 
imprisonment or more with parole after three and a half years for all fmite sentences of 
seven years or longer (Webb 1982). The non-parole period for those serving sentences of 
life or preventive detention was cut from ten to seven years (Newbold and Eskridge, 
forthcoming 2003). 
21 Names unknown 
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Legislatively, provisions for community-based sentences were expanded in New Zealand 
during the 1970s and into the early 1980s. As discussed in chapter two, probation 
continued as a crucial aspect of after-care, home leave requirements were relaxed and 
work parole extended. Periodic detention was also developed, although due to rising costs 
the sentence was restricted to daytime attendance by the late 1970s. fu 1980, community 
service was introduced. This sentence, deemed to be less punitive than periodic detention, 
required an offender to do voluntary work in the community, according to a timetable 
established by the Justice Department. Amongst the legislative conditions of these 
sentences, however, no real provisions existed for community-based programmes. At this 
time, these facilities existed outside of New Zealand's criminal justice system as non-
profit facilities, and were therefore responsible for their own management and 
administration, including the acquisition of funding and clientele. 
The Early Programme 
After months of preparation and planning, the Salisbury Street Foundation was 
established in Salisbury Street, Christchurch, in October 1979. The initial facility was 
situated in a four-bedroom house leased from the Methodist Mission. Robinson describes 
the developments which led to the emergence of SSF: 
I spent a lot of time with him [David Hall]. I used to go out to the prison once or twice a week 
and we'd sit and talk. When he got out of prison initially he came and stayed with me, at my 
house, and we began the process. We talked to probation officers and we gradually put together 
this concept and we got the Methodist Mission behind us. They gave us our initial house on 
Salisbury Street, which is why we called it the Salisbury Street Foundation. We gradually started 
to put it together. 
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Establishing a Board of Trustees 
Once SSF had been initiated it was essential that the programme established a Board of 
Trustees (BOT). In 1979, under the provisions of the Charitable Trusts Act 1957, the 
Salisbury Street Foundation Trust was created. The Charitable Trusts Act set out the role 
and functions of a BOT and regulations for its operation. It defined a BOT as consisting 
of no more than twelve members and no fewer than three. Board membership was 
deemed to be open to any person interested in the Board's objectives and capable of 
assisting the Board in carrying these out through their "skills, knowledge, expertise, 
profession, standing in the community or other qualification".22 Some of these key 
objectives were defined in SSF's constitution as being: 
1. "To provide a rehabilitation scheme for prison inmates, discharged prison inmates, 
drug addicts and other individuals who have experienced institutions, hospitals, 
treatment programmes and been involved with statutory Government and voluntary 
agencies, so that such individuals might both individually and collectively develop 
in the community''. 
2. To carry out services that are beneficial to the community including relief of 
poverty, advancement of education, vocational training, employment, recreation, 
accommodation and social welfare. 
3. "To seek, accept and receive donations, subsidies, grants, endowments, gifts, 
legacies, loans and bequests either in money or in kind". 
22 Charitable Trusts Act, 1957 
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4. To have the general power to enter into any arrangements with any Government or 
authorities, supreme, municipal, local or otherwise that may seem conducive to the 
Board's objectives.23 
The specific functions instituted under the Charitable Trusts Act were revised and further 
developed by those involved at SSF. It was understood that the BOT would involve a 
group of about five individuals. Initially, their primary role was to "sort out [SSF's] own 
philosophy so that it works as one with trust and understanding".24 The goals set out by 
the Board for SSF were to be in full operation by March 1981. It was believed that by 
doing this, the BOT would ensure that "the overall concept [of SSF] is maintained and 
the rights of the individual are upheld".25 
SSF's BOT was established with a dual role. This incorporated: (1) being a close overseer 
of financial matters; and (2) generating and maintaining a creative therapeutic 
community. Financially, the Board was deemed responsible for considering various 
monetary grants and making sure that maximum use was made of these funds while 
remaining conducive to the aims of SSF. It was suggested that the BOT work out a 
careful plan/programme for the use of funds, in such a way as to increase the income of 
the Foundation. In relation to the second role, it was decided that the Board should have 
the final word regarding the advisability and acceptance of a programme or a client. In 
doing this, however, it was essential that every decision was negotiated fully and retained 
23 SSF Constitution, 1979 
24 BOT Document: Role of SSF Board, 1979 
251bid. 
84 
flexibility. There was also a desire for the BOT to increase its visibility with residents by 
playing a more active and participatory role in the programme. Finally, in regards to the 
future direction of SSF, the Board was expected to be innovative and instrumental in 
introducing new initiatives. For example, it was envisaged that by the end of 1980 SSF 
would be publishing a monthly paper.26 
Aims and objectives 
SSF, like DSF, was set up as a therapeutic community. Its explicit goal was to rehabilitate 
the ex-offenders who attended the programme and help them to reestablish themselves in 
the community. An idealism surrounded SSF with the programme's initiator, Dave 
Robinson, hoping that residents would develop their own programme based on their 
individual needs. Therefore, as time went on, few external structures would be required. 
Robinson believed that the project would follow DSF and become fully self-sufficient. As 
he explains, "It was my hope, my dream, but it was of course going to be taken over and 
run by ex-prisoners themselves". 
An early promotional pamphlet (1979) clearly set out the aims and objectives of SSF: 
Salisbury Street Foundation is a place for people who've been in prison. 
But it's more than just a "half-way" house. It's more than just a place to stay. We expect those 
who join us to make a commitment to us and to our programme. The minimum stay is three 
months. 
We think our programme is a good one. Its aim is to give ex-inmates a real foundation for a 
prison-free future. Lots of people- probation officers, social workers and the like- are involved. 
26 BOT Document: Role of SSF Board, 1979 
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But the real basis of Salisbury Street is the group -those who have been inside. 
We try and consider the whole person and his place in the community ... 
FINALLY, THOUGH, WE ARE ON ABOUT HELPING EACH OTHER TO CHANGE OUR 
OWN LIVES to get out of the prison cycle ... 
We also know that part of the problem is in us, so we have regular "encounter" groups to help 
us understand who we are and how we've got to where we are ... We don't want to pretend 
life at Salisbury Street is all a bed of roses ... 
We haven't got all of the answers, but we're making a start, and we're doing it together ... 
If you're inside and interested in Salisbury Street we want to hear from you ... 
Drop us a line. We'll be in touch. 
Programme Structure 
During its first year, a weekly schedule existed for those residing at 237 Salisbury Street. 
Work was a central feature of this routine. As Anni Brown, an early resident of SSF 
explains, the programme had "a little bit of structure but looking at a work scheme, 
getting people out to work, because it was difficult for people getting out of prison to get 
jobs". Every resident was expected to work at the house Monday to Friday from lOam-
12pm and 1 - 4pm, with set tasks being set out for each day. These were: Monday and 
Tuesday- maintaining SSF's grounds; Wednesday- a compulsory hobby day; Thursday-
volunteer work, either for the Methodist Mission or another organisation; and Friday -
individual programmes including educational and vocational training. Group 
therapy/individual counselling sessions also occurred on a frequent basis including an 
obligatory Thursday night group. Attendance at all groups, work and hobbies was 
compulsory. 27 
27 During the weekend a range of different activities were organised by the residents. 
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Initially, attendance at SSF was voluntary. There were a variety of reasons why 
individuals chose to go there. For some it was a way of avoiding jail or keeping away 
from further trouble, while for others it was a means of accessing work. As Ken Turner, a 
resident at the time explains, "back then for me and for a lot of members then the 
alternative was help up either go and do this programme or [end up in] jail and so of 
course you're going to go there". Anni Brown also had a multitude of reasons for wanting 
to attend SSF. She recalls, 
I got into some trouble. My partner robbed a bank and went to jail for seven years and I was in a 
really volatile situation. I was a junkie ... and my probation officer was actually Dave Robinson 
and he suggested to me I was on my way to jail ... I had a daughter who was six and I was on 
the verge of losing her so I applied to go, well just asked Dave really, if I could go to SSF. 
Once involved in the programme, residents were assessed monthly by their peers and the 
BOT. Then at the end of three months it was decided whether a resident was ready to 
leave the Foundation. At this point, their options were to stay at 23 7 Salisbury Street and 
renegotiate their contract, or to leave the programme while potentially maintaining 
contact through becoming a link person for an individual starting at SSF. 
Early Problems 
Within its first year of operation conditions at the Foundation deteriorated quickly. 
Residents, who had initially been enthusiastic, soon got bored and lost motivation to 
remain at SSF and because attendance was voluntary they were not compelled to stay. As 
well as this, involvement in criminal activity continued frequently to occur. Reasons for 
these difficulties were twofold. The first factor was due to the location of the Foundation. 
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It was situated in the inner city, the "old stomping grounds" for many SSF residents 
(Jamieson 1991: 47), and hence the temptations of their former lives continued. This 
situation was accentuated by the fact that the organisation was located between two pubs 
and consequently residents ended up spending a lot of time drinking in bars with old 
associates. 
The second aspect was that administratively, SSF was still young and undeveloped and 
hence few formal rules and little structure existed. In fact, during its early period, while 
SSF had experimented with a wide variety of freedoms and lifestyles, rules and 
regulations were generally avoided. According to Brown, "We were all living together 
with no actual structure, no rules as such. There were no rules like no alcohol and 
offences, or no drugs or no offending. It was just respect each other and there was an 
assumption that people would automatically do that". The lack of rules, however, proved 
extremely problematic. Many of the residents simply did not have the skills to manage 
themselves in an unregulated environment. For instance, the first trial releasee to arrive at 
the Foundation had a serious drug problem and the unstructured programme was highly 
unsuited to his needs. As a result, SSF became criticised as ineffective and as "an 
opportunity to get something for nothing" (Jamieson 1991: 47). In response to this and in 
keeping with the goal of fostering self-responsibility, some suspensions were introduced 
for limited periods. 
Along with disciplinary problems, early ambitions to become self-sufficient were not 
realised. Residents often struggled to settle into a work routine, which was especially true 
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for those who had spent long periods in prison, where dependency and a lack of 
motivation were common. Attempts to run small businesses, utilising the skills of 
residents, therefore, proved both impractical and unsuccessful. In fact, according to the 
First Annual Report (1979-1980), "Job creation schemes left a lot to be desired". The 
Ball and Chain shop, for example, conceived as an SSF outlet for prisoners' arts and 
crafts, closed without achieving any significant losses or gains after only three months in 
operation. This was the result of a variety of factors but most significant was the 
influence of new government legislation aimed at controlling the flow of drugs into 
prisons. By restricting the flow of goods to and from prison, the legislation limited a 
prisoner's ability to access the materials needed to make arts and crafts, and hence the 
shop could not secure enough items to sell. The most successful early project was Strand 
Promotions, an agency which booked bands for hotels. This business, however, became 
independent, thus removing it as a revenue earner for SSF. 
In addition to all of the other difficulties being faced by SSF, on the second of July 1980, 
David Hall's employment was officially terminated from the T .E.P scheme, 28 the Board 
and the Foundation. This occurred following a series of BOT discussions and letters to 
Hall, warning him that he was breaching the terms and conditions of his employment. 
Concerns had emerged relating to both financial mismanagement and inadequate 
supervision of the T.E.P scheme. The BOT initially suspended him on the 19 February 
1980 from all powers as a member of the BOT29 and as coordinator of SSF, pending a 
28 This Training and Employment Programme (T.E.P) was a scheme which had been developed by the 
Labour Department and was being run as part of the programme at SSF. 
29 Under section 2( e )ii of Appendix B of the Constitution. 
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satisfactory explanation of "financial anomalies and recompense thereof'.3° Failure to 
resolve these issues, however, resulted in a written notice of non-compliance and finally 
the termination of his employment and involvement with SSF, the programme he had 
helped create?1 
Programme Review 
So SSF's first year of operation was characterised by numerous difficulties. According to 
Murray Cree, one of the early programme administrators at SSF, "The first full year of 
operation has been one of insight and experience ... we have made numerous mistakes in 
the early stages . . . Essentially the problems were caused by inexperience in 
administration". 32 The areas considered to require the most revision at the end of 1980 
were the rules and regulations present within the organisation. It was decided that a new 
set of rules were to be drafted and debated after Christmas, including gaining feedback 
from prospective clients still in prison to ensure sustained commitment despite tight codes 
of behaviour. Total abstinence from alcohol and drugs was deemed the most essential of 
the new rules. This followed the suspension of a resident for three months due to his 
addiction issues and ongoing concern for the remaining three residents who each had an 
incipient alcohol problem. Also there was an increasing recognition that future members 
were likely to have extensive histories of substance abuse as well. Another rule to be 
implemented was a ban on all personal off-premises use of marijuana because "too many 
30 BOT Meeting 19/2/1980 
31 Specific details relating to Hall's termination are sparse because, as it occurred over 20 years ago, both 
the records available and the recollection of the event by those interviewed was limited. 
32 First Annual Report 1979-1980 
90 
'street (crims)', known to be active, were frequenting Salisbury Street".33 It was further 
discussed that SSF should consider closing for a month if conduct remained unacceptable. 
PHASE TWO: 1981-1985 
Closure and Relocation in Merivale 
In spite of the Board's resolutions, the difficulties faced by SSF during its first year of 
operation continued into the 1980s. As a result, in 1981, the organisation was forced to 
close. According to Jamieson (1991: 47), the programme had become "little more than a 
prop for its unmotivated clients". Many of the residents were still heavily involved in 
criminal activity, the house was full of stolen property, and equipment was disappearing 
from SSF as well. 
Several months later, after undergoing a significant review, SSF was relocated and 
reopened. The new facility, a former Christchurch periodic detention centre that had the 
ability to house 12 residents, was rented from the Department of Justice at a very low 
rate. It was situated in St Albans Street, Merivale, an environment which was 
significantly different to the inner city where involvement in criminal activity by 
residents had been common. Instead, Merivale was a quiet, upper-class neighbourhood 
situated away from the centre of town. SSF's new location imitated DSF and Maher's 
rationale behind locating the programme in one of the most prestigious areas of San 
Francisco, Pacific Heights. He had declared: 
33 BOT Meeting 23/12/1980. 
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All social problems should move to where the rich people live - that way the problems can 
receive attention from the sector which has most control over the system that produced them ... 
You can no more cure an addict or criminal in slum than you could cure an alcoholic in bar 
(Maher cited in Hampden-Turner 1976: 62-63). 
Those working at SSF also believed it was important to move the residents away from 
their former associates in order to enable them to develop greater connections with the 
values, attitudes and skills of 'anti-criminal' groups. 
Programme Goals and Structure 
Once resituated, a major objective for those involved within SSF's administration was to 
significantly revise the aims and structure of the programme. Four key Foundation goals 
were decided upon?4 These were: 
1. To promote the individual well-being of members through self-awareness, group 
consciousness, and vocational and social skills. 
2. To create a 'therapeutic' community based on the peer group and principles 
associated with it. 
3. To create an independent financial base providing employment and income to 
members and the Foundation. 
4. To promote awareness of the criminal justice system and the need for alternatives, 
to make submissions relating to some, to promote awareness of the Foundation and 
its activities generally. 
Each of these factors was deemed crucial to the continuation and expansion of SSF and 
so each point needs to be considered in-depth separately. 
34 SSF Programme Outline 1981 
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The philosophy of self-help 
Links to the programme at DSF were maintained, with the principle of self-help 
remaining central to SSF' s philosophy. The development of skills such as personal 
responsibility and self-reliance were considered essential as many involved in the 
programme had never been equipped with these qualities. As Murray Cree stated in the 
Second Annual Report, "Rehabilitation is the wrong word for the Foundation because it 
helps people who have never been habilitated in the first place".35 
In order to further promote the principle of self-help, residents were encouraged to 
continue being involved in the day-to-day running of the organisation. According to a 
SSF brochure, "For the Foundation to operate, it is essential that participants become 
responsible for its development as well as their own . . . The household is run by the 
residents ... People living in the house need to develop a sense ofresponsibility".36 All 
residents were expected to attend weekly House Meetings, where house-related matters 
were discussed. It was believed that the strength of SSF' s programme relied heavily on 
resident's involvement in the programme and that the role of positions, such as House 
Manager, carried with them both status and accountability. House Managers, who in the 
early 1980s included Graham McFelin, Kevin Butson, and Judi Peterson, were expected 
to lead residents and support programme administrators by helping organise house 
activities and through reinforcing programme goals and rules. 
35 Second Annual Report 1980-1981: 4 
36 SSF Informational Brochure 1982: 2 
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The development of self-help among residents was considered crucial if the overriding 
programme goals of personal change and reintegration were to occur. As SSF 
administrators stated, 
A person coming out of jail is usually delighted to be out, but is often short of money, confused, 
anxious or angry, unwanted and not liked. When the ex-prisoner has come to realise that his or 
her only real options in life are further crime, suicide or change, and chooses to change, that is 
where S.S.F. can help. We recognise the most difficult choice is change! The aim of our 
programme is to provide a supportive atmosphere where it is possible to relax and to experience 
personal growth. The goal is for the ex-prisoner to build a future without drugs, crime or 
prison.37 
Therefore, each resident was expected to be instrumental in bringing about change in 
their own lives. As Dave Robinson told one newspaper in 1981, "He must change his 
attitudes to himself, his peers, his family and society; rethink and re-evaluate" (Jackson 
1981). 
SSF encouraged the progresston of residents towards personal change by offering 
maximum support and a range of resources to all involved in the programme. This 
included providing a safe environment, where rules existed and were strictly adhered to. 
Each newcomer to SSF was required to sign an agreement to abide by the rules of the 
programme. The main rules were no criminal activity, drugs and/or alcohol, and no sex or 
violence between residents, for the duration of the programme.38 Failure to obey these 
basic house rules could result in instant dismissal. Support was also maintained through a 
clearly structured weekly programme comprising of therapy groups (up to 18 hours per 
37 SSF Informational Brochure 1982: emphasis in original 
38 SSF Informational Brochure 1982 
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week), work, community work, recreation, the learning of social skills, self assessment 
groups, educational and vocational training, plus free time for individual interests and 
hobbies. 
A minimum commitment of three months was retained for all who joined the programme. 
SSF administrators believed, however, that at least two years was needed to "build a 
positive, responsible, confident and self-sustaining lifestyle".39 Hence, it was discussed 
that SSF would ideally become a two-year programme and by 1984 a two-year contract 
had been developed. The guidelines for those wishing to graduate therefore ranged from a 
normal two-year residence, a two-year residence plus conditions, or a residence of less 
than two years but with a qualifying performance. 
Family was also considered essential in advancing change and promoting the 
reintegration of residents back into the community. Administrators believed that by 
focusing on 'family', residents would become aware of the gaps in their childhood and 
family experiences, enabling them to alter their own family life accordingly. All involved 
within SSF were expected to function as a family, providing initial support, so that each 
resident would gradually and systematically take full responsibility for himself/herself 
and his/her actions. As a result of the desire to create a family environment, women were 
allowed to join the programme from 1982. According to SSP's Annual Report (1981-82), 
women brought "with them a natural and healthy balance to the house and its activities. 
No longer need we fear the dread prison image- of the abnormal, single sex institution". 
39 SSF Informational Brochure 1982 
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Once women became involved in the programme, children were also included so they 
were able to stay with their parentis. 
Psychotherapy 
Between 1981 and 1985, psychotherapy dominated the programme at SSF. The 
organisation defined itself primarily as a therapeutic programme which focused on a 
"total reorganisation of an individuals values, attitudes, psychological and behavioural 
patterns and generallifestyle".40 The rationale behind this was that most of those entering 
the programme came from dysfunctional families and poor social backgrounds, had 
extensive criminal histories and prison records, were substance abusers and generally had 
"immense difficulties in dealing with life issues that many people in the society take for 
granted".41 Hence, it was believed that residents needed to gain insight into the impact 
that past experiences and familial dysfunction had had on their development and 
progression towards criminal behaviour. It was only by acknowledging the influence of 
these early experiences that the reformation of an individual's 'criminal personality' 
could occur. As Geoff Samuels, a psychologist at SSF at this time, explains, 
You see these people had been through some pretty traumatic life situations and hopefully 
(through psychotherapy) they were going to be able to deal with those and make a real difference 
in their lives, and hopefully they were going to be able to have some good experiences and be 
secure with us, the Salisbury Street Foundation, to gain new experiences. 
The rationale behind the dominance of a psychotherapeutic programme was centered on 
the belief that a criminal personality existed and was able to be 'cured' through a course 
40 SSF Background Paper, Dave Robinson 1984 
41 Ibid. 
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of therapy. One informational brochure about SSF (1983) described the significance of 
this criminal personality, 
Living in the criminal world, inside and outside of prison, has as very deep effect on the 
personality. There are rhythms, patterns and habits that make up a typical criminal personality. 
The criminal may be quite unaware of this because of the lack of understanding of the world 
outside of this environment ... The personality change that is required, for our experience, takes 
a lot of hard work. We realise that giving up a way of life with its own friends and language is 
nothing short of a culture shock . . . It is because we recognise the deep-seated nature of the 
criminal personality, that we have organised a tight programme and we stick firmly to our values 
and rules. It is also why we have an intensive programme of therapy available. 
Within this psychotherapeutic model, group therapy was viewed as the most pivotal form 
of counselling.42 Once again this followed DSF and the emphasis the programme had 
placed on the therapeutic benefits of group sessions. According to Robinson, group 
therapy involved a mixture of "yelling, and holding people's hands -going in with hob-
nailed boots and a handkerchief' (cited in Jackson 1981). The value of a group, over an 
individual, approach to counselling was summarised into five main categories. These 
were: (1) exploring thoughts, feelings and actions, to pinpoint and solve problems; (2) 
making clear decisions to carry out new plans and to get support in sticking to them; (3) 
learning and trying out new skills such as being assertive, showing anger, accepting love, 
understanding others, and being open and honest; ( 4) learning how others see you; and 
(5) looking into childhood origins of repeated offending, lack of confidence, 
destructiveness. The therapists at SSF, however, also used the group environment for 
other purposes. As Geoff Samuels explains, 
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We really aimed to bring staunch people from prison and make them accountable. We really 
wanted to shake up the transition back into the community ... So we were really encouraged that 
we could bring issues to the group and challenge people's whole attitude ... (Also) it was very 
much part of the group, having several members who'd been through different psychotherapeutic 
experiences and who were willing to challenge others ... Having people who knew both sides, 
who could bring out material and who were from the same kind of lifestyle made it easier. 
During the early-to-mid-1980s, a range of group therapy sessions was held, the most 
prominent of which occurred each week on a Thursday evening. This general therapy 
group was compulsory for all residents, with some 'outsiders' being included as well. 
Other groups and experimental courses held at SSF included psychodramas, assertion and 
social skills courses, and classes in sexuality, spontaneity, and movement.43 In 1982, 
following the lead ofDSF and its 'marathon Games' (see chapter three), the first 12 hour 
marathon therapy group was held at SSF. The exercise was deemed "profitable" because 
it introduced "a whole new view to a range of personal attitudes and experiences"44 and 
subsequently, in 1983, SSF developed these longer group therapy sessions as a tool in 
much the same way as DSF had done. 
Group sessions at SSF were generally run by two qualified therapists; Probation Officer, 
Dave Robinson and Psychologist, Geoff Samuels. As well as being therapists, these men 
were also heavily involved in other aspects of programme, including being members of 
the BOT. Their overall input with regards to the programme content and focus on the 
42 Fifth Annual Report 1983-84: 2 
43 Ibid. 
44 Third Annual Report 1981-1982: 2 
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therapeutic component was, therefore, significant. In fact, their influence was recognised 
in the Third Annual Report, which stated "[Dave and Geoff] have put a lot of personal 
effort into the therapy side of the programme on top of their valuable work as Trustees".45 
As well as the qualified therapists, residents such as Graham McFelin, Ken Turner and 
Kevin Butson, were also recognised as playing an important therapy role in evening 
groups. As well as group therapy, individual therapy was provided, if requested, and was 
generally carried out by Justice Department psychologists. 
Management: Board of Trustees 
The Board's initial objectives were maintained and additional functions developed. 
Overall, these goals included: 
1. To supervise, approve, and promote activities and programmes within the 
Foundation. 
2. To oversee financial affairs. 
3. To provide assistance as individuals to the Foundation according to their skills and 
connections. . 
4. Generally, to advance the Foundation's goals. 
As mentioned, between 1981 and 1985, the focus was strongly on developing the 
administrative structure of the programme, which had been the cause of many of the 
programme's early difficulties. The Board created three sub-committees that were to 
improve specific areas of the programme. These were an administration sub-committee, a 
programme sub-committee and a public relations sub-committee. The role of the 
administration sub-committee was to create and maintain viable administrative 
45 Third Annual Report 1981-1982: 2 
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procedures and to promote external support for the organisation. The programme sub-
committee was expected to create and maintain the "therapeutic" programme and ensure 
its effectiveness. And the public relations sub-committee's role was to ensure that the 
aims ofSSF were promoted to the community.46 
During the early 1980s, the Board of Trustees met at SSF weekly, although this shifted to 
a monthly meeting in 1984. Throughout this time, the Board comprised a combination of 
professionals, including several with prison experience, and residents, both former and 
current. Board meetings were promoted primarily as giving residents a chance to watch 
how the organisation was managed. The purpose of this was related to the desire 
Robinson and others had for SSF to follow DSF and become self-sufficient. Robinson 
believed that he and his colleagues would only remain involved with the organisation 
until its basic administrative structures were established and then they would be able to 
leave the programme to be operated by its residents. The ultimate aim was still for ex-
residents to graduate into positions of responsibility within SSF and to be solely 
responsible for the organisation and management of the programme. 
Funding: Social Rehabilitation Subsidy Programme 
Ensuring SSF had sufficient funding to survive was a constant concern as the programme 
worked to establish itself during the early to mid-1980s. The initial setting up costs for 
the organisation in 1979-80 had been met by a $14,000 grant from Internal Affairs. 
Subsequent to this, any grants available to residential programmes such as SSF were 
continually being studied. SSF administrators often found themselves held back by Inland 
46 SSF Programme Outline 1981 
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Revenue Department (IRD) regulations when attempting to obtain tax-deductible 
donations from firms and large corporations. Some small grants of less than $1,000 were 
received from the Christchurch City Council, the Trustee Savings Bank, and a few other 
small trusts and individuals. The most significant financial contribution, however, came 
late in 198l when the Social Rehabilitation Subsidy Programme (SRSP)47 was 
introduced. 48 
The SRSP, introduced by the Department of Social Welfare, came into effect on the 1st 
October 1981. It was available to incorporated societies and charitable trusts, which 
provided "a proven rehabilitation programme for a fmite period in a residential setting", 
with a treatment period of between three months and two years.49 The intended purpose 
of this subsidy was summarised as being to, 
Assist voluntary welfare organisations offering a programme of special care or treatment (not 
necessarily medical) in a residential setting to persons with addiction problems, emotional or 
psychiatric disorders, histories of repeated offending or related difficulties. The programme 
offered must seek to rehabilitate persons who could otherwise become dependent on Government 
support and assistance, so that they can cope adequately in the community. 5° 
The SRSP was designed to provide additional relief, in conjunction with existing 
voluntary and community contributions, for programmes experiencing financial 
difficulties or operating at a substantial loss. The amount of funding available was a 
maximum of $25 per week for each person involved in the programme and payment was 
47 SRSP: Guidelines for Voluntary Agencies 1981 
48 The SRSP continued to fund SSF throughout the majority of its pre-habilitation centre phase. 
49 SRSP: Guidelines for Voluntary Agencies 1981 
50 Ibid. 
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made by way of a single yearly grant applied for annually. In 1982, SSF, which had been 
taken as a model structure for the SRSP, received the maximum amount of $15,000. 
Administrators at SSF regarded this scheme for ex-prisoners as a policy breakthrough. It 
increased funding opportunities for SSF, which along with existing sources, 51 enabled the 
programme's financial position to slowly improve through the early to mid-1980s. 
During this time, the level of income versus expenditure was comparable, with only a 
small amount of surplus being left at the end of each financial year. 
Community networks 
For those involved with SSF, another important component of the programme was 
establishing and maintaining community networks. This included promoting in the 
community a general awareness of the failures of the current criminal justice system and 
the need for community-based alternatives. In fact, for SSF, public education was a key 
part of the programme's weekly community work. Programme administrators and 
residents were determined to challenge the structures and officials who they contended 
continued to endorse prisons and deny prisoners their "rights" by "treating them as 
second class citizens".52 This was achieved through letters being written to newspapers 
and officials, and in the general promotion of SSF and its philosophies, which reinforced 
the belief that prisons do not rehabilitate offenders. According to Robinson, this was 
because, "Crime is a community problem and the solution must eventually be found in 
the community, too" (cited in Jackson 1981). Therefore, members of SSF argued that 
51 Another major funding source came from the unemployment benefits of SSF resident's, which, apart 
from a small amount given back to residents for spending, when into the communal programme funds. 
52 SSF Archival material1984 
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since, ''the causes of crime are largely social and cultural in origin it is imperative that ex 
prison inmates have residential facilities which divert them away from the site of 
resistance".53 They continued to state that, "We believe very strongly that social policy 
measures, a higher level of police surveillance and longer prison sentences, are not going 
to arrest the rising level of crime". 54 
As well as providing a general awareness of New Zealand's correctional environment, 
maintaining a strong, positive community image of SSF was emphasised. 55 The 
importance of having a good image in the wider community was to show outsiders that 
residents at SSF were serious about successfully re-entering the community and to make 
those involved in the programme feel like ''we have earned our way".56 A key feature of 
this was weekly community meal nights held at SSF,57 which had operated since the 
programme commenced and continued as a successful contact point between SSF and 
interested guests or groups. As one SSF brochure described, "People learn by experience 
and so we invite people to experience aspects of the Foundation and its growth process by 
joining our weekly community meal night''.58 As well as these meal nights, visits were 
made to churches, service clubs and fellowships in order to explain the paradox of prison 
and promote SSF. The Foundation also worked to maintain close links to the Probation 
53 SSF Archival material1984 
54 Ibid. 
55 Second Annual Report 1980-1981 
56 Fourth Annual Report 1982-1983:5 
57 Currently, in 2002, these meal nights continue to be an important aspect of the programme at SSF. 
58 SSF Brochure 1982 
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Service, the Prisoners' Aid and Rehabilitation Society (PARS), the Movement for 
Alternatives to Prison (MAP) and other organisations with similar goals. 
The Penal Policy Review Committee, 1981 
An examination of penal policy and sentencing provisions within New Zealand was 
undertaken in 1981 by a government appointed Penal Policy Review Committee. Due to 
the importance SSF administrators placed on maintaining community networks, a lot of 
time and effort went into preparing a submission for the Committee. Numerous guests, 
including various staff and consultants of the Justice Department, visited the programme 
and as a result SSF gained significant exposure by being presented as an example of a 
community-based after-care project in the review (New Zealand Penal Policy Review 
Committee 1982: 69). 
Within the completed penal policy review document, there where two recommendations 
of direct significance to SSF. First, was that imprisonment was stressed as a penalty of 
last resort. Hence, one of the explicit aims of the review was "to consider the means by 
which the incidence of imprisonment can be reduced to the greatest degree consistent 
with the maintaining of public safety" (New Zealand Penal Policy Review Committee 
1982: 39). This translated into the further promotion and development of after-care 
facilities and community-based alternatives to custody. Second, the "Throughcare" 
concept was introduced. Throughcare was advocated as a means of ensuring the 
management of prison sentences so that appropriate arrangements were made for release 
and assistance was given to criminal offenders in their reintegration into the community. 
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The throughcare concept emerged subsequent to discussion concerning the inadequacies 
of pre-release or work parole hostels. While it was acknowledged that these facilities 
provided support and assistance with re-entry into the workforce prior to release, they 
were criticised for being too selective and for generally not admitting those who had a 
history of violent or sex crimes. Also, work parole hostels only catered for a small 
percentage of the overall prison population and recidivist rates indicated that they were 
no more successful in reintegration that straight release from jail (New Zealand Penal 
Policy Review Committee 1982: 68-69). Operationally, the hostels were expensive to 
run, had low occupancy rates, and were plagued with selection difficulties and 
administrative conflicts. Hence, it was decided that alternative post-release facilities were 
needed for as many newly released inmates as possible because, 
The need for after-care is obvious. The nature of a sentence is to cut a person off from those 
relationships and community ties making up life in society. The longer the term, and the more 
remote the prison is from his own community, the deeper and more permanent will be the effects 
at the time the prisoner is delivered back to freedom" (New Zealand Penal Policy Review 
Committee 1982: 145). 
Throughcare was designed to help reintegrate the offender back into the community, an 
aim, which according to the Penal Policy Review Committee (1982: 6), "has been grossly 
neglected in penal policy to date". Throughcare incorporated three phases: (1) services at 
court, that is, welfare workers providing immediate support to the offender and his/her 
family; (2) the term of the sentence, including planning for the release and reintegration 
of the offender into the community; and (3) preparation for release and immediately after, 
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incorporating involvement with programmes that are able to help ensure the offender is 
fitted back into the community. 
Of significance to SSF was the third phase, which involved the further development of a 
wide range of after-care facilities. Essential to this recommendation was the greater 
involvement of welfare and other voluntary agencies in the social, educational, and 
recreational services available to programmes located in the community. The Committee 
insisted that these facilities be flexible in their operation and incorporate a wide range of 
aspects, such as life skills and social skills, literacy development, vocational training and 
pre-employment programmes, work co-operatives and work trusts, therapeutic 
communities and halfway houses, community hostels and homes, day training schemes, 
foster family schemes, sport and recreational programmes, cultural and ethnic support 
schemes, assessment and treatment facilities for drug and alcohol addicts, and supervised 
reparation. SSF was promoted as a good example of such a programme, which could be 
utilised in the development of the throughcare concept. The Committee stated, 
They could include existing pre-release hostels to be used by individuals and agencies within the 
community rather than the department; hostels such as those presently run by PARS, or half-way 
houses based on the Delancey Street Foundation in the United States and operating like the 
Salisbury Street Foundation in Christchurch or Kahanui in the Bay ofPlenty (New Zealand Penal 
Policy Review Committee 1982: 69). 
Programme Expansion: Second Stage 
During the early to mid-1980s, encouraged by the findings of the Penal Policy Review 
Committee, a lot of discussion occurred regarding the expansion of SSF through the 
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development of a 'second stage'. The rationale was that in the first stage, residents had "a 
chance to create a new sense of self- in the second stage the aim is to make the living of 
the new self a reality".59 The second stage was, therefore, to be geared towards promoting 
collective self-sufficiency for those who had "realised the value of mutual support and are 
accepting the responsibility that goes with it".60 It was anticipated that the second stage 
would provide an environment for the training of residents as well as assisting them to 
find a job and remain in it. 
In order to maintain a collective environment, it was decided that a 'second house' should 
be available for those progressing to the second stage. It was envisaged that residents 
living at this premises would require minimal oversight, following their own 
interests/work during the week while continuing to attend group meetings at the 
Foundation, and sports activities, where possible. Administrators at SSF believed that the 
Foundation needed to develop a commercial base to underpin its other activities and it 
was hoped that a second stage/house would provide a source of funds to help develop 
other aspects of the programme. It was decided that only those at the second stage should 
carry out work because the first stage occupants were "too unstable to be relied on as a 
foundation for income and business".61 The goal of the second stage was, therefore, to 
create work opportunities through combining the collective labour of ex-residents in 
59 SSF Newsletter 1984 
60 SSF Programme -Role of Supervisor/Organisation 1980 
61 Ibid. 
107 
order to overcome individual exclusion in the field of employment and by 1984, a 
number of businesses and work proposals were being considered. 
Prospective second house facilities included a Forfar Street property, which SSF 
unsuccessfully attempted to purchase in late-1984 when it ceased being a residential 
periodic detention centre, and a derelict property at 92 Packe St, St Albans, which was 
eventually rejected due to the amount it would cost to renovate it. 62 Also in furtherance of 
second stage/house, the BOT established a second trust, the Salisbury Street Foundation 
Development Trust, which was to provide some funding for these ventures in the future. 63 
Key Personalities 
From the early to mid-1980s, the responsibility for the running of SSF existed in the 
hands of a select few. While numerous others, especially residents, were heavily involved 
with the programme and were essential to its development, the level of commitment was 
most significant among four key people. Dave Robinson and Geoff Samuels have already 
been mentioned, both as psychologists and members of the BOT. Along with these two 
individuals, the roles of Murray Cree and Kevin Butson were criticaL 
Murray Cree 
Throughout the . early 1980s, Murray Cree was a hugely influential figure in the 
development of SSF. In the words of Robinson, "Murray was an administrative genius. 
62 While the notion of a second stage/house was proposed during this time it was never implemented. It was 
not until 1987 that a second house was rented for a works skills programme and then in 2002 that a second 
property was purchased. These developments will be considered in upcoming discussion. 
63 Fifth Annual Report 1983-1984: 3 
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He put together the structure [of the programme]". Originally a community social worker, 
Cree became involved with SSF in 1979 devoting five hours per week while still 
remaining a full-time social worker. Then, following SSF's relocation in Merivale, he 
was appointed the administrator of the programme in October 1981. He was also selected 
as Chairman of the BOT six months later, when the Board was experiencing some 
difficulties. This was due to the often conflicting goals and interests of BOT members, an 
issue which was to plague SSF throughout its existence. 
Cree was deemed to have the skills to project "a strong, confident and progressive image" 
which would lead the organisation into the 1980s. 64 It was also believed he would help 
the BOT achieve focus and guide the organisation in the direction necessary to ensure 
that SSF became a viable enterprise. This dual role approach was established as necessary 
for the early stability of SSF. As time progressed, however, members of SSF's Board and 
staff viewed the "super manager" role taken on by Cree as increasingly problematic. It 
was argued that, 
In recent months it has become clear that the organisation has become dependent upon [Cree] ... 
because of the combined power of the roles coupled with the professional skills of the person ... 
Thus the new Board with fresh minds from the outside, plus the relegation of Murray to the 
functional position of Secretary means the House, its Managers and the Trustees will have to 
work together more rather than relying on Murray to fill all the gaps. This is the next step in 
developing a strong self-help organisation. 65 
Despite this change in management structure, those involved in the programme at this 
time all mentioned and acknowledged the role Cree played in developing the 
64 SSF Background Paper 1984 
65 Ibid: 2 
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administrative side of the programme and establishing a wide base of support including 
the Probation Service, the Psychological Service and the Methodist Central Mission. 
Kevin Butson (1983-1985) 
Kevin Butson was one of the early residents at SSF, beginning his involvement with the 
place soon after it opened. He had a long criminal history and had previously spent time 
in prison following numerous burglary convictions (Butson: personal communication). In 
1982, the quietly spoken Butson moved into the role of House Manager and within a year 
he became SSF's first Programme Director. As Butson himself describes, "Over a period 
of twelve months I [went from] taking part in the programme [to] taking on more 
responsibility as the Director of the place". Butson's appointment as Director reflected 
the overriding desire of Foundation initiators to see SSF become fully self-sufficient and 
completely run by its residents. 
For Butson, being Director of SSF was a total lifestyle situation. He claims, "I lived for 
the place. I believed in it". As a result, Butson was involved with the organisation 24-
hours a day, seven days a week, living there permanently throughout his time as Director. 
His rationale behind maintaining such a total commitment was, "I believe you have to be 
there, because you have to practice what you preach and you have to oversee them like 
children" (cited in Jamieson 1991: 53). As Director, Butson was heavily involved in the 
development of the programme content and structure. As well as this, however, he 
believed an essential part of his role was to "lead by example and be there so I could say 
if you do this and do that, then look at me! You can stay out of jail". 
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Initially, Butson supported the psychotherapeutic regime operating in the programme. He 
had experienced psychological change during his time at SSF and it had altered his life 
dramatically. As one Board member at the time explains, 
[Kevin] is an example of how that programme [of psychotherapy] can work for a small number 
of people. He was ... a high-class burglar, safe blower and criminal and very well organised, a 
very able guy. And he gave all that up. Changed completely ... He's now one of the most 
upright, moral and honest people I think I've ever met (cited in Jamieson 1991: 56-57). 
Hence, Butson was committed to the psychotherapeutic rationale and the use of group 
therapy as a critical component ofthe Foundation's programme. 
As well as psychotherapeutic treatment, Butson believed it was essential that rules be 
strictly adhered to. His belief was that if rules were rigorously enforced, residents would 
be more likely to recognise the "error of their ways" and change their behaviour. 
Consequently, Butson admits he expelled a large number of residents who failed to 
comply with the rules. 
I guess the bottom line was that I kicked a lot of people out [of SSF] ... I would have kicked 
probably 70 percent of the people out. But, I didn't see any other way for it, because I believed 
that the programme had to be upheld. If you turned a blind eye to anything, it didn't work (cited 
in Jamieson 1991: 54). 
The impact of maintaining such a strict regime was paradoxical. While it ensured that a 
general anxiety existed amongst residents who had volunteered to attend the programme, 
it also reduced the overall effectiveness of the programme because it only ended up 
dealing with a small, select number of ex-offenders. 
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Decline of Therapeutic Emphasis/Resignation of Butson 
By mid-1985, Salisbury Street was once again nearing closure. There were virtually no 
residents at the Foundation, which was the result of Butson's expulsions as well as others 
abandoning the programme feeling frustrated and dissatisfied. Both residents and board 
members were increasingly questioning the dominance of psychotherapy as a method of 
goal attainment. Residents were failing to see any obvious benefits in group therapy for 
them while various board members were struggling with the theory that residents could 
go through a course of therapy and emerge at the end 'cured' of their criminal 
personalities. Butson, himself, had also come to the opinion that very few people in the 
prison system wanted a residential therapy programme. Instead, he believed that a work 
rehabilitation programme would be more successful. As a result of his disillusionment, 
Butson resigned as Director in September 1985. He claimed, "I couldn't handle people 
being so negative - the whole attitude of 'the world owes me' ... I needed to be around 
positive people that were fun, that you could communicate with". Butson did, however, 
remain involved with SSF until mid-1988 but to a much lesser extent. 
Criminal Justice Act, 1985 
Less than a month after Butson announced his resignation, the Criminal Justice Act 1985 
was introduced. This Act replaced the earlier 1954 Act and implemented many of the 
recommendations made in 1981 by the Penal Policy Review Committee (1982). It was 
based on two principles. First, that those convicted of committing serious offences, 
especially violent crimes, should be sent to prison. Second, that the majority of offenders 
should not be sent to prison and, therefore, a variety of other options should be available 
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that would fit their crime (Department of Justice 1990). As discussed in chapter two, this 
reflected the general perception that offenders should be dealt with within the 
community, whenever possible, as opposed to being incarcerated. 
The Criminal Justice Act introduced two new sentences, community care66 and 
reparation, and also replaced probation with "supervision". The sentences which 
impacted most significantly on the structure of, and programme at, SSF were community 
care and supervision. Community care was introduced as a community sentence of up to 
one year, which could be either residential or non-residential (Criminal Justice Act 1985 
s. 53(1 )). It was intended primarily for first time and non-serious offenders, with the aim 
of diverting them from jail and increasing "the constructive and beneficial involvement of 
offenders in supportive community activities . . . and . . . the responsibility taken by 
community groups for offenders" (Spier and Luketina 1988: 131). The sentence of 
supervision, available for a period of six months to two years, was deemed appropriate 
for any offender convicted of any offence punishable by imprisonment (Ministry of 
Justice 1999). It differed from probation because it incorporated additional conditions 
which could require an offender to undergo treatment in a community programme or to 
receive probationary supervision or any other such provision that the court believed was 
likely to reduce the likelihood of reoffending (Criminal Justice Act 1985 ss. 46 and 50 
(l)(a)). 
66 Conununity care was later renamed conununity programme (from the first of September 1993), and then 
subsequently abolished by the Sentencing Act 2002 (see chapter five). 
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Parole provisions were broadened under the Criminal Justice Act 1985. Previously, 
parole eligibility at half sentence had been available to those serving five years of 
imprisonment or more. For all finite sentences of seven years or longer, parole was an 
option after three and a half years and for those serving sentences of life or preventive 
detention following the completion of seven years (Webb 1982). Within this Act, 
prisoners serving a term of less than 14 years became eligible for parole after the expiry 
of half of their sentence, while those serving life, preventative detention or a term of more 
than 14 years became eligible after seven years of that sentence (Criminal Justice Act 
1985 s. 93 (1)). The overall aim of widening the conditions of parole was to reduce prison 
numbers. Initially this occurred as there was a surge of inmates into the community and 
hence the prison population fell to its lowest level since 1970. Within 13 months, 
however, the prison muster was higher than it had been when the 1985 Act took effect 
because many parolees had reoffended and returned to prison (Newbold and Eskridge, 
forthcoming 2003). 
The introduction of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 had a considerable impact on SSF. 
Prior to the implementation of the Act, residents attended SSF on a voluntary basis. 
Under the new Act, however, SSF could now formally receive both parolees and those 
who had not served any period of imprisonment. Of those coming from prison, inmates 
were eligible for early release from prison if they had a suitable community programme 
to attend (Criminal Justice Act 1985 ss. 101(2) and 99(1)(b)). Hence, the principal 
motivation for attending SSF changed. Rather than admissions occurring voluntarily, 
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generally due to a desire to cease further criminal involvement, the primary reason for 
attending SSF became early release from prison. Legal restrictions placed on residents 
also obligated them to remain in the programme until their parole period was complete. 
Failure to do this could result in residents being breached for violating parole conditions 
and subsequently being sent back to prison. Therefore, the overriding concern for many 
who were sent to SSF was completing the programme without being sent back to jail and 
the level of involvement and commitment displayed related only to what was necessary to 
ensure this occurred. 
The average length of stay at SSF declined significantly after the passing of the Criminal 
Justice Act. Prior to the Act, some residents stayed for between one and two years. 
Following 1985, however, SSF was redefined as a six to twelve-month programme and 
subsequently, as a result of numerous expulsions and voluntary departures, the average 
length of stay fell below four months. 67 This made it difficult for SSF to maintain its goal 
of accessing staff from the resident pool. It also meant that staff had to carry a larger 
burden of the workload because there were not the long-term residents there to help with 
the administrative and therapeutic aspects of the programme. As a result, SSF had to 
increasingly rely upon skilled, professional staff that had had no prior involvement with 
the organisation. 
The 1985 Act necessitated a review of the programme content at SSF. While formal 
sentencing provisions ensured funding from the Department of Justice, improvements in 
67 Seventh Annual Report 1985-1986: 4 
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fmance and resources could not sustain the increase in resident numbers which saw the 
programme consistently operating at its maximum capacity of 12.68 Consequently, SSF 
could not financially maintain the previously intensive counselling component of the 
programme, which was already under threat due to increased questioning by staff of its 
effectiveness. As a result, the programme experienced a shift in emphasis. It came to rely 
on group-type, encounter methods that were aimed at the more 'middle-of-the-road' 
offender. 
PHASE THREE: 1986 -1990 
Director: Terry Easthope 
At the beginning of 1986, Terry Easthope replaced Kevin Butson as Director of SSF. 
Easthope, who had had some previous involvement with the organisation, was seconded 
to SSF from the Probation service. Easthope was a recreation specialist, who had been an 
Outward Bound instructor, with 10 years experience at Anakiwa and similar centres in 
Britain and the United States (Jaspers 1988). He was also a former British Army 
paratrooper who was committed to strict discipline and a strong authoritarian approach. 
He believed that SSF would operate most efficiently if run along quasi-military lines, 
where residents had to follow orders and obey commands. 
When Easthope initially arrived at the Foundation, the recently introduced Criminal 
Justice Act was yet to have a significant impact. The programme was still in dire need of 
residents, operating with numbers well below what was financially viable. Easthope 
68 Seventh Annual Report 1985-1986: 4 
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believed that these difficulties could be overcome, however, by working within the 
bounds of the Criminal Justice Act and rethinking the core component of the programme 
at SSF. As a result, once involved as Director of the Foundation, Easthope implemented a 
shift in the philosophy of programme from psychotherapy to 'encounter recreation'. 
Easthope's desire to implement an encounter recreation model at SSF was supported by 
the majority of those at the Foundation. This was because the change in emphasis, 
accompanied with the introduction of the Criminal Justice Act, enabled SSF to overcome 
the crisis created by low resident numbers, which had threatened to close the organisation 
in 1985. As a result, a major shift occurred over a 12-month period following Easthope's 
instatement. The organisation was virtually restarted from scratch and developed 
according to a new key goal, which focused on providing challenging recreational 
activities for the residents of the Foundation to participate in. 
Easthope was determined to establish encounter recreation as a more viable approach 
than psychotherapy. According to Ken Turner, who took over as Director of SSF in 1987, 
Terry Easthope came along with this philsophy, which is the Outward Bound philosophy really, 
which is give people self-esteem through achievement, you know, rather than telling them that 
their mothers love them in a therapy group. You can actually take them out and take them on 
activities and let them achieve and feel good about themselves because they've accomplished 
something. 
Physical challenge, therefore, became the overriding objective of SSF, while other 
aspects, including therapy, took a back seat. A strict criterion regarding the acceptance of 
individuals into the programme was established in order to eliminate those who would 
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struggle with a physically demanding programme or were at a high risk of reoffending. 
As a result of this careful selection process, encounter recreation appealed to the client 
group accepted into SSF. At the end of its first year, encounter recreation was heralded as 
a huge success. The shift in emphasis, along with the impact of the Criminal Justice Act, 
had seen SSF's popularity increase, with the programme consistently operating with a full 
quota of residents. It was asserted that the model "has been worked into a most successful 
therapeutic and developmental tool" and that it has been a lot less costly to administer 
than intensive counselling. 69 
Encounter Recreation 
The encounter recreation approach, followed by Easthope, is a social-psychological 
method based on the assumption that ex-inmates exhibit certain characteristics, which are 
inconsistent with life in free society. These include low self-esteem, poor communication 
skills, a lack of responsibility, an inability to pursue long-term goals, and a dependence 
on, and alienation from, others (Davie 1993). As noted in chapter two, this presumption 
extended from the vast array of literature available suggesting that prison and open 
society are incompatible, and had serious, negative consequences for incarcerated 
individuals following their release. The philosophy behind encounter recreation aims to 
enhance the offender's chances of participating in mainstream society by demonstrating 
alternative attitudes and behavioural patterns which encourage individuals to face and 
overcome challenges in a practical way. The encounter recreation approach, also known 
as wilderness training and adventure-based education, is largely based on the Outward 
69 Seventh Annual Report 1985-1986: 3 
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Bound philosophy. 70 It uses recreational activities as vehicles for change by placing 
participants in unfamiliar and challenging situations, which generally require a high level 
of physical fitness, patience and determination (Davie 1993). 
The wider goal of encounter recreation is to weaken and eliminate the 'anti-social', 
criminal traits mentioned above and replace them with more functional, 'pro-social' 
alternatives. Such change has been promoted as being best achieved through a number of 
key strategies (see Davie 1993). These include offering recreational activities as a 
constructive use for leisure time and means of channeling boredom. Two important 
aspects to be considered in greater depth, however, are the breaking down of criminal 
responses and the raising of self-confidence and self-esteem. 
Recreational activities generally offer an unfamiliar environment to many offenders. 
Hence, the mechanisms employed within prison to maintain superiority, such as the use 
of coarse language and/or threatening behaviour, become irrelevant. As Easthope 
describes, "You take the biggest guy in the jail and put him at the end of a rope rock 
climbing and he loses all his mana. His tough guy image is not worth an ounce of shit 
because the guy is scared stiff and screaming" (cited in Jaspers 1988). The philosophy 
behind encounter recreation argues that the outdoor environment requires a new set of 
skills and problem-solving techniques from those employed in prison. It requires 
individuals to work together and trust each other, as many of the activities used 
70 Outward Bound was founded by Kurt Hahn in Wales in 1941 as a means of helping young sailors survive 
the harsh physical challenges of war. Since this time, Outward Bound has expanded throughout the world 
(there are 47 international schools in 42 countries) as a means of challenging individual's perceived 
physical, mental and emotional limits (http://www.outwardbound.co.nzlabout/history.html). 
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emphasise the need for teamwork. Whether it be rock climbing, kayaking, or skiing, the 
ex-offenders are forced to depend on each other and deal with any complications that 
may occur. 
Encounter recreation has also been promoted as a means of increasing confidence and 
self-esteem. The rationale behind this is that encounter recreation takes physical prowess, 
an attribute important to many ex-offenders, and turns it into a vehicle for behavioural 
change. While at first the ability to complete physically demanding tasks and deal with 
difficult situations is a very real challenge for most, once individuals begin to be able to 
complete these set tasks it is said to increase their self-confidence. Turner (cited m 
Jaspers 1988) explains, 
It's difficult for them because ... you take away all their support systems: the drugs and alcohol. 
You're asking them to throw away all their crutches, and telling them to wait awhile until they 
can build up other ones ... You're putting them into an environment the don't feel comfmtable, 
or confident in, and therefore they have to start looking at themselves and make themselves feel 
confident from within. 
Director: Ken Turner 
In 1987, Easthope was re-appointed to the Probation Service, so stood aside as Director 
of SSF while still remaining on the BOT. He was replaced by Ken Turner, a charismatic 
former resident who had left the programme in the early 1980s, trained as a counsellor, 
and been hired as a social worker at SSF by Easthope in 1986. According to Turner, "I 
only became Director by default really, nobody else wanted to do it and when I became a 
resident the programme had relied upon the most senior residents becoming involved in 
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running the place". Following his appointment, Turner continued to run the programme 
along the same lines as Easthope, maintaining the emphasis on encounter recreation. 
During Turner's time as Director, between 1987 and 1990, residents continued their 
involvement in a wide range of recreational activities. These included kayaking, 
swimming, ten-pin bowling, golf, rock climbing, scuba diving, mountain biking, 
tramping and volleyball, as well organised events such as the South Island Coast-to-Coast 
expedition, from Kumara to Christchurch, held in January 1986. Initially, the recreation 
programme ran over a period of 12 weeks for two days a week. By 1989, however, time 
spent on encounter recreation had increased, occurring on Wednesday afternoons, and 
full-day expeditions on Thursdays and Fridays. Combined with the emphasis on 
recreational activities, there was also a focus on expanding the equipment base. 
Consequently a wide variety of expensive items were continually being purchased. This 
included scuba gear, speedboats, kayaks and ski gear all available for use by those 
. 1 d h . . 71 mvo ve at t e orgamsation. 
Up until mid-1989, the recreation programme at SSF ran according to few formally stated 
objectives. In July, however, administrative changes were introduced in order to tighten 
the running of the programme. A comprehensive recreation plan was developed, which 
divided the year into quarters and allocated specific activities, appropriate to the season, 
into each section. The overall aim of the recreation plan was to provide residents with the 
opportunity to graduate through a series of activities, gaining skills that would allow them 
71 See BOT Meetings 1986-1989 
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to advance to the next quarter. The progression through these stages ultimately 
culminated in the undertaking of major endurance events, such as the Coast-to-Coast, 
triathlons or two to four day tramps which were conducted by SSF most months. 72 
Other Programme Features 
Referral process 
Throughout Turner's regime, the average time spent at SSF remained four months. This 
meant that there were frequently places available in the programme and new applicants 
were constantly being sought. During this time, 80 percent of those involved in the 
organisation were parolees who arrived as the result of referrals from prison. The other 20 
percent were offenders who had not been sentenced to terms of imprisonment but arrived, 
under the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1985, largely as the result of referrals 
from the Probation Service or the Department of Labour. 73 The referral process at SSF 
consisted of an individual informally hearing about the programme and writing with 
reasons as to why he/she74 wanted to come and join the organisation and/or requesting 
more information. Many were introduced to SSF through the prison groups that Robinson 
ran at Paparoa until mid-1989. They ceased at this time, however, as a result of time 
pressures on SSF employees, a lack of desire to continue work in the prisons and the 
increased popularity of SSF, thus reducing need for advertising. 
72 Letter to Sheryn Elbom from Denise Crowe, SSF Assistant Director, 10/4/1989 
73 SSF Archival Material 1990 
74 According to SSF policies and guidelines women were able to join the programme up until its 
introduction as a habilitation centre. Despite this, it appears that no women were accepted into the 
programme between 1986-1990. 
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According to the Annual Report (1985-1986: 2), "The utilisation of the SSF prison group, 
the availability of the Prison Parole Team liaison and the use of day parole programmes 
have proved to be an aid to the selection and assessment process this year". 75 
The Recreation Officer at SSF initially responded to all letters received by the 
programme. Then, for those seeking community care or supervision placements, a 
Probation Officer was generally required to get involved. As well as this it was expected 
that all applicants would have a referee who visited the Foundation and assessed the 
programme content and its appropriateness for the applicant. If a candidate was deemed 
suitable, the director of SSF, a social work department head and SSF's recreation officer 
all assessed him. Suitability was decided following the individual being released to SSF 
for a day parole and an interview with the applicant, referrer and SSF staff. These visits 
occurred on a monthly basis and intake of residents into the programme was generally 
limited to a maximum of three persons per month. Once accepted into SSF, residents 
became involved in all aspects of the programme, which as well as recreational activities 
included the development of work and life skills. 
Work skills 
Along with encounter recreation, the acquisition of work skills was also emphasised at 
SSF. The development of the stage two concept, discussed since the programme's 
inception, moved closer at the beginning of 1987 when a second house at 151 Edgeware 
75 Seventh Annual Report 1985-1986: 2 
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Road was rented from the Ministry of Works.76 This property provided the premises for 
the operation of a Training Assistance Programme (TAPS), which began on the 16th of 
February 1987. Half of the second house provided the scheme's base, while the other half 
was developed as a flat for those in the scheme.77 The purpose of this government-funded 
programme was to provide opportunities for further education and training to those 
unable to find employment. Any organisation willing to become a training provider was 
eligible to gain funding and institute a TAPS programme. Butson coordinated the initial 
TAPS scheme at SSF/8 where a 'day programme' was developed to run in tandem with 
the residential programme. By mid-1987, however, the TAPS programme was working 
very closely with the residential programme and it was being suggested that it "seems 
possible to combine them".79 Following the completion of two TAPS modules at SSF, the 
scheme was discontinued and replaced by a work skills programme, known as the 
ACCESS scheme. 80 
The government financed ACCESS programme was very similar to its predecessor, 
TAPS. It provided work training and life skills courses to "assist persons at a 
disadvantage in the labour market to acquire skills which will increase their potential to 
find employment".81 Work-based training within this scheme also incorporated other 
"positive action" elements, including cultural sensitivity, confidence building, and 
76 Letter to Anne Pitcaithly, Department of Social Welfare, from Denise Crowe, SSF Programme 
Administrator, 3 February 1987 
77 BOT Meeting 20/1/1987 
78 Butson permanently ended his involvement in SSF in mid-1988. 
79 BOT Meeting 12/5/1987 
80 Government financed ACCESS schemes were initially introduced in 1984. At this time ACCESS courses 
were available for day residents at SSF and focussed on the development of social/life skills. It shifted 
towards an emphasis on work skills in 1987. 
81 Wellington Regional Employment and ACCESS Council1987: 2 
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encouraging wider job choices. The first ACCESS course began at SSF on the ih of 
December 1987 with six trainees, including three from the last TAPS scheme. The 
scheme ran for 22 weeks, focussing on job readiness and getting people back into the 
workforce, while also incorporating additional aspects such as defensive driving and 
anger management. 
Rules 
Another programme feature, which was important for those entering SSF between 1986 
and 1990, was the clear set of rules that existed. 82 These were: 
1. All residents agree to cooperate with staff and other residents to the best of their 
ability and to maintain a positive attitude throughout their involvement with the 
programme and the Board of Trustees. 
2. Unless permission has been obtained from the director, all residents must be at the 
House after 12am Sunday through Thursday. 
3. No criminal offending is tolerated either inside or outside the Foundation. 
4. No physical violence under any circumstances. 
5. No alcohol to be used or in a residents possession on the Foundation's premises. 
6. No drugs to be consumed or in a resident's possession on or off the Foundation's 
premises. SSF legally able to take random urine samples from residents. 
7. No sexual relations on Foundation premises. No friends or partners permitted to 
stay overnight without the permission of the director. 
8. All residents' fmances will be placed under the control of the Board ofTrustees.83 
82 SSF Newsletter September 1988 
83 Ibid. 
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Some of these rules were strictly maintained throughout an individual's time at SSF, 
while others were relaxed as the length of stay increased. For example, when residents 
initially arrived at SSF for the first week they had a curfew of 1 Opm Sunday to Thursday, 
but this was extended to 11 pm in the second week and 12am from the fourth week on. 
When rules were broken, a set disciplinary regime existed. This consisted of three stages, 
which were a verbal warning, generally issued by the director; a written notice; and 
dismissal from the programme, although residents were usually given the opportunity to 
reapply to reenter the programme after two weeks. 84 
As mentioned, discipline was strict during Easthope's time as Director. Many involved 
with SSF felt that this approach subverted the organisation's goal of creating 
independent, responsible and self-sufficient people. Despite this rigid environment, 
criminal offending, especially marijuana smoking, burglary and theft, continued to occur 
at a high rate. Butson, who was on the BOT at the time, approached Easthope with his 
concerns reg a- ng tlie high level of criminal activity but they were dismissed and the 
programme continued as previously (Jamieson 1991). 
When Turner took over as Director the emphasis on strict adherence to rules and 
discipline diminished. Turner acknowledges of himself, "You take someone who's made 
a whole mess of their life and been in a programme for six months and then you put them 
84 SSF Newsletter September 1988 
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in charge of all these people. It's crazy! So we had a free-for-all". As a result, incidents of 
rule breaking were trivialised and warnings often not given. 85 Turner said, 
There were always the underlying rules of no drinking alcohol, no drugs, no female friends to 
come and stay ... basically the rules adopted from Delancey Street ... but during my period, 
some of guys which were very strong willed guys ... they were people who when they were in 
jail they ran the jail ... So when they came to SSF, why should things be any different. So 
they'd say we think we should be allowed to go down the pub and you can present quite a 
feasible argument, you can say well you want us to reintegrate into society, part of society is 
going and socially drinking . . . So we presented these arguments to the BOT . . . and for 
whatever reasons they didn't disapprove of it, so some things changed which in hindsight should 
never have been changed ... they became judge and jury really and started deviating from the 
rules. 
While the BOT deviated from the rules on some occasions, they were also often largely 
unaware of much of what was going on during this time. A prison-style "anti-narking" 
code existed in order to avoid drawing BOT, and at times staff, attention to the 
widespread criminal offending and rule breaking that was occurring. Turner, himself, 
used many informal tactics to secure authority over the organisation, including 
controlling all communication channels, so he could select what information the Board 
received. Genevieve Strang, a counsellor at SSF, explains, 
There was a coerciveness there. I didn't know what it was at the time, I was probably part of it, 
but it was about the no narking: I'll scratch your back, you scratch mine. It was unspoken ... but 
it seemed to me that was how people worked, ran the place, with a prison record. 
85 Of the warnings that were given, in 1989, 80 percent involved drug use, either smoking or possession of 
marijuana (SSF Archival materiall989). 
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Funding 
During Turner's reign as Director, the "free-for-all" mentality extended from freedom 
from rules to accessing monetary backing. The Board and staff, especially Turner, spent a 
lot of time applying for donations and grants and were very successful at securing 
funding for the Foundation. Financially, the programme was more robust than it had ever 
been previously. Newbold remembers, "There was endless amounts of money, money for 
everything. Equipment was going missing and getting stolen and it would just be replaced 
... and the guys would have these huge meals and anything that was left-over would just 
get chucked out". Strang also concedes, "He was very good at getting funding, at putting 
his boots on and going to Wellington ... It [the programme] was absolutely humming 
along and they spent hundreds on recreation gear". 
Turner admits, however, that the use of funds donated to the Foundation at this time was 
not always "honest". He explains, "We continued to apply for funds, we knew how to 
apply for funds really successfully and were quite successful at it but it was, if you were 
really honest about it, a little bit deceitful because the funds were never spent on what 
they were applied for". For example, Turner describes, 
We had a free-for-all, right down to things like applying for funding ... we would apply for a 
lawnmower ten times over and we would get $1000 for a lawnmower from ten different places 
and never purchase it. So the $10,000 went into the bank to be used for other things. You know it 
was deceitful and it went on for years and years. 
Between 1987-1990, SSF had four main sources of funding. These were government 
sources, philanthropic trusts, the business community and private donations. Increased 
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amounts of funding enabled the programme to spend more on its operation. For example, 
during the year 1989-1990, the cost of running the Foundation was $324,200, which was 
an increase of $86,500 from the prior year. The major sources of revenue during this year 
were government sources (approximately $60,000) including the Department of Social 
Welfare ($249.11 per full-time resident on the maximised sickness benefit and 
accommodation allowance per week) and the Labour Department (ACCESS benefit to 
individuals of $137.24 per week). Other contributors included the Mental Heath 
Foundation and the New Zealand Lotteries Board. Programme administrators were well 
aware, however, that this level of financial support would not necessarily continue. In the 
financial statement presented to the Board on the 15 August 1989 it was stated that," ... 
while we can operate at the present level until the end of the present financial year, unless 
we are able to secure permanent long term funding, then the nature of the programme will 
have to be curtailed very considerably". 86 
The Roper Report, 1989 
In 1989, a government prison review was carried out by the Ministerial Committee of 
Inquiry into the Prisons System. The findings of this Committee were subsequently 
published in a report, often referred to as the Roper Report. The recommendations of the 
Roper Report, and subsequent legislative developments, will be considered in depth in 
chapter five. SSF administrators were, however, heavily involved with submissions to the 
Committee at this time. Director, Ken Turner, and BOT Chairperson, Dave Robinson, 
met with the Roper Committee for a number of hours during 1989 to discuss issues 
including rehabilitation/habilitation and the reintegration of ex-inmates into the 
86 BOT Meeting 15/8/1989 
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community. 87 SSF staff supported the recommendations put forward by the Roper 
Committee, and in fact it was suggested that the concept of habilitation, highlighted by 
the Roper Report, had been used within SSF since its introduction (New Zealand 
Ministerial Committee of Inquiry 1989). As Robinson recalls, "We developed a phrase 
that came out of DSF and we called it a habilitation programme, which happened before 
all of the stuff that went on ... in the Roper Report, that mainly came out of SSF ... and 
I believe SSF is now called an habilitation centre". Also, in 1989, a member of the Roper 
Committee, Kath Dunstan, joined SSF's BOT and subsequently continued her 
involvement with the Foundation until 2001. 
SSF in Crisis 
By the end of the 1980s, SSF's administration was experiencing a management crisis. 
The original administrative system set up by Murray Cree was being undermined as the 
distinction between the process and content of the programme became increasingly 
blurred Board members were frequently getting involved in the development of the 
programme's content, which essentially led to crucial administrative decisions, such as 
discipline, budgeting and liaison with government heads, being compromised. SSF's 
Director and other administrators, who were also often more concerned with the content 
than management practices, had failed to keep comprehensive records throughout much 
of the mid-to-late 1980s and hence, an unknown amount of SSF's resources were 
unaccounted for. 88 
87 Tenth Annual Report 1988-1989 
88 SSF Special Meeting 10/4/1989 
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Concern regarding the lack of financial records kept by SSF administrators had been 
expressed by Bob Calkin, a former commercial lawyer and current Board member, in 
1988. He argued, "It seems clear to me that the present accounting system is not meeting 
the needs of the Board of Trustees of the S.S.F".89 Calkin, who had himself once been 
imprisoned for fraud, indicated that an integrated budget showing true levels of 
expenditure was needed, but that this would involve strict accounting for depreciation. It 
had concerned him that the balance sheet recorded assets of around $40,000 when the 
true amount was, in actuality, far less than this, and that the same probably applied to 
other components of the programme as well. Consequently, Calkin had suggested that an 
investigation into the Foundation's accounting system was needed in order to improve it. 
He emphasised, "I cannot stress too strongly, the importance of this matter, for, without 
adequate financial data, we lack the tools to effectively manage and plan".9° Calkin's 
concerns proved well founded, as by the following year, inadequacies in management 
were indeed threatening the future of SSF. 
The BOT was both a victim of, and a key contributor to, the advent of this administrative 
crisis at SSF. The efficiency of the BOT in managing SSF was clearly compromised by 
the lack of information being provided by the Director and staff. As Newbold suggests, 
The problem, as is the case for many of these institutions, was that the Board of Trustees were all 
amateurs ... and part-timers, whereas the admin staff were professionals and full-timers, so they 
could very easily pull the wool over the eyes of the BOT if the BOT isn't well-organised and 
doesn't have good systems in place. 
89 SSF Accounting System 1988 
90 Ibid. 
131 
Board members were also, however, often becoming too heavily involved in the content 
of the programme and failing to make decisive administrative resolutions. Turner, 
therefore, is partially correct when he claims, "It was their (the BOT) responsibility to 
oversee it and I think they neglected that responsibility whole-heartedly ... I think it was 
just easier for them to rubber stamp everything that was being done rather than actually 
stand up and fight against it". 
The management crisis eventually became so untenable that Turner resigned on the 21st 
of March 1989 and the BOT took over collectively as Director of SSF. While this 
collective situation proved ineffective for numerous reasons, it did display that for several 
years the directors and staff at SSF had run a "sophisticated programme in an ad hoc 
fashion that was essentially unaccountable and subject to abuse".91 As a result, 
responsibility and accountability were discussed as being essential to the future 
management of SSF. 
In August 1989, the BOT negotiated for Turner to resume his role as Director. Shortly 
after his reappointment, however, concerns arose regarding Turner's methodology, 
spending and bookkeeping practices. Consequently, the firm Horrocks and McNab 
undertook an investigation at the Foundation's request. Major financial anomalies were 
discovered and although, in the words of Newbold, "the police, in the way they deal with 
suspected fraud, didn't want to deal with it ... we had enough evidence of 
mismanagement to fire Ken Turner but we gave him the option of resigning". Easthope, 
91 Twelfth Annual Report 1990-1991 : 2 
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who had promoted Turner's appointment at the outset, opposed the decision to ask Turner 
to resign. He tried to convince the Board that if Turner had taken any "perks" from the 
organisation that were not due to him, this was a small matter relative to the good work 
he was doing. When the Board refused to compromise, Easthope was furious and stormed 
out of the meeting (Newbold: personal communication). Then a few days later, on the 
14th February 1990, Turner once again resigned as Director and was assured that no 
positions would be available for him in the future. Still incensed about the treatment of 
Turner, Easthope now resigned from the BOT. 
PHASE FOUR: 1990-1995 
De-emphasis of Encounter Recreation 
SSF's management crisis, combined with Turner's resignation, necessitated that the 
programme undergo a significant restructuring, both in regards to its administration and 
content. It was decided that the encounter recreation approach needed to be de-
emphasised in favour of a more comprehensive programme. Many believed that 
encounter recreation had gained too much ascendancy at SSF and some even questioned 
its reintegrative/rehabilitative ability. Newbold, for example, argues, 
The thing about encounter recreation, the philosophy behind it, was that it would provide self-
confidence and incentive for the guys to get out and work and everything but that was bullshit, it 
was never proven ... I used to laugh about it and call it holidays for criminals. 
The programme at SSF was also not conducive to encounter recreation's graduated 
course structure. At SSF, residents were constantly entering and leaving the programme. 
New arrivals were expected to participate in activities with residents who had been 
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involved with the programme for a lot longer than they had. As a result, many new 
residents were expected to perform beyond their capabilities and therefore often lacked 
the skills and confidence to master the activities being offered. This situation was not 
only physically unsafe, but also subverted the aim of raising self-confidence by 
increasing feelings of dependency and hopelessness. 
Following the decision to de-emphasise encounter recreation, two major changes 
occurred. First, expensive recreational equipment was sold and involvement in costly 
activities such as skiing and scuba diving ceased. Second, a greater focus was placed on 
finding a balance between individual, group and community involvement and 
understanding. Hence, group sessions recommenced and a community awareness 
programme was resurrected. 
Henry (Skip) Crossen (1990-1991) 
Progress towards the administrative restructuring of SSF began in March 1990 with the 
appointment of Henry (Skip) Crossen as the new Programme Manager/Director. He was 
employed specifically because of his business background and therefore his ability to 
introduce the managerial structures that had been lacking at SSF for several years. 
Crossen worked closely with Greg Newbold, who had been appointed Chairperson of the 
BOT in 1990, 92 to develop a Policy Manifesto, and a Management and Programme Plan, 
which clearly established the programme goals and administrative structures crucial to 
the operation of SSF. 
92 Robinson resigned as Chairperson of the BOT in 1990 but rell,lained on the Board. 
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Policy Manifesto 1990/ Management and Programme Plan 199019193 
The Policy Manifesto, developed in 1990, briefly outlined SSP's history and described 
the present period as a rationalisation phase. The principal components of this period 
were outlined as: 
1. A change in emphasis from encounter recreation to job training and life skills. 
2. The establishment of clear lines of authority, communication, and accountability; 
the institution of formalised objectives with plans of action and regular, 
independent assessments; and a review of SSP's fiscal administration. 
3. A move to case management and the focussing of organisational resources onto 
meeting the critical needs of each participant. 
The development of key administrative documents, such as the Policy Manifesto, and a 
Management and Programme Plan, were deemed to be essential to this rationalisation 
process. 
Within the Management and Programme Plan, SSP was realigned toward two primary 
goals. First, was to provide a habilitation programme aimed at reintegrating ex -offenders 
into the community and second, was to break the recidivism cycle.94 In order to achieve 
these goals it was stated that the "programme must be run efficiently and effectively with 
all components and officials operating in a co-ordinated fashion". 95 It was also 
93 The Policy Manifesto and Management and Programme Plan were revised in 1992-1993. The main 
components of the programme remained largely unchanged and the overall framework was maintained 
until the end of the pre-habilitation centre period. 
94 Although not yet classed as a habilitation centre, SSF was already implemented some of the 
recommendations made by the Roper Report. 
95 Management and Programme Plan 1990/1991 
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established, however, that SSF "does not provide a magic cure for crime or criminality. It 
cannot change people who want changes to be made for them. Salisbury Street can only 
help those with a firm resolve to help themselves".96 Therefore, identifying the suitability 
of potential applicants was crucial to "ensure that the only ex-offenders selected are those 
who are going to be a success at the Salisbury Street Foundation".97 
The Management and Programme Plan examined eleven aspects of the programme, 
extensively detailing goals, objectives and tasks. These components were: (1) pre-
assessment; (2) assessment; (3) induction; (4) education; (5) life skills; (6) vocational 
skills; (7) counselling and therapy; (8) recreation and community skills; (9) post-
habilitation support; (10) executive requirements; and (11) the budget. Most of these 
aspects were also outlined in the Policy Manifesto. In regards to education, the aim was 
to improve numeracy and literacy skills through providing access to university courses, 
polytechnic, and programmes such as Adult Education, as well as offering tutors within 
the Foundation. The objective of life skills training and counselling was 
deinstitutionalisation and assisting social reintegration and personal growth both by 
teaching residents basic housekeeping skills, budgeting, communication skills, and health 
education, and by offering group modules, case management and individual counselling. 
As well as this, all residents were encouraged to explore vocational training options and a 
number of courses were available to them either at SSF or in the community. The role of 
recreation, while less dominant than previously, remained to "enhance candidates' 
physical, mental and social wellbeing through challenging activities" and to encourage 
96 Policy Manifesto 1992 
97 Management and Programme Plan 1990/1991 
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the group dynamic prevalent within the organisation's objectives.98 Finally, community 
involvement/work was established as crucial because SSF was funded almost entirely 
from community grants and donations. Hence it was essential that residents "return 
something to the society which supports them, while at the same time embellishing the 
profile of the organisation in the eyes of the public".99 
Operational and governance issues were also revisited within these two documents. The 
BOT was reinforced as having the legal authority over, and being ultimately responsible 
for, SSF. Therefore, it was deemed important that the BOT remain constantly informed of 
all of the Foundation's affairs through a variety of reports, audits, meetings, and the 
Management and Programme Plan. The role of the Programme Manager (also known as 
the Director) was to manage and administer Board policy and fmance while overseeing 
the programme. The overall lines of authority and communication were clearly 
established as being: the Programme Manager was responsible to the BOT (with 
communication occurring through the Chair); and employees and participants were 
responsible to the Programme Manager (with communication between 
employees/participants and the BOT occurrmg primarily through the Programme 
Manager, secondly through the Chair). 
98 Policy Manifesto 1990 
991bid. 
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Kimihia Trust 
As well as developing the Policy Manifesto, and the Management and Programme Plan, 
Crossen established a trust fund known as the Kimihia Trust. 100 The ostensible purpose of 
this organisation was to make use of SSF equipment, so that it could contract out 
recreation services to SSF and other organisations. It was arranged by Crossen that Paul 
McFelin, a resident at SSF, was to head the organisation, with others involved including 
Crossen, McFelin's wife Vema, and Kath Jamieson, a student researching SSF who had 
recently become personally involved with Crossen. A separate bank account was set up 
with Crossen and Jamieson as the only signatories and the Trust was established as an 
incorporated society. At the time of its development, concerns were expressed by some 
Board members in relation to issues of conflict of interest between Crossen being both a 
Kimihia Trust member and Programme Manager of SSF. Crossen was quick dispel these 
concerns, however, and the organisation continued. 101 
Crossen's Downfall 
SSF was generally well organised and efficient while Crossen was Programme Manager. 
Administration of the programme was competent and methodical, and Crossen was 
responsible for putting some good structures in place. His approach was also, however, 
very rigid and uncompromising. According to Newbold, 
What the Crossen regime gained in organisation, however, it lost in human relations. Although 
some residents felt secure in his system, many were antagonised by his ruthlessness and his 
100 Kirnihia Trust Constitution 13/9/1990 
101 BOT Meeting 27/11/1990 
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arrogance. Skip Crossen very soon alienated a great many people, and this impaired the long-
term feasibility of his method. 102 
Crossen liked to maintain a tight control over the programme and his staff. This resulted 
in Strang suspending her involvement as a counsellor at SSF in 1990 due to conflict 
between her and Crossen. She claims, "I just didn't have the skills to know how to deal 
with the man. He was incredibly controlling and very spooky, cold". 
Crossen's professionalism was first brought into question when he had begun a personal 
relationship with Kath Jamieson, the student who was researching SSF. 103 He was a 
married man in his forties; she was a young postgraduate sociology student from the 
University of Canterbury who had been studying SSF since mid-1989.104 According to 
Strang, "She (Kath) was spending a lot of time in Skip's office and he told me ... he 
needed to do some intensive therapy with her and then he would disappear for hours. It 
was just scary". Despite this, Crossen continued as Director largely because he had the 
full support of Greg Newbold, the Chair of the BOT. In retrospect Newbold concedes, 
Skip Crossen was a very slick operator. Very credible, good looking, confident and a little bit of 
a con man. He certainly sucked me in . . . Once he got control of SSF he became personally 
involved in it and worked very cleverly to alienate people he disliked or saw as a threat and to 
massage people, such as myself, who were in a position of power. 
Late in March 1991, it was discovered that Crossen was an undischarged bankrupt. 
Newbold recalls, "He did not disclose to us at the time of his appointment that he was an 
102 Twelfth Annual Report 1990-1991: 7 
103 He later married and had a child with this woman. 
104 Jamieson was awarded her Master of Arts in 1991, although her thesis was embargoed, meaning that it 
could not be viewed by anyone without the author's permission for five years. 
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undisclosed bankrupt and owed, I think, $30,000 to people in Nelson who had invested, 
through his business ventures which had collapsed". This was of significant concern to 
the BOT for two reasons. First, he had failed to disclose this information to them when 
initially interviewed, and second, in his position as Programme Manager, Crossen had 
had a wide discretion over the use of funds. Although it was believed that Crossen had 
not misused SSF funds, there was some uncertainty surrounding the actual role of the 
Kimihia Trust and the funds, including some of Crossen's income, being placed into it. 
Further investigation found that Crossen may have misinformed the Official Assignee in 
Nelson about the true level of his income, and had involved the BOT in this matter by 
requesting that they divert part of his income into the Kimihia account. 
After taking legal advice, formal discussions were held with Crossen to discuss the 
discoveries made by the BOT. These resulted in a unanimous decision by the Board to 
ask Crossen to stand down from his duties on 11 April 1991. Crossen was very resentful 
about his dismissal and a month later he wrote to the Minister of Justice expressing 
concerns about SSF. He alleged that Newbold, as Chairman of the Board, had stated that 
SSF's BOT was "exploitative, manipulative and into their fantasies" and furthermore that 
the Foundation was in "an utter mess". In this letter, Crossen continued to recommend 
that the Department of Justice should conduct a programme and financial audit of SSF 
and that, in fact, they should probably "take over the operation of this organisation in 
toto". 105 
105 Letter from Crossen to Doug Graham, Minister of Justice, 29/5/1991 
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Core Group (1991) 
Following the rigidity of Crossen's leadership, many Board members and residents 
desired increased "flexibility and openness in house management". 106 As a result, a Core 
Group concept was developed by senior and past members of SSF. The Core Group 
concept signified an attempt to revisit the primary premise upon which SSF was based: 
that reformed inmates were best able to assist and relate to ex-inmates. In a majority vote, 
it was decided that involving residents in the administration of SSF was preferable to 
maintaining a highly structured and stratified management hierarchy, which was largely 
unnecessary in the achievement of Foundation goals. It was also hoped that the Core 
Group would enable a free flow of communication, where channels were open for all 
involved in SSF, rather than a centralised few. 
On the 30th of April 1991, the Core Group proposal was approved, subject to periodic 
review, by the BOT. Most Board members were largely supportive of the Core Group 
concept. For example, Meladie Bras explains, 
It was a healthy exercise. It needed to have that trial ... [It] gave these guys a chance to see what 
it's like to run the place, to see what challenges there are for the staff. If we said no to the Core 
Group concept they would have always kept thinking, oh they just want to maintain control, they 
don't want to give us a chance, they don't believe in us. 
The main opponent to the proposal was Greg Newbold. He believed that it was 
irresponsible to use public money experimenting with residents, who had no leadership or 
administration skills, as managers of the programme (Newbold: personal 
communication). Ken Howat, a Recreation Officer at SSF at the time, confirmed 
106 Twelfth Annual Report 1990-1991 : 4 
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Newbold's concerns. Newbold recalls Howat saying, "It is going okay now but it won't 
be long before it starts to unravel" (Newbold: personal communication). 
The staff structure of the Core Group consisted of Robinson remaining as a part-time 
Programme Manager and Riecke Fergusson being hired as a part-time administrative 
assistant, with the overall running of the organisation being taken over by three former 
programme participants. In principle, the Core Group and the part-time manager were 
expected to function in the same way as a full-time programme manager had, as outlined 
in the Policy Manifesto. 
The men employed as the Core Group were Wally Aranui, Barry Joseph and Paul 
McFelin. Each of these individuals had extensive criminal histories. Aranui was a 
Mongrel Mob member who had been imprisoned for his involvement in the infamous 
Ambury Park Rape, which occurred on December 14 1986 in Mangere, Auckland. Joseph 
was a former Head Hunter who, at age 19, had received a life sentence for committing a 
gang-related murder in Auckland in 1979. McFelin had been sentenced to 11 years jail 
following the kidnapping of Gloria Kong on 29 June 1983. These three men had all been 
through and completed the programme at SSF as residents, and Joseph and McFelin had 
also subsequently been employed by Foundation: Joseph, as a Recreation Officer, and 
McFelin as a member of the Kirnihia Trust. 
Specific duties were developed for each of the Core Group members. Aranui's role was 
as the live-in house manager, who was responsible for security, maintenance, discipline, 
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training, education, and as a cultural liaison within SSF. Joseph was placed in charge of 
recreation co-ordination, programme facilitation, and as a liaison with penal and 
probation divisions of Justice. McFelin, a carpenter by trade, had authority over work 
skills and project development, funding, planning, and resource networking. 
While promising in theory, the Core Group concept proved disastrous in practice. Aranui, 
Joseph and McFelin did as well as they were able, but had no experience m 
administration. Newbold, who had opposed the proposal from the beginning, said, 
It was chaotic. Nothing was being done properly. No records were being kept. There were drugs 
and shit coming out of the place . . . The guys, when they came to meetings, were 
misrepresenting the situation, covering up the fuck-ups that had occurred. Equipment had been 
lost and we weren't being told about it. The place was being ripped off. There were drugs, people 
were going out at night and committing crimes. Bloody hell, the place just ran amuck. 
Even those who had initially supported the concept conceded that the Core Group did not 
work. Brown argues this was because, "They were set up to fail ... they weren't 
supported and they weren't trained in specific areas to make it happen". Bras, however, 
claims they resisted the assistance that was offered to them and this resulted in their 
decline. She maintains, 
They learned their own limitations in the end ... We let them go their merry way saying we're 
here if you need some help and they're saying oh god no we don't need your help, we're better 
than that. That was their mistake. They thought they could do it without the help and that is why 
they self-destructed. 
As a result of these numerous difficulties, the Core Group was disbanded on 31 October 
1991 after a six-month trial period. In the interim, Anni Brown, a former resident and the 
Board's financial vice-chairperson, assumed the role of Director, backed by the BOT. 
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Throughout this turbulent period, the programme at SSF continued and resident numbers 
were maintained. Following the collapse of the Core Group, however, only two existing 
staff members remained with the programme, namely Riecke Ferguson and Barry Joseph. 
One of the individuals to depart from SSF at this time was the programme's founder, 
Dave Robinson. While he resigned voluntarily from the BOT, in hindsight he feels that 
he was "pushed". Robinson claims, "The whole ethos of the place was changing. So I 
guess they quite rightly thought well the first thing we've got to do is get rid of Dave. So 
they got me out ... which was okay, I actually didn't mind ... the whole thing is now 
run along totally different lines". 
Barry Joseph Reoffends 
The difficulties being experienced by SSF following the collapse of the Core Group were 
worsened when Joseph was arrested in mid-December 1991 for aggravated robbery. He 
was charged with forcefully demanding money from a Christchurch motel owner and his 
family, an accusation to which he pled guilty and was subsequently sentenced to three 
years eleven months imprisonment for. According to the Thirteenth Annual Report 
(1991-1992), the BOT felt partially responsible for Joseph's behaviour because of the 
many management upheavals and reductions in staff numbers experienced in 1991 which 
had positioned him in a "strenuous position which was far beyond his capabilities without 
adequate supervision". 107 As well as this, the night Joseph reoffended he had been 
drinking at Ken Howat's 'pre-wedding' stag party, despite having serious alcohol 
107 Thirteenth Annual Report 1991-1992: 4 
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problem, a situation that was unknown to many involved with SSF at the time. For Bras, 
who became Chairperson of the Board in 1992, "That was probably the darkest day for 
me at Salisbury Street . . . because Barry had it all . . . a wonderful wife and a child . . . 
and he self-destructed in one night ... he drank when he knew he was not supposed to". 
Jon D' Almeida (1992-1993) 
The deficiencies of the Core Group led the BOT to finally agree that a full-time 
Programme Manager was necessary. Jon D' Almeida was subsequently appointed 
Director of SSF in January 1992. His background was with Outward Bound and, 
therefore, during his time as Director, the recreation component of the programme 
experienced a resurgence in emphasis. Strang recalls, "There was an emphasis on 
recreation. It was a bit like encounter recreation, where you put people in difficult 
situations. He came from Outward Bound, so he had that sort of background and 
mindset". As well as recreation, however, other components of the programme, such as 
education, vocational and life skills training, counselling and community service, also 
remained important. 
D'Almeida possessed a high standard of managerial skills and experience. Following his 
appointment, he reshaped SSF's administration through a series of organised and 
methodical procedures. Before implementing any changes, however, he ensured that he 
conferred with all staff and Board members in order to assess a proposal's viability. This 
open communication meant that SSF was "beginning to work as a team instead of an 'us 
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and them' situation as so often happened in the past". 108 D' Almeida streamlined the 
administrative procedures which provided clearer guidelines to staff and programme 
participants. As a result, staff/resident relations were at an all time high, due to both 
D 'Almeida's managerial skills and his personality. 
The procedures introduced by D' Almeida were described as being "more rational and 
realistic" than those implemented previously. 109 These included the introduction of 
urinalysis for all programme participants and staff. This addressed the fact that over 85 
percent of prison population have some drug or alcohol problem and it forced residents to 
deal with these issues. Having staff urinalysis also increased the accountability of those 
working at SSF, both to programme participants and the wider public. Along with the 
introduction of urinalysis, D' Almeida established a position of Night Manager for 
between 5pm- Spm. The role of the Night Manager ranged from monitoring disciplinary 
procedures to organising evening activities. The need for both a Night Manager and 
regular urinalysis had been expressed previously by Board members but had always been 
restricted by economics. D' Almeida, however, exhausted all possibilities until he found a 
solution and the funding to implement these initiatives. 
SSF's position in the private and public sectors improved considerably when D' Almeida 
was Director. This was because he involved himself heavily in public relations. He 
opened up communication lines with Christchurch Community Corrections by insisting 
on monthly meetings. He also reintroduced discussion groups to Paparua Prison, which 
108 Thirteenth Annual Report 1991-1992: 4 
109 Ibid: 6 
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increased SSF's profile with inmates and generally improved relations at local prisons. 
As a result, during 1992 and 1993 SSF was receiving an average of 14 day parolees per 
month. The effect of the resurrection of prison groups and subsequent increases in day 
parolees meant that SSF was able to streamline admission and assessment procedures and 
prepare future programme participants while they were still in prison. Overall, 
D' Almeida's professionalism and involvement in public relations led to a greater support 
of SSF from the Justice Department. 
D'Almeida left SSF in March 1993, after only just over a year as Director, to take up a 
position in South Africa working for Outward Bound. Both staff and residents were 
disappointed to lose D'Almeida. He had been a real asset to the Foundation, an energetic 
and competent leader, who had stabilised and tightened the programme more than had 
ever occurred previously. According to Strang, 
That year he was here, the place, he managed it. I felt safe there. You know for the first time I 
felt that if anything went wrong he would handle it. He would manage it. He would protect the 
staff, and he would move on professionally. It was the first time I'd ever experienced that and it 
was a damn good feeling actually. 
D'Almeida expressed having enjoyed his time at SSF and felt comfortable that he was 
leaving the programme in a secure position. He said in his letter of resignation (29 
January 1993), 
I have thoroughly enjoyed my working relationship with the Board, staff and residents as well as 
other agencies and the Department of Justice personnel ... The programme is extremely sound 
and challenging and is based upon workable aims, objectives and principles ... The Foundation 
has a strong Board of Trustees so in all respects I believe I have represented yourselves, the staff, 
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the residents and the future of the Salisbury Street Foundation toward a solid, professional and 
creditable stage. 
Following D'Almeida's departure, Strang moved into the position oflnterim Director for 
about nine months. She found the transition from counsellor to Programme Manager 
difficult, however, and looked forward to the appointment of a new director. She 
explains, 
It was a very difficult role because we were short-staffed and I had to do the counselling job as 
well as the Director's job. It's such a conflict of interest and, you know, I'm a head-patter not an 
arse-kicker. My role is to support and advocate for people ... I didn't enjoy that time much, and 
I would never want to move into that job again. 
In June 1993, Neil Borlase was appointed Programme Director. After only two weeks, 
however, he was asked to resign. According to Newbold, "The women on the board got 
right into him. A former navy man, they didn't like him. I couldn't say why but they just 
didn't like him. They decided that he was too authoritarian". Kathy Dunstan, one of the 
Board members who was instrumental in the dismissal ofBorlase, insists, "We had to get 
rid of this man as quickly as po8sible ... The director is the key person. They set the tone 
... and if you haven't got a good director you're pretty stuck and the place starts to fall 
apart pretty smartly". 
Hebsalody Committee 
Now we leave SSF, to consider the Hebsalody Committee, a composite organisation with 
representatives from the Hebron Trust (Heb ), 110 SSF (Sal), Odyssey House (Ody) 111 and 
110 The Hebron Trust was Youth Ministry operated by the Catholic Church. 
111 Odyssey House is a drug and alcohol treatment programme situated in Christchurch. 
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the Kimihia Trust. The Hebsalody Committee initially began in April 1991 when 
members from each respective group met to discuss the possibility of "introducing 
challenging recreational alternatives to people at risk". 112 When the Committee 
commenced it consisted of at least one member from each organisation. This included 
Brother Bernard McGrath (Hebron), Geoff Soma (Odyssey), Kathy Dunstall and Meladie 
Bras (SSF) and initially Paul and Vema McFelin (Kimihia Trust). The Hillary 
Commission funded the Hebsalody Committee and its role was to coordinate and supply 
recreational services to SSF, Odyssey House and the Hebron Trust. These services ranged 
from rock climbing to mountain biking, seasonal touch rugby to skiing, and gym training. 
The overall Hebsalody budget allowed for the employment of both Bob Cullen, a former 
SSF resident, and Barry Joseph as coordinators of the organisation. Initially it was agreed 
that Kimihia would provide six-monthly evaluations but a few months later, following 
advice from IRD regarding tax, the link with Kimihia was deemed to be unnecessary. 113 
Following its introduction, Hebsalody experienced numerous difficulties. Firstly, 
Crossen, who had initially been the main force behind the establishment of the 
organisation, was discharged from SSF in April 1991 and so his input ceased, as did the 
Kimihia Trust. Secondly, the Committee failed to provide sufficient guidelines and 
direction to the recreational provider, Bob Cullen, who had been a last minute 
replacement for Joseph. Thirdly, in 1992, allegations began to emerge that the 
representative from the Hebron Trust, Brother Bernard McGrath, had been sexually 
abusing young boys. He subsequently pled guilty to 10 charges of indecent assault 
112 Hebsalody Pamphlet 1991 
113 BOT Meeting 30/4/1991 
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involving six boys and was sentenced to three years in prison in 1993 (nzoom.com, 
6/12/2002). 114 Fourthly, Cullen's ongoing negative attitude towards clients and fellow 
workers, often described as "abusive and insulting", led to him being discharged from his 
duties in April1992. 115 
Following his dismissal, Cullen threatened SSF and in particular, Meladie Bras. 116 She 
recalls, 
I had nwnerous times gone to the bat for this resident of ours, Bob ... I went to bat for him to 
get that position for Hebsalody . . . When he was fired I'd stepped back and let everything 
happen ... He'd looked to me for support and I said "Bob, I'm not supporting you on this ... it 
was your choice" ... About two months later, he called me up at home and he abused me ... and 
he said "I just want to let you know that I've put you on the top of my list for burglaries now that 
I'm back doing them because I have no choice. 
Cullen's threat caused Bras to review her six years with SSF, including the scepticism she 
now carried, and as a result she decided it was time to leave the programme. She claims, 
"I still think it's a great concept ... [but] I'd got to the point I thought once a thief always 
a thief and I thought yep I need to get out of this because I'm not going to be doing 
anybody any help". Approximately a year after Cullen's discharge, SSF withdrew from 
its Hebsalody contract, discontinuing all involvement with the organisation. 117 The reason 
for SSF's withdrawal from Hebsalody was largely due to financial difficulties 
114 In 1997, he plead guilty to six more counts of indecent assault and received another three years to be 
served concurrently with his prior sentence. 
115 SSF Evaluation of Service Delivery given by Bob Cullen on behalf ofHebsalody 1992 
116 Letter from Bob Cullen to SSF Chairperson 27/5/1992 
117 Letter from Newbold to Sharon Van Gulik, Programme Manager, Hillary Commission, 20 July 1993 
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being experienced by the organisation at this time. These concerns will be dealt with in 
later discussion. 
Colin Elliott (1993-1994) 
Colin Elliott took up the role of SSF's Director in October 1993. He had previously 
worked primarily as a social worker for a range of organisations, including the Crippled 
Children's Society and Outward Bound. Elliott claimed to bring with him to SSF "a clear 
determination to challenge the focus of the programme ... by inviting residents ... to 
take more responsibility for their own behaviour and the way they function within the 
programme". 118 He wanted to both empower and challenge individuals who were stuck in 
set roles and patterns, through a mixture of therapy and outdoor recreation (Colin Elliott: 
personal communication). In actuality, however, Elliott spent the majority of his time 
dealing with financial issues, such as funding, budgeting and expenditure. 
SSF premises under threat 
Combined with this lack of funding there was also a threat that SSF might lose its St 
Albans Street, Merivale premises. The potential loss of the house in St Albans Street 
initially emerged, prior to Elliott's appointment, in February 1993. That month SSF had 
received a letter from the Department of Justice giving the Foundation three months 
notice to vacate its Merivale premises. This proposition placed the programme in serious 
jeopardy because SSF was unable to pay market price for the property. 119 The only 
alternative seemed to be to try and re-locate. Subsequent exploration of this possibility, 
118 Chairman's Report, August 1994 
119 The rent being paid for SSF's Merivale premises was still well below the market rate. 
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however, indicated its viability was limited. This was due to four key factors. First, 
funding was always uncertain so SSF could never qualify for a mortgage. Second, the 
Foundation was operating on a shoestring budget, with a lot of volunteer help, and would 
not be able to afford market rentals for premises which could accommodate up to 12 
residents. Third, Christchurch City Council town planning staff and SSF's legal counsel 
advised the BOT that gaining permission to operate an organisation of this type anywhere 
else would be difficult. The application process was lengthy and it was likely that local 
residents would oppose the introduction of a programme like SSF. The fourth and final 
limitation of relocating was the expense involved with adapting new premises to suit the 
needs ofthe Foundation. 
As a result, it was decided that the best option for the continuation of the programme was 
for it to remain at its current location. The solutions suggested included that the Justice 
Department sell the property to the Board at a "token" price, enabling Justice to get the 
property off the books, or for an arrangement to be reached to establish some way of 
renting the property to the Board at concessionary rates. After a period of uncertainty and 
ongoing negotiations, politics intervened when the St Albans Street property was placed 
in the landbank .by the State in October 1993 as compensation in the Treaty of Waitangi 
claim made by Ngai Tahu. SSF subsequently secured a three-year tenancy agreement 
with the Property Manager ofNgai Tahu, which took effect on 1 September 1995. At this 
time, however, it was made quite clear that the agreement was unlikely to be renewed 
after three years, so concerns relating to relocation and the future of the programme 
continued. 
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Funding crisis 
In combination with concerns over SSF' s residence, the organisation was also 
experiencing a significant funding crisis. Community funding for organisations like SSF 
had been drastically reduced and redirected into the development of habilitation centres. 
Consequently, SSF's operating budget for the 1993-1994 year was $26,000 less than the 
prior year, amounting to $205,000 actual expenditure. This was below the $209,000 
which was needed to maintain a quality programme with full staff. 120 
Despite continued efforts to access new sources of funding, the crisis deepened as 1994 
progressed with funds being exhausted by the end of July. 121 In a letter to Mel Smith, the 
Acting Secretary of Justice, Chairman of SSF's Board, Peter Brittenden expressed his 
concerns. "It is crunch time at the Salisbury Street Foundation. Money runs out at the end 
of October ... The future of the Salisbury Street Foundation and the programme it 
provides is now in grave jeopardy''. 122 As a result, SSF received emergency funding from 
the Ministry of Justice in two installments of $40,000 and $60,000 in July and August 
1994. The Justice Department also expressed a desire for the programme to continue and 
proposed that SSF needed to negotiate a contract with them. It became quicldy clear that 
this contractual arrangement was likely to involve SSF becoming part of a habilitation 
pilot programme scheme that was being contemplated following an amendment to the 
Criminal Justice Act in 1993. 
120 Report on Salisbury Street Foundation: Executive Summary February 1994 
121 BOT Meeting 29/6/1994 
122 Letter to Mel Smith, Acting Secretary of Justice, from Peter Brittenden, 28 July 1994 
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Elliott resigns 
In August 1994, at the same time as the funding crisis was occurring and after less than a 
year as Director of SSF, Elliott resigned. The uncertainty over funding and associated 
problems that carne with it had exhausted him. Elliott explains, 
It was a very difficult time ... There wasn't adequate staffing or managing to feel safe that [we] 
had cover, like because of funding issues there was one night a week when there was no staff on 
... [Also] I went to Wellington three times in a year and each time they gave me 20 or 30,000 
dollars to continue the programme and the last time I said it's too hard, I'm resigning ... I was 
burnt out by that stage. 
Glenn Newman, a former probation officer and colleague of Dave Robinson, who had 
also assisted Terry Easthope in the development of the encounter recreation programme 
at SSF in 1986, replaced Elliott as Director of SSF in November 1994. Soon after his 
appointment, he had the habilitation proposal placed in his lap. It had become clear to 
many staff and Board members at SSF that the survival of the Foundation was dependent 
of continued funding from the Department of Justice and, therefore, progress towards 
SSF being established as a habilitation centre needed to begin. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SSF History- The Habilitation Centre Phase and Beyond 
Introduction 
In April 1996, the Salisbury Street Foundation was established as a pilot habilitation 
centre. This followed a series of recommendations, initially made by the New Zealand 
Ministerial Committee of Inquiry into the Prisons System in 1989, then revised by the 
Habilitation Centre Development Group in 1990, and finally introduced into legislation in 
the Criminal Justice Amendment Act 1993. The implementation of SSF as New 
Zealand's first pilot habilitation centre was the result of a lengthy and complex process. It 
required an in-depth review of the management and structure of SSF and established the 
Foundation as ultimately accountable to the Ministry of Justice. Along with this, 
however, it also ensured greater stability for the programme, especially in relation to 
funding. Consequently, and in conjunction with the appointment of a new Director, David 
Coom, since 1997 the Foundation has experienced the most stable period of its 23-year 
history. Recently, in July 2002, SSF's legislative existence as a habilitation centre ceased 
with the introduction of the Sentencing Act. The programme continues to operate, 
however, within the terms of the new legislation and as yet has not been significantly 
altered by the policy change. 
As with discussion on SSF's pre-habilitation centre period, this chapter will maintain a 
focus on five key areas of interest. These are (1) the personality of each programme 
Director, namely Glenn Newman and then David Coom, and the influence they had on 
155 
the running of the programme at SSF; (2) operational philosophies and strategies; (3) the 
role of the Board of Trustees; ( 4) the effect of legislative changes; and ( 5) the impact of 
critical events and incidents. As mentioned, each of these factors is essential in gaining a 
comprehensive understanding of SSF and the development its programme. Consideration 
of these aspects also enables the introduction of issues relating to (re )habilitation and the 
organisation and management of not-for-profit organisations, which are to be discussed, 
in relation to SSF, in later chapters. 
HABILITATION CENTRES: THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
The Roper Report, 1989 
The habilitation centre concept was introduced to New Zealand in the 1989 Prison 
Review carried out by the New Zealand Ministerial Committee of Inquiry into the Prisons 
System (The Roper Report). This Committee was chaired by The Hon. Sir Clinton Roper, 
a retired Judge of the High Court, and included six other members who were: ( 1) Kathy 
Dunstall, a parent, community worker and former Nursing Tutor; (2) Rev. Robert Biddle, 
Chairman of Whakatohea Executive and member of their Trust Board, and General 
Secretary of Ringatu Church; (3) W.D. Garrett, a retired Inspector and Superintendent of 
Prisons; ( 4) Dr. lain McCormick, a Registered Psychologist, Partner and National 
Director of Human Resources, Touche Ross; (5) T.A.F. Withers, a Justice of the Peace 
and former Registrar of the High Court; and (6) Margaret Thompson, a Research Officer. 
Entitled 'Te Ara Hou: The New Way', this report offered habilitation centres as an 
alternative to the traditional prison system which, it contended, was largely failing to 
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rehabilitate or deter offenders. The Committee made bald assertions that this was due to 
an "irreconcilable conflict" between the two fundamental objectives of prison, secure 
containment and reform, and that although there was "sufficient evidence to suggest that 
with a more intensive and extensive therapeutic approach, it is possible to reduce the rate 
of offending of some individuals or turn them from crime altogether", this was unlikely to 
occur in prison (New Zealand Ministerial Committee of Inquiry 1989: 35). 
Habilitation centres were characterised by the Roper Committee as "independent 
community-based therapeutic programmes" that could "offer inmates realistic 
opportunities to make permanent change in their lives and put an end to criminal activity" 
(New Zealand Ministerial Committee of Inquiry 1989: 36). Central to the notion of 
habilitation was the argument that rehabilitation was often an unrealistic goal within 
community-based programmes. This was because 'rehabilitation' implied the restoration 
of former skills and abilities which arguably did not exist in the first place. The 
philosophy behind habilitation centres, therefore, was to "equip and make fit for life" 
(New Zealand Ministerial Committee of Inquiry 1989: 35). In the opinion of the Roper 
Committee, this was a more positive and realistic approach to take in the establishment of 
effective and workable reintegrative programmes for offenders outside of the traditional 
prison environment. 
The Roper Report listed a range of features that needed to be incorporated into 
habilitation programmes. (1) They needed to be clear, well structured, organised and 
documented. (2) Their emphasis should be based on a social-learning model 
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incorporating a holistic approach that addressed all aspects of behaviour/personality and 
focused on the attainment of new skills. (3) Habilitation centres were not a soft option 
and they would provide an intensive and sometimes confrontational environment. ( 4) 
Habilitation programmes needed to be conducted within the inmate's community 
whenever possible. (5) High quality and committed staff. 123 (5) It was deemed important 
that an adequate post-release follow up was developed. Also habilitation councils were 
recommended as a way of overseeing the movement of inmates from prison to 
habilitation centres and then into the community. 
According to the Roper Committee, there were numerous programmes already in 
existence in New Zealand that could be established as habilitation centres. Five centres 
recommended as appropriate for the transformation to a habilitation centre were: Beck 
House in Napier, Downie Stewart Foundation in Dunedin, Montgomery House in 
Hamilton, SSF in Christchurch and Te Moana Marae in Wellington. As well as these 
programmes, there was also room for the development of new specialised habilitation 
centres. The Roper Report described seven types of programmes as being compatible 
with the habilitation centre concept. These were: 
1. Secure treatment centres for high risk offenders including those convicted of sex 
crimes, such as Kia Marama, the child sex offenders unit at Rolleston Prison. 
2. Therapeutic, community-based programmes, founded on the Delancey Street model 
and making use oflong-term confrontational therapy, for example, SSF. 
3. Community-based programmes for violent offenders, such as Montgomery House, 
an organisation run by PARS in conjunction with Psychological Services. 
123 It was suggested that staff should include ex-inmates with appropriate skills for the job. 
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4. Programmes specialising in Maori offenders which were based on a marae and 
involved cultural, educational, vocational and therapeutic programmes. 
5. Drug and alcohol treatment programmes such as Odyssey House. 
6. Programmes that provided opportunities for education, trade and/or other 
employment training. 
7. Programmes which focused on social skills, budgeting, job search skills and 
constructive recreational skills. 
The Habilitation Centre Development Group 
The ideas and suggestions put forward by the Roper Report were assessed, refmed and/or 
further developed by the Habilitation Centre Development Group in 1990 (Department of 
Justice Habilitation Centre Development Group 1990). 124 While having some misgivings 
about certain aspects of the Roper Report, in general the group claimed, "We support the 
proposal for habilitation centres as an attempt to give a strongly positive dimension to 
imprisonment" (Department of Justice Habilitation Centre Development Group 1990: 
34). For the Development Group, habilitation centres were viewed as a "natural and 
positive extension to the case management system". This system had concentrated on 
"the planned co-ordination of all programmes and services to meet the individual needs 
of the inmates in prison and to prepare them for their successful reintegration into the 
community" and it was believed that habilitation centres would continue to foster this 
goal (Department of Justice Habilitation Centre Development Group 1990: 36-37). 
124 Research into habilitation centres continued through the 1990s. For example, see Dyer (1994). 
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The Habilitation Centre Development Group reviewed and reiterated the key guidelines 
for the establishment of habilitation centres. The Group focused on the reduction of 
reoffending through altering social, behavioural or vocational functioning. Other crucial 
elements included: the programme was residential and full-time; that residents were 
closely supervised; that no alcohol or drugs were consumed; and any non-compliance or 
breaches of conditions were to be immediately reported and resolved. Within the 
remaining guidelines there were varying degrees of flexibility. For instance, habilitation 
centres could be either non-profit or profit organisations, there was no one set prescribed 
length, and transfer was based on perceived need not automatic admission. 
The Habilitation Centre Development Group had three main concerns regarding the 
Roper Report and the implementation of habilitation centres. The f1rst was that the role of 
the sentence of imprisonment should not be undermined because most of the general 
populace in New Zealand still viewed the deprivation of liberty and removal from the 
community associated with incarceration as necessary elements of justice. Therefore, it 
was suggested that the inmate should be required to serve a minimum period in prison 
(one third of the sentence was deemed appropriate) prior to any transfer to a habilitation 
centre. The second area of concern related to the development of an appropriate system 
for the provision of habilitation centres and the supervision of inmates. For the 
Development Group the preferred solution was to ensure specific authority existed 
regarding the release of inmates into residential habilitation programmes and their return 
to prison under certain conditions. Third, the Development Group emphasised that the 
introduction of habilitation centres must be accompanied by careful evaluation, including 
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comparative assessments with prison programmes (Department of Justice Habilitation 
Centre Development Group 1990: 49). In the opinion of the Group this was a core 
function of the State, which could not be delegated. 
The Criminal Justice Amendment Act, 1993 
The recommendations of the Roper Report and the Habilitation Centre Development 
Group were enacted into law under the Criminal Justice Amendment Act 1993. Section 
two of this Act established habilitation centres as approved residential centres. The 
Habilitation Centres Pilot Programme was established with four key objectives: (1) to 
provide residential programmes which identify and address the causes and/or factors, 
which contribute to offending behaviour; (2) to contribute to the successful reintegration 
of offenders into the community; (3) to reduce reoffending; and ( 4) to foster community 
involvement in the provision of programmes to offenders. 125 Offenders were able apply to 
reside at a habilitation centre or alternately they could be sentenced to a centre by the 
District Court or High Court as an additional condition of a sentence of supervision or 
community programme. The actual time spent at a habilitation centre was to be 
determined by the Parole Board or District Prisons Board, although initially it generally 
extended for a maximum of 12 months, so long as this did not continue beyond an 
offender's sentence expiry date. 
125 Department of Corrections: Media Release, 27 July 1995 
161 
Under the 1993 Act, probation officers were designated as habilitation coordinators. This 
role was defined as having five key areas of responsibility. The first was to investigate 
and evaluate the suitability of inmates for release to a habilitation centre. Second, 
habilitation coordinators were expected to monitor the conduct and participation of 
residents including their compliance with the conditions of release. Third, they were 
responsible for providing advice to habilitation centre staff regarding the placement of 
offenders. The fourth area necessitated the involvement of habilitation coordinators in 
programme development, and operational and security matters. Fifth, they were expected 
to report to the district manager of Community Corrections on matters relating to the 
centre (Criminal Justice Amendment Act 1993, s. 44). 
Release to a habilitation centre was based on the same standard conditions involved when 
determining release on parole. These included the likelihood of reoffence, the welfare of 
the offender and any attitudinal changes experienced during his/her sentence, and the 
nature of the offence (Criminal Justice Amendment Act 1993, s.104). Of primary 
importance within the Criminal Justice Amendment Act 1993 was that all persons 
eligible for early release from prison, whether on parole or remission, were subject to 
revocable conditions. Therefore, it was considered essential when deciding upon the 
release of an offender to a habilitation centre, that no offender was to be deemed eligible 
unless the Parole Board or District Prisons Board was satisfied that the offender was 
suitable for release to the facility, likely to benefit from participation in the programme, 
and understood all conditions of release to an habilitation centre (Criminal Justice 
Amendment Act 1993, s.l02 (3)). 
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Eligibility to attend a habilitation centre varied according to the sentence being served. 
Most residents were able to apply to a habilitation centre when they became eligible for 
release on parole under section 89 of the Criminal Justice Amendment Act 1993, or when 
they were to be released under section 90 at their final release date126 (Criminal Justice 
Amendment Act 1993, s.102). 127 According to the 1993 Act, discretionary release on 
parole was available for those serving determinate sentences of more than 12 months for 
a non-violent offence, following the completion of a third of their sentence (Criminal 
Justice Amendment Act 1993, s.89 (3)). For those serving indeterminate sentences, or 
sentences of more than 15 years for a serious violent offence, eligibility was after the 
expiry of ten years of that sentence (Criminal Justice Amendment Act 1993, s.89 (1) 
(4)).128 
A number of conditions had to be agreed to, and written consent given, prior to the 
release of an offender to a habilitation centre. For instance, offenders were required to 
reside at the centre unless authorised by the manager to be released on leave for a 
maximum of three days. They were also expected to co-operate with their assigned 
probation officer/habilitation centre coordinator and comply with all rules and lawful 
orders given by programme personnel. If any of these conditions or consents were 
breached, including if the resident committed an offence or jeopardised the safety of any 
126 Final Release was available after one-half sentence for those sentenced to prison for 12 months or less, 
two-thirds sentence for those serving more than 12 months for a non-violent offence or a violent offence 
with no minimum period of imprisonment, and the period imposed for violent offence sentenced to a 
minimum non-parole period (Criminal Justice Amendment Act 1993, s. 90). 
127 This did not include those serving less than 12 months imprisonment or a sentence of corrective training. 
128 The non-parole period for lifers and preventive detainees had been increased from seven to ten years 
under section 93 of the Criminal Justice Amendment Act 1987. 
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person at the centre or the security of the organisation, then in accordance with this act 
they could be recalled to prison to serve the remainder of their sentence (The Criminal 
Justice Amendment Act 1993, part VI, s 107 1(6)(a) to (e)). 
SSF: NEW ZEALANDS FIRST PILOT HABILITATION CENTRE 
Preparation: Glenn Newman 
Glenn Newman was appointed Director of SSF in November 1994. He had initially 
applied for the position in 1993 but Colin Elliot had been offered the job ahead of him. 
Newman's informal involvement with SSF dated back to the programme's introduction. 
As a probation officer, Newman knew Dave Robinson and had spoken with him about the 
possibility of opening up some kind of post-release facility in 1979. He recalls, 
That debate was very current amongst probation officers at that time, you know finding 
alternatives to imprisonment. Actually part of our job was to look at community-based 
alternatives, so yeah I was involved in a low-key kind of way. I knew what was going on and I 
contributed ideas. 
After its establishment, Newman maintained links to SSF. For example, in 1986 because 
he had previous outdoor experience, he assisted Terry Easthope in the development of the 
encounter recreation programme at SSF (Newman: personal communication). When 
Newman became Director of SSF, therefore, he had the advantage of knowing the general 
history and development of the programme. 
Being aware of SSF's history, including prior problems and difficulties, meant that 
Newman had a clear idea about what he wanted to change. He stated, "I didn't want to 
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continue with Salisbury Street as it had been in the past. I was very clear about that". 
Firstly, Newman recognised that the resident-run, Delancey Street model had not worked 
at SSP and had instead led to ''unprofessional management" and "inefficient 
organisation" especially in terms of money. He believed a greater professionalism was 
needed within the organisation and that SSP would be more viable and successful if it 
increased its connections to Corrections and the prison system. Secondly, Newman aimed 
to end "the old idea of a charismatic leader of the place", which historically had seen the 
organisation totally reinvent itself when a new director took over. Alternatively, Newman 
wanted to develop a comprehensive set format for the programme so that when he left, 
SSP could continue to operate without "depending on my personality to make it happen". 
As discussed in chapter four, the possibility of becoming a pilot habilitation centre had 
been suggested by Corrections prior to Newman being employed as Director. Once 
Newman was appointed, however, the development of a proposal began relatively 
quickly. This was due both to financial necessity and because Newman supported the 
shift towards a greater connection between SSP and Corrections. In fact, he would have 
preferred an even deeper involvement. According to Newman, "What I would have liked 
was to have merged Salisbury Street into something to do with Corrections so we became 
almost like a Corrections structure, the administration being completely handled by 
Corrections". He was of the opinion that SSP had never really been a community 
organisation. It had been set up and largely run by professionals not criminals and would, 
therefore, function more productively as an "outpost" of corrections, where funding was 
certain and administrative expectations clear (Newman: personal communication). 
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Not everyone involved with SSF agreed that the Foundation should become a habilitation 
centre. For instance, Kathy Dunstan, who had been a member of the Roper Committee, 
believed the original philosophy upon which the habilitation centre had been based was 
being undermined by the Department of Corrections (Dunstall: personal communication). 
She argued, 
Corrections, or the Department of Justice, claimed ownership. That was the big conflict, I 
think. The Roper recommendation was that community-based organisations maintained 
their autonomy ... I stood down from the Board at that period because of the operating 
specifications which came out of Corrections ... I think they went over the top with the 
requirements of community-based organisations. 129 
Anni Brown also discontinued her involvement with SSF at this time. She believed the 
programme had drifted from the ideals upon which it was founded and that becoming a 
habilitation centre would simply undermine these principles further. For example, the 
value of the BOT would lose all credibility. Brown contended, "What's the point in 
having a Board of Trustees if we're going to be a habilitation centre ... they're too tied 
down by Corrections policy anyway. The policies are set by Corrections, not by Salisbury 
Street". Despite these concerns, enough support existed within SSF for the progression 
towards becoming a pilot habilitation centre to continue. 
The process of setting SSF up as a pilot habilitation centre was complex and involved a 
lot of work, including writing up an application and developing a contract with the 
Department of Corrections. According to Newman, "It was just a mammoth amount of 
work . . . The contract document was gigantic and we had to start right from scratch to 
129 While Kathy Dunstan stood down at this stage she later rejoined the BOT and was involved with SSF 
until her resignation in 2001. 
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write it out. There was no format for that. There was simply the outline of what 
Corrections would pay for and so we had to build a contract in connection with that". 
Along with Newman, members of the BOT and in particular Janice Patterson 
(Chairperson of the BOT) and Greg Newbold were involved in the development of the 
pilot habilitation centre documentation. Subsequently, and following a series of drafts, 
the initial proposal to establish SSF as a pilot habilitation centre was completed in March 
1995 and followed by the development of a detailed policy and procedures manual in 
February 1996. 
Pilot Habilitation Centre Proposal, March 1995 I Policy and Procedures Manual, 1996 
Developing a proposal to establish SSF as a pilot habilitation centre necessitated a 
general review of the current programme. The Department of Corrections required a 
detailed account of all operational and structural aspects of the organisation. Based on the 
submission subsequently made to Corrections, the overall programme at SSF was to 
retain the majority of its prior objectives, structures and procedures. The most significant 
aspect of the transition to a habilitation centre was that SSF was going to become both 
more accountable to, and fully funded by, the Department of Corrections. Along with the 
1995 proposal, a comprehensive policy and procedures manual was developed in 
February 1996. Within this document, the objectives and key components of the 
programme were reiterated, as were the rules, assessment procedures, proposed operating 
costs, and job descriptions of all SSF staff. 
167 
The proposal and Policy and Procedures Manual established the overriding aim of SSF. 
According to the mission statement this was, "To provide a professional, caring 
residential habilitation programme for men who have been involved in criminal 
offending, to prevent further offending and to facilitate their safe integration into the 
community". 130 This was to be achieved through the use a wide range of effective 
interventions including group therapy, relapse prevention, social skills/education/life 
skills programmes, encounter recreation, prison discussion and assessment groups, 
assessment of offender needs both within institutions and the community, and the 
presentation of reports to National and District Prisons Boards and Probation staff. 
The cost of operating the habilitation programme at SSF was set at $320,605 for the first 
year, increasing to $327,000 in the second year and $333,500 in the third year. In 
retrospect, however, Newman concedes that, 
I had to keep saying but we can't do that. That's not what Corrections will pay for ... The big 
mistake I made was I did not make enough room for staff ... you need a core four or five staff, 
then you've got to multiple that by three to get 24-hour coverage ... But it was difficult because 
we were having to compete with other organisations and Corrections ... were saying you know 
this organisation here are going to provide staffing at half what you've quoted ... I wish now 
that what I'd done is put down all of the staff. I should've challenged them to tum that down. 
The key positions of responsibility within SSF remained largely unchanged. The BOT 
was to retain overall control of the administration and content of the programme. The 
Director (Manager) was responsible for the management of the centre, including the areas 
of supervision, security, safety and participant involvement, and was ultimately 
130 SSF- Policy and Procedures Manual1996: 2 
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accountable to the BOT. Other staff members included the full-time positions of a 
Programme Manager (now a separate position from the Director), an Office 
Administrator, and an Evening Programme Manager, and on a part-time basis a 
Counsellor, Weekend Managers and a Community Worker. All of these staff members 
were primarily answerable to the Director who then reported to the Board. 131 
A set of criteria was developed regarding who would be eligible to attend SSF once it 
became a habilitation centre. It was decided the programme would concentrate on males, 
generally over 20 years of age, with a substantial background of offending and 
institutionalisation. Priority was to be given to those in prison over those awaiting 
sentencing from the courts, and all potential applicants were expected to display a 
willingness to make substantial life changes. Although not written into official policy, 
some Board and staff members also deemed certain offenders as inappropriate for SSF. 
These included those whose central problem was addiction to drugs or alcohol, those with 
a history of sexual offences against children, and individuals with a recognised 
psychiatric illness. 
Eligibility for the programme was to be determined through a clearly set assessment 
procedure. As had previously occurred, this was to begin with an initial interview at the 
prison with a group of inmates, and then a subsequent check of any potential client's 
institution files and discussion with appropriate prison staff. A second interview was to 
provide an opportunity to discuss material discovered in the institution file or from the 
input of prison staff, and subsequent to this, a series of day paroles would ultimately 
131 See SSF- Policy and Procedures Manual1996 
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decide the acceptability of an offender. An independent assessment was also to be carried 
out by the Habilitation Centre Coordinator, although the Director of SSF was to retain the 
right over the final decision 
The rules remained largely unaltered from those that had been developed in the 1980s, 
and they continued through the early 1990s. These were listed as: (1) all participants must 
agree to co-operate with staff and other residents to the best of their ability, and maintain 
a positive attitude; (2) no criminal offending; (3) no physical violence; (4) no alcohol; (5) 
no drugs; ( 6) no sexual relations; (7) all finances of residents under the control of the 
Foundation (although it was stated that this rule was to be reviewed); (8) all residents 
who had attended the programme for under two weeks had a 11 pm curfew and were only 
to leave the property with a staff member; (9) no overnight leave for initial one month 
and then no overnight leave between Monday and Thursday; (10) all excursions were to 
be negotiated with the Director and Night Manager and all participants were expected to 
be in by 11 pm on weeknights with all visitors also gone by this time. 
Along with these rules, a curfew and leave system was developed at SSF. This system 
consisted of three stages: Red, Orange and Green. The Red stage was imposed during the 
first two weeks of a resident's stay. During this time, residents were placed on full curfew 
and were only able to leave the property with a staff member. From the third week, 
residents entered an Orange stage which allowed them evening leave until curfew time 
(as stated above) and day leave during the weekend with a resident who is on Green 
status or a designated support person. After eight weeks, residents progressed to the 
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Green stage which enabled them to leave the property alone if staff approval was given 
and also provided the opportunity for weekend leave if deemed appropriate. 
SSF becomes a Habilitation Centre 
SSF became New Zealand's first pilot habilitation centre in April 1996 following the 
successful negotiation of a three-year contract with the Department of Corrections. 132 
This was a historic event in SSF's history. For over seventeen years, a major focus for 
programme administrators had been on attaining the funding necessary for the future 
survival of the organisation, a situation which had been becoming increasingly difficult in 
recent years. The contract with Corrections, establishing SSF as a pilot habilitation 
centre, provided the programme with a greater degree of security, both financially and 
professionally, as well as higher standards of service delivery. 
Along with increased support came greater expectations and levels of accountability. 
Frequent visits were made to SSF by Corrections staff and a variety of guidelines were 
established for the accreditation of pilot habilitation centres. These detailed a wide range 
of areas including physical environment, accommodation, organisation and management, 
financial management, personnel, medical care and health, health and hygiene, 
safety/security, intake, records, evaluation, monitoring/support/liaising, and programme 
content. 133 SSF was expected to adhere to all of these protocols and procedures, and to be 
able to measure them in a "reliable and transparent way". 134 The prime concern for SSF, 
132 The other habilitation centres which were established at this time will be discussed in chapter seven. 
133 Draft Guidelines for the Accreditation of Pilot Habilitation Centres 1996 
134 Report to Patterson and SSF BOT from Anne McCormack, October 1996 
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however, with funding assured, was to maintain eight to ten residents in the programme, a 
standard they failed to meet throughout much of 1996. 
Resident Numbers 
During the twelve-months that the contract with Corrections was being prepared resident 
numbers were lower than usual at SSF. This was put down to the amount of time 
Newman was spending on the habilitation centre contract. Following the signing of the 
contract, however, numbers remained low. This was partly because the prison was not 
providing SSF with referrals and Newman was not pursuing the issue. Also conflicting 
opinions existed between SSF and Corrections regarding who was responsible for 
providing SSF with clients. SSF Board members argued it was the Department of 
Correction's job, while the Department argued SSF should be finding their own residents. 
Eventually, Corrections conceded they were responsible for providing SSF with potential 
clients but they also reiterated to SSF that, according to the contract specifications, an 
average of eight residents was required over a six-moth period and that the current 
standard of two to three residents was unacceptable. 
A major reason for the lack of residents at SSF during this time was deemed to be due to 
the "energyless environment" that existed amongst the Director and staff regardless of the 
time or day of the week. 135 Hence, strategies for increasing numbers in the programme 
were not being developed. Staff members were aware of the low energy level present at 
SSF and determined it to be because, "We worked so hard getting the contract accepted 
135 Report to Patterson and SSF BOT from Anne McCormack, October 1996 
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and then we haven't really moved since". 136 It seemed that so much effort had gone into 
the preparation of the contract that little was left over to put it into action. This was 
especially true for SSF's Director, Glenn Newman, with exhaustion and a lack of 
motivation ultimately calling his leadership into question. 
Resignation of Glenn Newman 
On 10 December 1996, concern was expressed by members of the Board that Newman 
was increasingly "extremely stressed and agitated". 137 He was constantly failing to do 
what was asked of him. The BOT had also become aware that appointments were being 
changed without prior notice and that Newman was not ringing weekend staff before they 
started their shift to update them on the week's activities and developments. As a result, a 
letter was sent to Newman informing him of the BOT's concerns but suggesting that he 
should remain as Director because he was good with residents and could be monitored by 
the BOT. Newman, however, who had never intended to remain involved with SSF for a 
long period of time, was ready to leave. He explains, "I never had any intention of staying 
there too long . . . I had in mind two or three years to try and make up a programme that 
could be run so that I could leave and someone else could come and pick it up and just 
keep going along the same format". 
According to Newman, the huge amount of work required for the establishment of SSF as 
a pilot habilitation centre had drained him of energy to continue as Director. He was also 
136 Report to Patterson and SSF BOT from Anne McCormack, October 1996 
137 BOT Meeting 10/12/1996 
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finding it increasingly difficult to deal with, and incorporate into SSF's programme, the 
often conflicting agendas of the BOT. He recalls, 
[SSF] was driven by this group of trustees from the community and they all brought in amazing 
agendas ... This person had one view, this person had another view, and so on. And it was very, 
very difficult to marry all those things together ... It's certainly something I underestimated 
when I took the job ... I didn't think it was going to happen and when it did I was taken aback 
by it. I would deal with it differently now. 
Newman was even beginning to question the motives of some Board members. He states, 
"In some ways, during my bad moments, I was quite clear that some of them were using 
this as a way to bask in their own professional careers". Consequently, soon after the 
commencement of the New Year, Newman resigned as Director of SSF. 
Appointment of David Coom 
Following the resignation of Newman, David Coom was welcomed as the new Director 
of SSF in April1997. Coom had worked as a social worker for over a decade and arrived 
from Methodist Child and Family where he had been employed as a manager since 1993. 
For Coom, working for SSF seemed like "an ideal opportunity for me to pull together a 
lot of things that professionally I was really interested in; management, clinical work, 
group work and working with male offenders". 
Coom's appointment has been largely beneficial for the stability of SSF. He remained the 
Director of SSF for nearly six years, up until February 2003 when he offered his 
resignation. According to Newbold (1999: 3), during Coom's reign as Director, SSF 
experienced "a period of tranquility, the most uneventful in the foundation's history". 
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Therefore, rather than continuously worrying about issues such as poor management, 
inadequate record keeping, and/or insufficient funding, administrators have been able to 
focus on revising and reworking policies and procedures, undertaking research on SSF, 
and working towards meeting Department of Corrections requirements. Consideration 
needs to be given to some of this documentation which has emerged since 1997 as well as 
the occurrence of events significant to the running of SSF. 
Habilitation Centres: Quarterly Reports 
Along with guaranteed funding, the most significant impact for SSF of the transition to a 
habilitation centre was the increased level of accountability to the Department of 
Corrections. A key aspect of this was the provision of quarterly service performance 
reports. Every three months, reports were expected from each of the pilot habilitation 
centres. Along with SSF, the other initial pilot habilitation centres were Higher Ground 
Drug Rehabilitation Trust in Auckland, Aspell House in Plimmerton (run by the National 
Society on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence), Te Thi Tu of Roopu Tane Taranaki in 
New Plymouth, and Te Whanau 0 Waipareira Trust in West Auckland. Reports from 
each of these organisations were subsequently used as a means of comparing and 
evaluating the programmes in regards to programme delivery, standards of care and 
management, serious incidents, programme completion, and financial results. The 
specific findings of these reports, in relation to all of the initial pilot habilitation 
programmes, will be considered in chapters six and seven, which assess the success of 
SSF in relation to the areas of organisation, management, and rehabilitation. In general, 
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however, SSF was the only pilot habilitation centre to consistently meet the majority of 
the objectives set out by the Department of Corrections. 138 
Department of Corrections: Interim Evaluation Report, 1997 
Along with the quarterly reports, an assessment of SSF was carried out in 1997 by Dr 
David Yeboah, a Senior Research Advisor at the Department of Corrections. The main 
aim of his evaluation was "to provide information and policy advice to the Minister to 
enable him to make an informed decision on whether or not the habilitation centres 
concept should be continued, modified or abolished" (Y eboah 1997: 11 ). The research 
detailed the successes and failures of SSF over its first year as a pilot habilitation centre. 
The specifics of his findings, especially in relation to the areas of programme completion 
and recidivism, will be considered in greater depth in chapter six. In general, while 
Y eboah concluded that SSF had "successfully completed the set up phase and the pilot 
has been well established" (Yeboah 1997: 4), he also made a series of recommendations 
and suggestions for the improvement of the programme at SSF. 
Y eboah offered a range of suggestions and recommendations as a means of overcoming 
inadequacies within, and surrounding, the programme at SSF. These incorporated: (1) the 
clarification of roles within the organisation especially in regards to the habilitation 
coordinator and prison officers; (2) adopting a more robust approach to the marketing of 
the programme; (3) offering a programme which was more specifically tailored to the 
needs of each individual resident including, for example, a core course on anger and 
violence and a Maori component of the programme; and (4) ensuring more effective 
138 See Habilitation Centre: Quarterly Reports/Service Performance Reports 1996-2001 
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supervision particularly at night and during the weekends in order to reduce and minimise 
breaches of programmes rules and regulations (Yeboah 1997). A number of these 
recommendations were subsequently discussed at SSF and further considered by Coom 
through the completion of some research of his own. 
Research Project: Coom 
In addition to the research carried out by Yeboah, in 1997 Coom undertook a project 
examining the programme at SSF. He aimed to evaluate SSF based on McLaren's (1996) 
research on criminogenic needs and the provision of skills needed to reduce 
reoffending.139 McLaren established the problems and skills deficits which are predictive 
of reoffending as relating to the areas of violence, education, substance abuse, cognitive 
skills, self-management, driving offences, vocational development, pre-release activities, 
and recreation and leisure skills. Coom's research found that SSF went a long way to 
addressing these skills deficits and that clients were generally happy with programme. 
Despite the generally positive outcome of Coom's research, there were also areas 
established as requiring further attention. These incorporated the development of more 
specific skills training, such as a violence programme, education on drug and alcohol 
issues, work skills, and an increase in cognitive skills training specifically around 
problem solving and self-motivation. A greater level of formality in the application and 
checking of programme delivery, including the graduation of residents, was also deemed 
139 McLaren's research and the findings ofCoom's research are dealt with in greater depth in chapter six. 
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necessary. As a result, Coom offered eleven recommendations for the further 
enhancement of programme delivery at SSF. These were: 
1. Adopting the National Stopping Violence programme as a way of focussing the 
programme at SSF and making it more challenging of men's behaviour. 
2. Ensuring staff model non-violent and respectful behaviour. 
3. Continuing the education programme as it is, with both an individualised 
programme and group slots on a range of relevant issues. 
4. Building into the education syllabus drug/alcohol slots run by outside agencies. 
5. Incorporating more specific skills learning. For example a cognitive skills course, 
aimed at broadening a client's knowledge of problem solving, conflict resolution 
and motivation techniques. 
6. Developing basic life skills for men and checking these are being adhered to. 
7. More clearly identifying work skills and ensuring they are taught at SSF. 
8. Further developing and formalising plans to leave the programme and incorporating 
these into the new case management system. 
9. Adding to the recreation/leisure component of the programme so that individual 
clients and/or their families, especially those on benefits, can experience a range of 
affordable activities. 
10. Differentiating between outdoor adventure, which is structured to facilitate clients 
facing challenges, and normal recreation/leisure interests that can be pursued 
following the completion of the programme. 
11. Setting up a formal process of internal monitoring for all programme content to 
ensure accountability around programme delivery. 
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Rape by a SSF Resident 
While the continual revision and development of aspects programme content and delivery 
are important, they can not always prevent recidivist acts when dealing with such a high-
risk group. A serious incident occurred at the Foundation on the weekend of the 13th/14th 
of February 1999. A resident, 'Richard', 140 who had been admitted to the programme a 
month earlier, had allegations of rape made against him. This situation was aggravated by 
the fact that the woman, 'Lisa', 141 who laid the charges, had been in the process of 
becoming Richard's support person. 
At SSF, once a resident had been in the programme for more than two weeks and was 
placed on 'Orange Curfew', they were able to leave the premises accompanied by staff, 
another resident or a support person. There was some concern about Lisa becoming 
Richard's support person, however, as she was only 19 years of age. As a result, a 
lengthy meeting had occurred between SSF staff, Richard and Lisa in order to assess 
whether Lisa might be vulnerable or unsafe in any way and to discuss Richard's 
offending history, which most recently consisted of a life sentence for murder. While Lisa 
was aware of this murder conviction, she did not know that the murder had been 
committed against a woman. Coom felt it was important that Lisa was informed of this 
situation and so approached Richard offering him the opportunity to tell her rather than it 
coming from SSF staff. Subsequent to being challenged about telling Lisa about his 
murder victim, Richard told SSF staff members that he wanted Lisa's position as a 
support person to be put on hold until after he had completed the programme. Staff 
140 This is a pseudonym 
141 This is a pseudonym 
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members at SSF and Richard's Probation Officer all agreed that Richard should stop 
using Lisa as his support person for the time being. It was also decided that he should 
only to see her at SSF or in a public place and not at her home. 142 
On 12 February, following a meeting with SSF staff, Neil,143 was approved as Richard's 
new support person. The next day a form was filled out and signed by both Richard and 
Neil stating they were going out for the day on Saturday. As it transpired, however, 
Richard went to Lisa's house where another friend of his lived and spent most of 
Saturday consuming 'pills'. Coom was called at 10.15pm and informed that Richard had 
just been returned to SSF and that Lisa alleged he had raped her. The police were 
informed and Richard was subsequently taken into custody at 4.30am on the 14 
February. 144 
The aftermath of this event could have been a lot more difficult for SSF than it actually 
was. Staff dealt with the incident professionally and were supported by the existing 
policies and procedures, which administratively had now been implemented. Detailed 
records had been kept of all discussions with Richard and clear systems for handling the 
incident were in place. Seven specific measures had also been implemented, which if 
adhered to, would have prevented the occurrence of the offence. These were: (1) Richard 
had been tested weekly for drugs/alcohol and had been clean. (2) He had completed a 
142 Confidential- Report on the Alleged Rape by a Salisbury Street Foundation resident on the Weekend of 
the 13th/14th February 1999: David Coom. 
143 This is a pseudonym 
144 The outcome of these allegations is not detailed within the archival material. It had little impact on the 
reviews which subsequently occurred at SSF and were focussed on preventing the reoccurrence of such 
breaches ofpolicy. 
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Safety Plan in-group and had participated in all parts of the programme. (3) He had been 
openly challenged about not associating with Lisa and would have received a written 
warning on the 15 February had he not been taken into custody. (4) He had been 
counselled by the Director on further safety issues around domestic violence and the need 
to be very careful in any future relationships because if allegations were made against 
him it would be difficult to defend them given his prior record. ( 5) Detailed records were 
kept of the meeting with Lisa and concerns dealt with which ultimately led to Richard 
finding a new support person. (6) On 12 February, Richard had been told he was to have 
nothing more to do with Lisa. (7) When he was taken into custody on 14 February, he 
was formally discharged from SSF for breaking our rules on association, and for 
drug/alcohol use. 
Following the incident, policies were reviewed and some were changed in order to 
minimise the risk of recurrence and to ensure the existence of clear procedures. SSF 
counsellor, Genevieve Strang claims, "It was great. Suddenly we'd have a crisis, like one 
of our residents raped a support person, and we had a whole lot of policy develop around 
the issue". The principles adopted as a consequence of this incident were: (1) support 
people must be over 25 years of age; (2) there has to be some context to a support person 
such as a sponsor from a Church or support group; (3) a support person must be fully 
informed of the resident's offending history; and ( 4) if an individual has offended in the 
previous two years they would not qualify as a support person. The Red, Orange, Green 
curfew system was reviewed so that as well as a set time enabling a resident to progress 
they were also required to complete certain tasks to earn the movement to the next stage. 
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These tasks included providing clean urine samples, beginning victim impact work, and 
establishing a positive attitude towards the programme and an appropriate support 
network. 145 
The advent of a serious incident, such as this alleged rape, reinforces the importance of 
maintaining good public relations and strong community networks. The 1999 alleged 
rape never appeared in the media which Coom claims was "a mixture of luck and also I 
believe good management that we've got good relationships with the press but more 
importantly we're really clear about who talks to the media". The maintenance of good 
public relations also ensures that if the press does report on a serious incident, which has 
occurred at SSF, stakeholder support is maintained because they have been well 
informed. Coom explains, 
It's about if something happens keeping all of your stakeholders incredibly informed and that 
way they have trust that you're dealing with it professionally and have good processes. So that's 
the main thing, so even if it does hit the headlines, you know they're still batting for you because 
they're satisfied that you've handled it properly. 
Purchase of Merivale Premises/Second Premises: Manchester Street Flats 
A more positive event occurred on the 13th of August 1999 when SSF succeeded in 
raising a mortgage and purchased its premises in St Albans Street, Merivale from Ngai 
Tahu, a South Island Maori tribe, for $320,000. As discussed in chapter four, SSF had 
begun renting the house from Ngai Tahuin 1995 after the Justice Department had put it 
145 Confidential- Report on the Alleged Rape by a Salisbury Street Foundation Resident on the Weekend 
of the 13th/14th February 1999: David Coom. 
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into the landbank. The possibility of buying the property had initially emerged at this 
time when, according to Patterson, "we ceased paying peppercorn rent and were forced to 
negotiate market rent". 146 Subsequently intermittent discussion occurred between SSF 
administrators and Ngai Tahu regarding the purchase of the Merivale house. It was not 
until late 1998, however, that this prospect emerged as a serious option. The BOT then 
put a considerable amount of time and energy into ensuring the property acquisition 
happened. Financially, the purchase of the St Albans Street property was made possible 
through the provision of monetary support from The Community Trust and the approval 
of a home loan from The National Bank of New Zealand. 147 
Three years after buying the St Albans Street house, SSF took possession of a second 
property located in the central city in Manchester Street. This followed the acquisition of 
a $150,000 grant from The Community Trust to provide the Foundation with sufficient 
equity to purchase a second residence. 148 Subsequently, in April 2002, these premises, 
consisting of three two bed-roomed flats and able to accommodate up to six men, were 
purchased for residents in the final third of their time with SSF or for suitable graduates. 
The purpose of these flats has been to provide ongoing support and somewhere to live for 
SSF residents/graduates while they "ease back into the realities of community 
life". 149 Jeff Cooper, a former resident and current programme supervisor at SSF, acts as 
146 AGM September 1999: Chairpersons Report 
147 AGM September 1999: Directors Report 
148 The Community Trust grant was supplemented by an offer of mortgage finance from The National 
Bank. 
149 SSF Newsletter March 2002: 2 
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the live-in supervisor at the flats. He believes the purchase of the Manchester Street flats 
was a positive and progressive step for SSF. As Cooper explains, 
The flats are a great idea ... we've got the [ongoing] support of this place and Genevieve has 
always been open to ex-residents coming back and talking to her ... even if you fall over they 
say come back to us and talk about it ... There's a guy down there [at the flats] at the moment 
that needs that and might need it for the rest of his life ... So it was a good idea, the board 
coming up with [the flats]. 
Integrated Offender Management 
In July 2000, a new methodology for working with offenders, namely Integrated 
Offender Management (IOM), became fully operational across three Corrections 
services: the Public Prisons Service, the Community Probation Service and the 
Psychological Service. Due to SSF' s connection to the Department of Corrections, the 
Foundation has been expected to incorporate IOM within their programme. Theoretically, 
this approach maintains many of the same basic principles of previous methods, including 
public safety and the reduction of reoffending. IOM works to achieve these objectives 
through taking "a best practice approach- ensuring the Department's work is targeted, 
consistent, cost-effective and proven to reduce reoffending" (Law Guide 2002). 
Under IOM, offenders are assessed according to their risk of reoffending, the causes and 
influences behind their behaviour, and their willingness to change. The outcome of this 
evaluation establishes both the sentence duration and an individualised plan, according to 
a 'Criminogenic Needs Inventory' (CNI), for each offender dependent on what is most 
likely to break the cycle of reoffending (Department of Corrections 2002). The three 
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basic areas covered in the sentence plan include secure confinement/imprisonment, 
rehabilitation programmes dealing with factors such as alcohol and drug abuse, basic 
numeracy and literacy skills and vocational training, and reintegrative courses focused on 
living skills such as budgeting, parenting and seeking employment. SSF fits largely into 
the third category, which is responsible for the readjustment and reintegration to 
community life following a period of incarceration. 
The success of 10M in the reduction of reoffending is yet to be proven. Preliminary 
results indicate that IOM has no effect (Newbold and Eskridge, forthcoming 2003: 26), 
although the CEO of the Department of Corrections, Mark Byers, remains optimistic that 
reoffending will be reduced. Those being primarily targeted include Maori prisoners and 
individuals identified as at the highest risk of reoffending, such as the group dealt with by 
SSF, because Corrections expects they will be the most responsive to 10M. According to 
the Department of Corrections, the overriding goal of IOM is to cut reimprisonment rates 
by 10-15 percent for those exposed to the intervention. 
Redraft of SSF Constitution and Rules 
Following the introduction of 10M, the constitution and rules for the Salisbury Street 
Foundation Trust were once again reviewed and redrafted in September 2000. In general, 
this document continued to reflect many of the objectives, principles and policies upon 
which the organisation had been based for many years. For instance, the main objectives 
remained: providing a rehabilitation scheme for prison inmates; establishing a series of 
self-help collectives so that prison inmates could realise their potential in the community; 
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assisting in the reorientation and redevelopment of prison inmates; and carrying out 
services beneficial to participating individuals and the community by reducing 
reoffending and promoting positive lifestyles. 150 Other issues regarding funding and 
finance, rules and regulations, and a range of other areas were also updated but in general 
continued to reiterate past principles. 
One area which was altered by the new constitution related to the powers of the BOT and 
its respective members. In the past SSF's BOT had been elected at an AGM from 
members of the general public. This meant that any person could become a member of 
the BOT at the AGM and that ultimately the whole BOT could be taken over by a lobby 
group at any time. This was an issue which had plagued the BOT throughout much of 
SSF's history and, as seen particularly in chapter four, had often resulted in SSF's BOT 
being unstable and ineffective. The new constitution aimed to overcome these prior 
difficulties by restricting who was able to be appointed onto SSF's Board. Now, members 
are co-opted by those already on the Board. In general, Board members are professionals 
who have been selected specifically because of the qualities they are able to offer SSF. 
Also the BOT now has the ultimate ability to vote individuals off if they prove unsuitable 
or cause disruption and/or dysfunction amongst Board members. 151 
150 SSF Trust: Constitution and Rules 2000 
151 Ibid. 
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BEYOND HABILITATION CENTRES 
The Sentencing Act/The Parole Act, 2002 
The Sentencing Act and the Parole Act came into force on 1 July 2002. These two Acts 
replaced a large section of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 and both made many notable 
changes of direct significance to SSF. Under the Parole Act, automatic release on 
remission at two-thirds of a sentence was abolished and now only exists for those serving 
less than two years, who are released at half sentence. Parole was made available at one-
third of a sentence or ten years, whichever is shortest, to those serving finite sentences of 
more than two years, including those convicted of serious violent offences whom had 
been ineligible for parole since 1987 (The Parole Act s. 84). All persons released on 
parole have also been made subject to release conditions until the expiry of their sentence 
or for at least 6 months, even if this was longer than the remaining term of their sentence 
(The Parole Act s.18; s. 29; s. 32). It is under these new conditions, and in accordance 
with the definitional changes made under the Sentencing Act, that offenders are now 
sentenced to SSF. 
The amendments made in the Sentencing Act included the replacement of periodic 
detention and community service with a sentence called community work and, more 
importantly, the abolition of community programmes and the modification of supervision 
to incorporate the 'care' aspect of the community programme sentence. The aim of 
reworking community-based sentences into these two clearly defined entities, community 
work and supervision, was to give a "clearer focus with an emphasis on responding to the 
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nature of the offence and the character and further offending risks of the offender" 
(Ministry of Justice 2002). 
Within this new legislation, the provision for habilitation centres was repealed. 
Consequently, there is no longer any specific reference to these organisations in current 
law. Instead, former habilitation centres are now officially referred to as residential 
community centres. The deletion of habilitation centres was largely due to the overall 
failure of these facilities in New Zealand, often as a result of issues of mismanagement 
and/or recidivism (to be discussed in chapter seven). In spite of this, however, some 
facilities including SSF, continue to be used by the Department of Corrections under the 
official title of residential community centres. Although now, rather than functioning 
under the specifications of 'community programme', they operate in accordance with the 
terms and provisions of supervision. 
According to the Sentencing Act 2002, supervision is available for a period no less than 
six months and no more than two years, for offenders who are convicted of an offence 
punishable by imprisonment or a prescribed community-based sentence (Sentencing Act 
2002, part 2, s. 41 (1)(2)). As well as the standard conditions of supervision,152 special 
conditions make provisions for a variety of community-based programmes. SSF falls into 
the category of facilities which offer "attendance at any medical, psychological, social, 
therapeutic, cultural, educational, employment-related, rehabilitative, or reintegrative 
programme" (Sentencing Act 2002, part 2, s. 47 (b)). A 'programme' may be imposed if 
152 Under the standard conditions of supervision, the offender is released into the community but must 
report to a probation officer as required (by the probation officer). 
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the court is satisfied that there is a significant risk of further offending by the offender 
and that standard conditions alone would not adequately reduce that risk (Sentencing Act 
2002, part 2, s. 46 (la-c)). 
In general, the effect of the Sentencing Act on SSF has, so far, been minimal. The 
structure of the programme is largely continuing along the same lines as previously, 
although in a slightly more vulnerable position than when it was a habilitation centre 
because it is now no longer incorporated into legislation or guaranteed funding. Overall, 
however, it is too early to conclusively assess whether the Sentencing Act will have a 
significant impact on the programme at SSF. 
The Future of SSF 
In spite of the Sentencing Act, SSF is still in a period of stability. The Foundation 
continues to get significant financial support from Corrections, which has enabled it to 
progress and expand many areas of its programme. For instance, while four years ago 
SSF did not own any property and had about $50,000 in the bank, the organisation now 
has paper equity of approximately half a million dollars through the purchase of its St 
Albans Street premises and more recently the Manchester Street Flats (Coom: personal 
communication). 153 Between these two premises, the Foundation is now able to 
accommodate up to a maximum of 18 residents at a time, 154 most of whom continue to 
arrive at SSF as a condition of parole or release from prison, and then stay in the 
153 These premises are heavily mortgaged. 
154 Provision for 18 residents has been incorporated into SSF's contract with the Department of Corrections. 
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programme for between six and twelve months.155 Along with this, other developments 
such as the establishment of a joinery workshop and an arts-and-crafts centre with the 
Department of Corrections are in the planning stages (Coom: personal communication). 
Overall, it seems appropriate for the future prospects of SSF to be summed up by its most 
recent Director, David Coom, who states, 
I think the future is very good. I think that over the next five years that we will grow quite 
considerably around offering different services like a formal aftercare programme for 
Corrections clients that have finished their terms with the Department of Corrections but need 
ongoing support. I think you'll see us pick up individual contracts with men who are assessed by 
Corrections as hugely at risk for reoffending and need individual, one-on-one type programmes 
because of their high risk type nature. And I think you'll see us, hopefully, within a years time, 
we'll have this employment workshop and art and crafts centre up and running. So I think the 
outlook is most probably better than it has ever been. 
Conclusion 
The transition of SSF to a habilitation centre marked a significant change in the 
organisation's history. For 17 years, the programme had existed as an entity separate 
from the government and, although SSF had received some state funding, the Foundation 
remained largely unaccountable to it. This was not a coincidental situation. Being based 
on a self-help philosophy, the founders of the programme had ideally wanted the 
community-based organisation to become fully self-sufficient. The shift to a habilitation 
155 Ongoing debate occurs within SSF concerning the eligibility of certain individuals and the issue of 
maintaining public safety. One recent applicant was Barry Ryder, who had previous convictions for 
indecent assault against young boys and was to be provided with a full-time carer by the Department of 
Corrections because he was such an extreme recidivist risk. Due to these factors, SSF was reluctant to take 
Ryder on as a resident. Instead, they rented him one of their flats but his supervision was contracted 
elsewhere. Only a short time later, on the 17th December 2002, Ryder was rearrested and charged with 
possession of a knife in a public place, and indecent assaults on three schoolboys under 12 (The Press 
17/12/2002). 
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centre, therefore, alienated a number of the individuals who had been involved with the 
organisation since its early history. Their opinion was that SSF was undermining the 
principles upon which it had been based by allowing itself to be dictated to by 
Corrections. 
In many respects, the assertions made by those against the transition to a habilitation 
centre were correct. The shift did mean that SSF became more heavily involved and 
ultimately accountable to the Department of Corrections. The trade off, however, was that 
SSF secured a permanent source of funding, relieving the programme of a considerable 
burden which had plagued the organisation throughout much of its history. This 
undoubtedly improved the stability of the Foundation, as did the appointment of David 
Coom, who remained as Director of SSF for almost six years, a period longer than any of 
the previous directors. 156 Being accountable to Corrections also necessitated more 
frequent evaluations and extensive record-keeping by the organisation, providing SSF 
with a clear idea about where the programme is succeeding and what areas need further 
improvement. 
Although habilitation centres ceased to exist under the Sentencing Act 2002, the future of 
SSF still appears promising. The Foundation is in a good financial position and remains 
supported, as a residential community centre, by the Department of Corrections. Its assets 
now include two properties worth approximately half a million dollars and further 
expansions, including a joinery workshop and an arts-and-crafts centre, are being 
156 That is, up until his recent resignation in February 2003. 
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discussed. Therefore, while a greater connection with the Department of Corrections has 
indeed moved SSF away from the initial ideology upon which it was based, it has also 
secured the Foundation a more certain future than it has ever experienced previously. 
192 
CHAPTERS/X 
The Rehabilitation Debate 
Introduction 
Rehabilitation is an ideal that has influenced correctional development and penal policy 
for many years. As a philosophy, it focuses on the reduction of reoffending through the 
provision of treatment services. The history of SSF is reflective of attitudinal changes 
towards rehabilitation and wider debate in relation to ''what works" in the administration 
of criminal justice. This debate was accentuated by the findings of Robert Martinson in 
1974, who claimed that ''with few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that 
have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism" or alternately 
nothing works (Martinson 1974: 25). Substantial investigation occurred following these 
findings, much of which attempted to disprove Martinson's claim by identifying factors 
that were successful in the reduction of recidivism. In New Zealand, Kaye McLaren and 
Julie Leibrich have been key figures in this debate offering a range of principles likely to 
enhance the effectiveness of correctional interventions. 
Due to the focus of rehabilitation on the reduction of reoffending, the key means of 
assessing rehabilitative programmes has largely been by considering rates of recidivism. 
There are some fundamental problems, however, with relying solely on recidivism as a 
means of gauging success or failure. The purpose of this chapter is to consider these 
issues relating to recidivism, as well as the wider debate surrounding rehabilitation, prior 
to undertaking any statistical assessment ofSSF. 
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What is Rehabilitation/Habilitation? 
For over 200 years, rehabilitation has been a correctional goal which has influenced the 
development of penal policy. The rehabilitative approach alleges that, in general, external 
societal factors cause an individual to commit crime. Central to rehabilitation, therefore, 
is determining how best to intervene and prevent the influence of these aspects in order to 
reduce the risk of involvement in further criminal activity. It is assumed that given the 
right kind of treatment, "criminal offenders can be reformed and taught to live socially 
productive, crime-free lives" (Haas and Alpert 1986: 295). Consequently, rehabilitative 
programmes aim to reduce offenders' motivation and/or desire to commit future crimes 
by addressing their needs for education, vocational training, counselling, and other 
related services (Champion 1996). 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the rehabilitative ideal was progressively replaced with the 
notion of 'habilitation' throughout much of the Western World. Central to the argument 
for habilitation was that rehabilitation was a misconception when applied to criminals 
because it implied the restoration of former skills and attributes, which arguably the 
offender never had (New Zealand Ministerial Committee of Inquiry 1989). In the words 
of Dyer (1994: 15), "Habilitation means to equip and make fit for life. Rehabilitation on 
the other hand, means the restoration of former capacities. In dealing with offenders, 
there is invariably a need for habilitation rather than rehabilitation". Habilitation, 
therefore, meant changing the way an offender thinks rather than altering his/her existing 
social conditions (Dunstall1992). In practice, the role of habilitative facilities was not to 
dictate decisions but alternatively to help offenders change their thinking processes so 
194 
that they could function responsibly. In a sense, habilitation was claimed as "enabling 
offenders to reclaim their humanity" (Dyer 1994: 9). The ascendancy of the notion of 
habilitation, however, was largely semantic and therefore short-lived. The habilitation 
ideal has been largely abandoned in the United States and Britain, and in New Zealand, as 
discussed in chapter five, the habilitation concept, which was implemented with the 
legislative introduction of habilitation centres in 1993, was abandoned in 2002. 
Whatever the term preferred, whether 'rehabilitation' or 'habilitation', the ultimate goal 
of these principles remains the same: to reduce reoffending. That is, to divert offenders 
away from a life of crime by reforming their attitudes and behaviours and giving them the 
skills necessary to reintegrate back into open society. According to McLaren (1992: 21), 
this "is an important social issue" within all criminal justice systems. Historically, the 
search for successful ways to rehabilitate and reintegrate offenders has certainly been a 
key ambition of penal reformers since the 18th century. 
The Search for Rehabilitation 
Cesare Beccaria (1963) initiated the rehabilitative era in corrections in his 1764 essay On 
Crimes and Punishments. He suggested that criminal justice should be based around 
notions of deterrence and social sanitation, as well as punishment, with the overall aim of 
creating a better society. Beccaria's belief in the ability to reform criminals fuelled the 
desire of other English liberals such as John Howard and Jeremy Bentham who worked to 
create a more humane and effective system. This culminated in Bentham's development 
of the panopticon in 1791, a model prison that aimed to replicate the conditions of a 
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perfect society and reform criminals by bringing out their inherent "goodness" (Newbold 
2002). In America, the rehabilitative themes from England were also undertaken. Here 
the Quaker state of Pennsylvania was at the forefront of penal reform. Quaker philosophy 
at the time was considered very humanitarian; they were against violence and believed 
that people were basically good. They established the first prison reform society in 1787 
and then, three years later, in Philadelphia created America's first penitentiary, known as 
Walnut Street Jail, which they believed would end criminality (Inciardi 1999). 
Although initially the principle of rehabilitation was interconnected with the development 
of the prison, as seen in chapter two the incompatibility of the two was quickly realised. 
As a result, while imprisonment continued to be frequently utilised, a search for more 
effective alternatives that were consistent with the ideal of rehabilitation commenced. 
This began with the privilege and liberty systems developed in the 1840s by Captain 
Alexander Maconochie on Norfolk Island and the 1860s by Sir Walter Crofton in Ireland, 
which incorporated the application of indeterminate sentencing in prisons, where release 
was reliant on inmate conduct (Newbold 2002). These principles also led to the 
establishment of other community-based facilities including the Elmira Reformatory in 
New York in 1876, British borstals from the 1840s, and a variety of halfway houses 
throughout the Western World (see chapter three). 
The focus of corrections on the principle of rehabilitation was largely responsible for the 
increased popularity of community-based alternatives to custody during the 20th century. 
Rehabilitation, as a correctional philosophy, was at its strongest in the mid-1900s. In fact, 
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Diiulio (1990) dubbed the period between 1945-1975 as the "everything works" wave, 
where the common belief was that every offender could be successfully treated through 
intervention. The dominance of the rehabilitative ideal, however suffered a significant 
decline from the early 1970s. Internationally, concern existed that crime and recidivism 
rates were increasing and that rehabilitation programmes were simply not working. As a 
result in 1974, led by the findings of sociologist Robert Martinson, a substantial debate 
commenced regarding the plausibility of the rehabilitative ideal and what works in the 
reformation of criminal offenders. 
Rehabilitation Debate- "What Works?" 
During the 1970s, the implementation of community-based initiatives in many Western 
countries slowed. This was partially the result of an international downturn in economic 
conditions. Recession appeared to be approaching as inflation rates increased and 
unemployment grew. These worsening conditions restricted the financial base that had 
been available for the development of community corrections following the war. 
Limitations on public spending meant that there was increased scrutiny of social 
programmes requiring monetary backing. There was also a conservative shift within the 
general social and political attitudes of many countries. Perceptions of crime, criminals 
and punishment veered in this direction (Rhine 2000). It was realised that despite the 
introduction of community corrections, prison populations throughout the world were 
growing, conditions within the prison were worsening, and crime rates were rising 
(Rawlings 1999). Scepticism surrounding the effectiveness of rehabilitation programmes 
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was dramatically accentuated by Robert Martinson's article, 'What Works? Questions 
and Answers about Prison Reform', published in 1974. 
Robert Martinson was originally hired by the New York State Governor's Special 
Committee in 1966 to undertake a comprehensive investigation of the most effective 
methods of rehabilitation (Martinson 1974). The premise of the committee was that 
prison could rehabilitate as long as the correct formula was found. Martinson and his 
colleagues, Doug Lipton and Judith Wilks, assessed 231 programmes worldwide 
undertaking a search of literature available on rehabilitative attempts made in America 
and other countries between 1945 and 1967 (Martinson 1974). The measures of offender 
improvement they used included recidivism, adjustment to prison life, vocational success, 
educational achievement, personality and attitude change, and general adjustment to the 
outside community. The overall outcome of Lipton, Martinson and Wilks's research was 
that generally rehabilitative schemes had been unsuccessful in diverting offenders from a 
life of crime. 
Initially the U.S. Government failed to publish the results of Lipton, Martinson and Wilks 
and refused to allow Martinson to publish them on his own. Permission was eventually 
given by the state, however, after an attorney subpoenaed the document for use as 
evidence in a case before the Bronx Supreme Court. As a result, in 197 4 and without the 
specific consent of Lipton and Wilks, Martinson published his now infamous 'What 
Works?' article. The ''bald summary" made by Martinson was that "With few and 
isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no 
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appreciable effect on recidivism" (Martinson 1974: 25). Moreover, "our present 
strategies ... cannot overcome, or even appreciably reduce, the powerful tendencies of 
offenders to continue in criminal behavior" (Martinson 1974: 49). Or alternatively, 
nothing works. Martinson's article had an immense impact inciting spirited international 
debate. In fact, according to one article recently published by The Observer, "Rarely, if 
ever, has a piece of social science research influenced policy so swiftly" (Rose 2002). It 
certainly had a much greater impact than the fmal 197 5 report by Lipton, Martinson and 
Wilks, which reached the far more guarded conclusion that "the field of corrections has 
not yet found satisfactory ways to reduce recidivism by significant amounts" (Lipton et 
al. 1975: 627), and hence left the door open for further rehabilitative optimism. 
Many endorsed the extreme perspectives of Martinson and treated them a fact (Sarre 
1999). Based on what could be gathered from editorials, political speeches and 
legislative changes the general public appeared to believe that Martinson was right 
(Wilson 1986, Gendreau and Ross 1986). Academically, support came from Paul Lerman 
who published a book-length evaluation of the Community Treatment Program (CTP) of 
· the California Youth Authority in 1975.157 This programme had been endorsed by 
President Lyndon Johnson who had claimed that it had reduced recidivism from 52 
percent among incarcerated youth to 28 percent among those given intensive counselling 
in the community (Wilson 1986). Lerman's findings disputed this. He concluded that, 
"the CTP did not have an impact on youth behaviour that differed significantly from the 
impact of the control program" (Wilson 1986: 329). He also alleged that the 'community' 
157 See chapter two for discussion on the Community Treatment Project 
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focus was exaggerated with more of the experimental youth being sent to detention 
centres than those from the control group. Other studies that essentially came to the same 
conclusion as Martinson included David F. Greenberg's 1977 review of more recent 
programmes than those considered by Martinson (Greenberg 1998) and S.R. Brody's 
survey in England on the institutional treatment of juvenile offenders (Wilson 1986). 
In 1977, America's National Research Council created a Panel on Research on 
Rehabilitative Techniques to review existing rehabilitative efforts. Lipton, Martinson and 
Wilks 1975 book, The Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment: A Survey of Treatment 
Evaluation Studies, was a major focus of their research (Lipton et al. 1975). The 
conclusion they reached was that Martinson and his colleagues were largely right, or 
more exactly "The Panel concludes that Lipton, Martinson and Wilks were reasonably 
accurate and fair in their appraisal of rehabilitation literature" (Wilson 1986: 330). The 
panel did concede, however, that there is always a chance that one of the rehabilitative 
methods currently in use but not yet tested may in fact prove to be efficacious (Wilson 
1986). 
Martinson's assertions also ignited enthusiastic rebuttal and significant controversy. 
Opponents emphatically rejected the validity of his claim that correctional treatment 
programmes were ineffective. Paul Gendreau and Robert R. Ross (1986), for example, 
fiercely disagreed with Martinson's fmdings. They argued that the most significant effect 
of Martinson's claim that "nothing works" was the sense of hopelessness it created 
amongst correctional workers who felt their efforts were of no benefit. They alleged that 
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Martinson was wrong and that there was mounting evidence to prove that some 
programmes "do work and work well" (Gendreau and Ross 1986: 316). The focus of the 
debate on correctional effectiveness, therefore, should, 
no longer focus on whether treatment programs are effective. That should now be viewed as an 
overly simplistic question. A more meaningful question ... is which programs work. Equally 
important, questions should be asked about why some programs work and some do not 
(Gendreau and Ross 1986: 316). 
A subsequent review of the key features of effective and unsuccessful programmes 
established that a multi-faceted approach existed within all successful programmes. 
Effective methods also generally utilised community resources and focussed on creating 
an environment of open communication and trust where rules were clearly established 
and anti-criminal modelling and assistance in coping with personal and social difficulties 
was provided (Gendreau and Ross 1986). 
James Q. Wilson (1986), a long time critic of rehabilitation, alleged that there was little 
new about Martinson's 1974 article. He stated that scepticism of rehabilitative efforts 
went back many years. For example, as discussed in chapter two, the Cambridge-
Sommerville Youth Study (completed between 1935-1945) had conceded at its 
conclusion that juveniles were as likely to reoffend whether or not they had received 
intensive counselling (Wilson 1986). Also R.G. Hood in 1967 had argued that whatever 
the treatment the results tended to be "similar, and not very encouraging", and Walter C. 
Bailey who a year prior to the publication of Martinson's article came to the conclusion 
that "evidence supporting the efficacy of correctional treatment is slight, inconsistent, and 
of questionable reliability" (Wilson 1986: 328). What Martinson\yvas responsible ~or, 
,, 
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Wilson argued, was "bringing out into the open the long-standing scholarly scepticism 
about most rehabilitation programs" and this subsequently led to a revival in the 
"deterrent, incapacitative, and retributive purposes of the criminal justice system" 
(Wilson 1986: 328). 
Wilson (1986) amended his ideas surrounding rehabilitation to concede that one of the 
unresolved issues relating to correctional treatment was whether certain types of 
offenders were more amenable to rehabilitation. This comment reflected the views of 
Daniel Glaser who, writing in 1973, had suggested that individuals who could 
communicate with ease and who had not found their prior criminal career to be 
rewarding, were more likely to be rehabilitated (Wilson 1986). If this was indeed the 
case, then offenders who were intractable would mask any reductions in criminality 
amongst those who were responsive to treatment, subsequently creating a misleading 
result of "no change" (Wilson 1986: 331). This is exactly what Ted Palmer claimed to 
have found in his study of CTP data. 
Ted Palmer claimed that Martinson had overlooked or downplayed a number of 
successful rehabilitation programmes (Wilson 1986). In particular, he argued that CTP 
had been misrepresented. In his 197 5 rebuttal to Martinson, Palmer contended that while 
many offences in CTP had been overlooked by counsellors this was largely because they 
were minor or technical infringements. He also insinuated that if Martinson had 
continued his review untill973 the differences between experimental and control groups 
would have been clearer and that these results suggested that certain offenders were more 
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amenable to treatment. Palmer's fmdings were criticised by the National Academy of 
Sciences Panel on Research on Rehabilitative Techniques who asserted that, 
Palmer's optimistic view cannot be supported, in large part because his assessment accepts at 
face value the claim of the original authors about the effects they detected, and in too many 
circumstances those claims were wrong or were over-interpretations of data (Wilson 1986: 331 ). 
The most significant criticism posed by Palmer, however, was that the synthesis of 
Martinson's fmdings was not valid because no one broadly categorised method of 
treatment was guaranteed to work all of the time and that examples of several group 
counselling programmes which successfully reduced recidivism existed (Palmer 1986). 
Charles A. Murray and Louis A. Cox, Jr added an alternative dimension to the continuing 
debate over rehabilitation. They studied chronic delinquency in Chicago but instead of 
using the traditional measure of "failure" based solely on whether an individual 
reoffends, they considered the frequency of recidivism. Using the conventional recidivist 
measure the results were typically discouraging with 82 percent being rearrested (Wilson 
1986). Considering the frequency of rearrest, however, the arrest per month per 100 boys 
fell dramatically by about two-thirds during the follow up period (Wilson 1986). Earlier 
in 1972 LaMar T. Empey and Maynard L. Erickson had reported similar results based on 
their study of the Provo Experiment in Utah (see chapter two). It is difficult to be certain, 
however, whether this is a fair representation or if it is simply the result of delinquents 
becoming better at avoiding apprehension. Murray and Cox also found that "the more 
restrictive the degree of supervision practiced by UDIS [Unified Delinquency 
Intervention Services], the greater the reduction in arrest rates" (Wilson 1986: 336 
emphasis in original). Provided this was accurate it "implies that how strictly the youth 
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were supervised, rather than what therapeutic programs were available, had the greatest 
effect on the recidivism rate" (Wilson 1986: 336). Wilson (1986: 339) claimed that this 
was significant because, "the study of deterrence and the study of rehabilitation must be 
merged- that, at least for a given individual, they are the same thing". 
The strong reaction against Martinson's article led him later to modifY his opinion to 
admit that some programmes do work, sometimes (Martinson 1979). Despite this 
concession, however, the international popularity of community corrections was 
negatively impacted by the revelations of Martinson and sustained by the international 
economic and political climate of the 1970s. The general shift back to conservatism 
resulted in community-based alternatives often being labelled as a 'soft option'. It was 
argued that they were "Holiday Inns" which "coddle criminals" (Giari 1986: 386) and 
demands were made for tougher sentences and tighter control of offenders (Rhine 2000). 
Community programmes, therefore, often failed to gain public support especially when 
attempting to locate themselves in local communities and neighbourhoods. For example, 
the development of the pre-release hostel movement in New Zealand (see chapter two) 
was constrained by public resistance (Webb 1982). To many it appeared obvious that 
community corrections had not lived up to their goals of providing an alternative to 
imprisonment, which would be more conducive to the rehabilitation of criminals. 
Community alternatives were not succeeding in reducing crime, imprisonment or 
recidivism and it was argued that they were ''well-intentioned; but misguided" (Haas and 
Alpert 1986: 295). 
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Although the international development of community corrections was impeded in the 
1970s, alternatives to custody did not disappear. The introduction of SSF in Christchurch, 
New Zealand in 1979 is an example of a programme that emerged despite the worldwide 
decline in support for community-based alternatives to custody. Supporters of community 
sanctions, while initially unable to transform society's views, continued their 
investigations into community-based facilities and introduced non-custodial programmes 
in spite of public opposition and often with little formal government backing (Jamieson 
1991). Many of these attempts focussed on disproving Martinson's findings by 
identifying factors that were successful in the reduction of recidivism. Subsequently, 
since 1985, it has been suggested that most of the developed world has entered a 
"something works" phase in correctional philosophy and policy (Dilulio 1990). Dilulio 
claimed, "only since 1985 has a critical mass of empirical studies accumulated to 
challenge the 'nothing works' school" (Dilulio 1990: 57). In New Zealand, two key 
contributors to the "What Works?" or "something works" debate have been Kaye 
McLaren and Julie Leibrich. 
('What Works?" in New Zealand 
In 1992, Kaye McLaren, an advisor to the Department of Justice, published a review of 
research undertaken into effective correctional interventions. She listed sixteen basic 
principles of effectiveness which were most likely to reduce reoffending. They were: 
1. Using a social learning model, which treats criminal attitudes/behaviours as learned 
habits that can be changed by teaching and reinforcing new, anti-criminal attitudes. 
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2. Having "firm but fair" authority structures that include clear rules and sanctions 
without interpersonal domination/ abuse. 
3. Modelling and reinforcing positive alternatives to criminal attitudes/behaviours. 
4. Problem solving training enabling offenders to better cope with personal 
difficulties. 
5. Maintaining positive community links and making use of community resources. 
6. Creating effective staff/offender relationships characterised by open 
communication and trust. 
7. Ensuring high levels of advocacy and referral of offenders to appropriate 
interventions. 
8. Having staff who are "warm, flexible and enthusiastic" to offenders and supportive 
of anti-criminal behaviours and attitudes. 
9. Including ex-addict and ex-offender staff because they "serve as credible models of 
successful lifestyle change". 
10. Involving offenders in intervention planning rather than imposing it on them. 
11. Strengthening positive behaviours rather than focusing on anti-social attitudes. 
12. Controlling offender peer groups in order to reduce the opportunity for the 
reinforcement of criminal and anti-social behaviours. 
13. Maintaining therapeutic integrity through the provision of proper resources and 
access to therapeutic knowledge, well-trained staff and adequate hours of 
intervention. 
14. Using a combination of intervention tools including vocational and academic 
training, group counselling, role-playing etc. 
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15. Teaching relapse prevention and self-efficacy so that offenders are able to 
recognise and cope with high-risk situations through gradual exposure and training. 
16. Matching offenders with interventions in order to ensure optimum suitability for 
each individual or particular offender type (McLaren 1992). 
Along with these sixteen factors, three other principles were established as being 
associated with intervention effectiveness. These were risk, need and responsivity. Risk 
referred to the probability of reoffending by a given individual and the factors, both static 
and dynamic, 158 likely to induce recidivist behaviour. In regards to risk, it was determined 
that higher risk offenders required more intensive interventions and supervision. The 
'need' of higher risk offenders indicated they responded better to certain types of 
interventions. These included substance abuse programmes, problem solving, and anti-
criminal modelling. The principle of responsivity once again reinforced the need to match 
interventions to individual offenders and their differing abilities and learning style . 
In 1995, McLaren revised the basic principles of effectiveness and added a further eight 
overarching factors, which extended and further reinforced the previous sixteen aspects. 
She presented her findings on criminogenic needs and the provision of skills needed to 
reduce reoffending at a criminology conference, held at Victoria University of 
Wellington, in 1996. In her contribution, McLaren (1996) discussed the problems and 
skills deficits which are predictive of reoffending. These were established as relating to 
158 Static risk factors were described as including having family members with a criminal record, low 
family income and accumulated personal convictions. Dynamic risk factors are those which can be changed 
such as substance abuse, limited education and poor cognitive skills. These are the factors targeted by 
intervention programmes. 
207 
the areas of violence, education, substance abuse, cognitive skills, self-management, 
driving offences, vocational development, pre-release activities, and recreation and 
leisure skills. According to McLaren, the interventions most likely to work were those 
that addressed these issues. She claimed, 
The major characteristic(s) of programmes that work ... focus on teaching new skills and they 
set up environments that encourage the use of these skills rather than focussing on punishing old 
behaviours. Effective programmes foster positive relationships between staff and offenders, and 
have clear rules and fair punishments. But the additional characteristic of effective programmes 
is that they actively teach new skills in areas that are strongly associated with reoffending 
(McLaren 1996: 8). 
McLaren's findings influenced the programme at SSF following its inception as a pilot 
habilitation centre. Both ofthe Foundation's Directors, Glenn Newman and David Coom, 
used McLaren's effectiveness principles as a means of running and evaluating the 
organisation. According to Newman, 
We were running the programme based on McLaren's research ... [and] making distinctions 
was very important because only a select group of people were really going to benefit from our 
kind of programme. And McLaren states it's useless wasting types of facilities [like SSF] on 
people that are not recidivists. 
As discussed in chapter five, David Coom based his 1997 research on SSF on McLaren's 
(1996) conference proceedings relating to criminogenic needs and the provision of skills 
required to reduce reoffending. 159 Coom found that while, in general, SSF went a long 
way to addressing skills deficits, there were some areas that required further attention. 
These incorporated the development of more specific skills training, including education 
159 See previous discussion on criminogenic needs inventory for a list of predictors. 
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on drug and alcohol issues, cognitive skills training, work skills development, problem-
solving/self-motivation training, and the provision of a better stopping violence 
programme. Coom also concluded that a greater level of formality was required in the 
application and checking of programme delivery, including the graduation of residents. 
Using McLaren's findings, Coom offered the 11 recommendations discussed in chapter 
five which, once implemented, could further enhance programme delivery at SSF. 
Another contributor to the rehabilitative debate in New Zealand surrounding "What 
Works?" is Julie Leibrich, a former Research Fellow for the Probation service. In 1991, 
Leibrich completed a study into the Probation service's understanding of its role in the 
reduction of reoffending. She concluded from this research that rehabilitation was still 
perceived as a crucial, and to some degree achievable, focus of corrections and, more 
specifically, the Probation Division. According to Leibrich ( 1991: 83 ), 
In the Probation Division the most commonly held theory of why people stop offending is the 
rehabilitative theory. Most ... who took part in the interview groups believe that the likelihood 
of reoffending is reduced when the problems which contribute to reoffending are identified and 
resolved. 
Leibrich followed up her 1991 study on the Probation Division, with a book, Straight to 
the Point: Angles on Giving Up Crime (1993). In this book, Leibrich investigated why, 
and how, offenders give up a life of crime. She did this by interviewing 48 New Zealand 
men and women who had prior convictions but had lived crime-free lives for 
approximately three years. Leibrich (1993) found that "going straight" was a gradual 
process that required ongoing reinforcement and support. She added that a reduction in 
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reoffending was more likely if an individual had "a sense of purpose and belonging", 
which, in her study, was often stated to come from strong links with the community 
(Leibrich 1993: 123). Other common ingredients found to enhance the likelihood of an 
offender "going straight" included the development of a new set of values and a life 
management strategy which was based on a new found sense of purpose and power and a 
greater value for life. Overall, however, Leibrich (1993: 237) claimed there was "no clear 
recipe for change" because definitions of "going straight" were individual. This comment 
is indicative of the numerous difficulties which exist when measuring rehabilitative 
success or failure, especially when recidivist rates are used as the primary indicator. 
Problems with Assessing Rehabilitation 
Rehabilitation is an ideal which can not be easily assessed. The key measure generally 
used to evaluate rehabilitative programmes is a reduction in reoffending. Numerous 
difficulties exist, however, with focusing primarily on recidivist rates as an indicator of 
success or failure. The majority of these stem from the complexities involved with 
defining recidivism. 
No consensus exists about the meaning of recidivism (Champion 1996). According to 
Maltz (cited in Champion 1996), at least 14 different measures of recidivism exist. 
Therefore, "While most agree that recidivism should be a primary performance measure, 
there is no agreement on its definition nor on the indicators to be used for its 
measurement" (Latessa and Allen 1997: 376). Areas of disparity include: does recidivism 
simply mean re-arrest or does it mean reconviction? And what if an offender is released 
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without any charges being filed? Recidivist rates also generally only take into account 
official law violations. Therefore, an offender has to be caught before being considered to 
have reoffended. 
The four most common ways of measuring recidivism are rearrest, reconviction, 
revocations of parole/probation, and reincarceration (Champion 1994). While it is 
difficult to assess what definition of recidivism is comparatively better than other 
alternatives, Champion (1996) claims reconviction is probably the most reliable indicator 
of recidivism. This is because it verifies that an offender has committed at least one new 
crime since their release and that a court has determined them guilty "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" (Champion 1996). As a measure of recidivism, however, reconviction 
is not free from difficulties and can not serve as a conclusive guarantee that reoffending 
has or has not occurred. 
The most frequently-used indicator of recidivism is rearrest. According to Champion 
(1994), however, this method needs be approached with caution because rearrest rates are 
often misleading. Prior to conviction, there is uncertainty as to whether an offender has 
actually committed a new crime and hence not everyone who is rearrested is subsequently 
prosecuted for those crimes. Also by focusing solely on rearrest other factors including 
the proportion of rearrests which result in new convictions, the frequency of rearrest or 
the type/seriousness of the new offence as compared to prior convictions are not 
considered. 
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Using the revocation of parole/probation and/ or reincarceration as measures of recidivism 
are also questionable. In regards to reincarceration, not all acts of recidivism necessarily 
result in imprisonment and other types of incarceration are generally not specified 
(Champion 1996). Also while an offender may not be reincarcerated the level of 
supervision assigned to them may increase. The revocation of parole/probation is 
problematic because it can incorporate a wide variety of violations from relatively 
harmless technical transgressions, like breaking curfew, through to more serious 
infractions, such as committing and/or being convicted of a criminal offence (Champion 
1994). Decisions relating to revocation of parole/probation are also influenced by a range 
of situational factors such as the state of overcrowding in prisons, recommendations made 
by probation officers, and, if the offender is attending a community-based programme, 
the requirements of the facility. Finally, the revocation of parole/probation does not 
necessarily lead to rearrest, reconviction, and/or reincarceration. 
In addition to these difficulties, policymakers and state legislators are continuously 
reworking policy and legislation in accordance with developments in philosophical and 
ideological perspectives. As a result, policy shifts often have the ability to alter how 
recidivism is used or defined (Champion 1996). For instance, as seen in chapter five, 
futegrated Offender Management (IOM) has recently replaced prior rehabilitative 
methods in New Zealand. Under IOM, offenders are now assessed according to a newly 
established 'Criminogenic Needs Inventory' (CNI). Each time approaches to intervention 
are altered, as is the case with IOM, patterns of recidivism are open to change because 
offenders are being dealt with according to slightly different principles than previously. 
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The complex nature of measuring levels of recidivism often makes it difficult 
conclusively to assess reductions in criminal behaviour. For instance, establishing control 
groups that are similar in nature to those being evaluated is difficult, and if variations 
exist, results may be influenced especially in regards to factors acknowledged as 
increasing the likelihood of reoffending. These difficulties become obvious once studies 
assessing recidivism are compared. As seen in prior discussion on the CTP, studies of the 
same programme can come to significantly different conclusions (see Palmer 1986, 
Wilson 1986). Also as methods of gauging recidivist rates vary greatly, it is often 
problematic to compare studies because it is "like comparing apples with oranges" 
(Champion 1996: 568). Significant variation exists, not only in regards to definition, but 
also as to how long recidivist rates are considered. For example, while some studies 
measure recidivism for six months after the completion of a programme, others continue 
their evaluations for two years or even five years. 
When considering the usefulness of recidivist statistics, a key question that needs to be 
asked is: does recidivism necessarily indicate programme failure? This is an important 
area of consideration because recidivism rates are influenced by a number of factors, 
many of which exist irrespective of the programme and what it offers. Alternately, they 
depend on the individual characteristics and personal histories of those being dealt with 
and are, therefore, difficult to account for. Some of these key predictors of reoffending 
include age, 160 accumulated personal convictions, poverty/low family income, 
dysfunctional family backgrounds, and having family members with a criminal record 
160 Age has been established as the most accurate predictor of reoffending, with younger offenders more 
likely to offend than older criminals (Newbold 2002). 
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(see McLaren 1992, Zamble and Quinsey 1997, Newbold 2002). All of these factors have 
the ability to impact negatively on a programme, while not necessarily signifying that the 
programme itself does not have the ability to rehabilitate certain offenders. As McLaren's 
(1992) risk-needs-responsivity model establishes, it is essential that rehabilitation is 
individualised and carefully targeted if it is to work. This is a continual problem as it is 
often difficult to match the right programme to the right clientele (Champion 1996). 
Therefore, if an offender is placed in a programme that is not conducive to his/her needs, 
it is difficult to know whether recidivism is indicative of individual or programme 
failures. 
The ability of a programme to rehabilitate can also be impeded by poor organisation and 
management. This is an area which will be considered in-depth, in relation to SSF, in 
chapter seven. At this point, however, it is important to realise that while a programme 
may have the potential to 'succeed' for certain individuals, if it is poorly organised and 
administered, its ability to operate competently is severely restricted. As we shall see, 
there have been many occasions throughout SSF' s history when poor management 
structures have impeded the ability of the organisation to function productively. 
Another problem with focusing on recidivism is that other measures of success/failure are 
neglected. In the words of Latessa and Allen (1997: 376), "Perhaps the most limiting 
aspect of effectiveness studies has been the neglect given to other performance measures. 
By simply comparing recidivism rates, researchers have ignored some of the main effects 
that community correctional programs are designed to achieve". These other factors 
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include cost-benefit/cost-effectiveness analysis, degree of humaneness, impact on prison 
population and the reduction of overcrowding in jails, vocational development and/or 
psychological adjustment (see McLaren 1992, Champion 1994, Latessa and Allen 1997). 
Conclusion 
Reaching definitive conclusions regarding the success of rehabilitative programmes, such 
as SSF, is extremely difficult. This is because the issues surrounding rehabilitation and 
recidivism are so complex. Certainly, debate concerning how to most effectively 
rehabilitate criminals has existed since 1764, when Beccaria argued that offenders could 
be reformed. Optimism surrounding the ability of rehabilitative programmes, however, 
suffered a significant blow when, in 1974, Martinson claimed that "nothing works". 
Although, since 1985, support for Martinson's claim has diminished, still no consensus 
exists on one treatment programme that is guaranteed to prevent reoffending. 
Accompanying ongomg scepticism concemmg rehabilitative programmes is that 
rehabilitation is not a principle that can be easily assessed. The primary measure of 
rehabilitation, namely recidivism, is surrounded by numerous difficulties. Most 
significantly, different studies define recidivism in a variety of ways. Recidivism also 
tends to dominate evaluations of rehabilitative programmes, rather than being used in 
combination with other measures of success/failure. Consequently, it is important to be 
aware of all of these issues as they certainly complicate the reliability of any data 
gathered and the ability for any findings on community-based programmes like SSF to be 
compared. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Rehabilitation at SSF 
Introduction 
When considering the statistical results available for SSF it is important to remain aware 
of the issues surrounding rehabilitation and recidivism as a primary measure of 
rehabilitative success. As discussed in chapter six, the 'effectiveness' debate is complex 
and thus it is difficult to reach definitive conclusions in relation to SSF. 161 A detailed 
account of the Foundation's recidivist figures cannot be compiled, particularly during 
SSF's early period, due to a lack of comprehensive records. To do so, access would also 
have to be gained to Department of Corrections databases, since long-term recidivist 
information is not kept at SSF. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an indication of recidivist figures for each of 
SSF's five phases of development, based on the information that is available from 
archival material and studies completed on the Foundation. Along with this statistical 
review, the opinions of those involved with SSF throughout its history will also be 
considered. Speaking with 13 individuals who had been associated with SSF at different 
times provided a range of assessments as to the role and relative success of the 
organisation. It is important to include these opinions because the personalities and 
161Recidivism is also not the only valid criterion for assessing rehabilitative programmes For this reason, 
chapter eight will consider the importance of organisational and management factors which are arguably 
more significant to the longevity of a programme like SSF than its ability to reform every offender whom 
attends. 
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charisma of those involved with SSF has frequently had a huge impact on the style of 
programme offered. 
Recidivism in New Zealand 
Until recently, information about recidivism in New Zealand has been very limited. 
Listed below are a few of the studies completed up unti11993 (Newbold 1993).162 
1. In 1962, at the Kohitere boys' training centre it was found that 37 percent 
reoffended within six months; 61 percent within a year; 74 percent within two 
years; 85 percent within three years; 90 percent within four years; and 91 percent 
within five years. 
2. At Wi Tako in 1965, a reconviction rate of 20-25 percent was detected amid the 
first time adult offenders, although no follow-up data was given. 
3. In 1965, a study on borstal training found that 71 percent were reconvicted within 
three years. This was followed up in 1967, when it was discovered that 70 percent 
reoffended within five years; 50 percent seriously. 
4. In 1966, detention centres were established as having a reconviction rate of 51 
percent within a year of release. This figure had increased to 60 percent in 1971. 
5. For periodic detention, it was discovered in 1968, that 33.5 percent were 
imprisoned within two years. 
6. In 1983, it was found that corrective training had a reconviction rate of 71 percent 
within one year. 
162 The difficulties established in chapter six with relying on recidivist figures must be remembered when 
considering this information and as a result all findings need to be approached with caution. 
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7. The reconviction rates of those convicted of rape and child sex offences was found, 
in 1991, to sit at 3.6 and 6.7 percent respectively (although no follow-up data was 
provided). 
8. In 1993, reconviction rates were considered for all national board parolees released 
from prison between 1985 and 1993.163 It was found that 20 percent were 
reconvicted within a year; 38.2 percent within two years; and 49.4 percent within 
seven years (Newbold 1993). 
Recently, Bakker and Riley (1999) completed one of the most comprehensive analyses of 
New Zealand recidivist rates. Between 1990 and 1996, they considered two large groups 
of criminal offenders. The first consisted of 31,985 individuals convicted of an 
imprisonable offence in 1990, and the second of 4,785 released from prison in 1990. The 
second group provides the most useful and reliable, information, however, because these 
offenders had all been released from prison in 1990 while many of those in the first group 
remained incarcerated in 1996, at the end of the research period. 
In their study, Bakker and Riley (1999) followed these two groups until May 1996, 
defining all that had recorded a criminal reconviction before May 1996 as recidivists. 164 
They found recidivist rates of 72 percent for those convicted in 1990 and, more 
significantly, 84 percent for those discharged from prison in the same year. It was also 
discovered that 53 percent of those released from custody in 1990 had returned to prison 
163 It needs to be remembered that offenders were released at different times during the study period and 
hence the interval in which some offenders could be reconvicted was greater than for others. 
164 This excluded those convicted of traffic and minor offences. 
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by May 1996. Bakker and Riley found that age was the most accurate predictor of 
reoffending, with 95 percent of those under 20 years old who had been released from 
prison in 1990 reoffending before 1996. This was compared with 53 percent of those 
aged 40 and over. Another predictor was previous convictions because while only 20 
percent of first time offenders released from prison in 1990 reoffended, this figure 
increased sharply with each subsequent conviction, and then levelled out at 70 percent 
after five previous convictions (Bakker and Riley 1999). 
In 2002, another study was undertaken which considered both reconviction and 
reimprisonment rates for offenders released from prison between 1995 and 1998. Spier 
(2002) investigated the prior and post conviction histories of the 22,340 inmates who had 
been released during this period. He found that 37 percent of inmates were reconvicted 
within six months of their release from prison; 58 percent within a year; 73 percent within 
two years; and 86 percent within five years. In relation to reimprisonment, Spier 
discovered that 13 percent of inmates were reimprisoned within six months of release; 25 
percent within a year; 37 percent within two years; and 51 percent within five years. 
Spier (2002) contended that there were two variables most strongly associated with the 
likelihood or reconviction and reimprisonment. These were: (1) age, including age at first 
conviction; 165 and (2) the number of previous convictions. 166 Other factors also deemed 
165 Younger inmates were more likely to be both reconvicted and reimprisoned than older inmates were. 
166 The more often an individual had been convicted and imprisoned previously the more likely they were 
to be reconvicted and reimprisoned following their release from prison Seventy percent of the inmates had 
more than 10 convictions prior to being imprisoned. Only five percent had no prior convictions. Sixty-two 
percent of the inmates had been imprisoned previously, 16 percent on more than five previous occasions 
(Spier 2002). 
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to have an influence were that male offenders were more likely to be reconvicted and 
reimprisoned than females, and Maori were more likely than non-Maori. Spier (2002) 
also found that only a small proportion of all released inmates were reconvicted for a very 
serious offence. 
Overall, while different studies produce varying results, they indicate high levels of 
recidivism among released prisoners in New Zealand. In fact, figures from Corrections 
indicate that New Zealand has a reconviction rate of up to 80 percent, higher than 
Australia, Canada, England or Scotland (Govt.nz). When compared with American 
statistics provided by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), however, it can be seen that 
New Zealand figures are very similar to those in the U.S. These BJS findings indicate that 
over 70 percent of American prisoners are rearrested within six years of release and 
almost half are subsequently reincarcerated (cited in Newbold 2002). It is important to be 
mindful of these findings, especially the generally high incidence of recidivism in New 
Zealand, when assessing the relative success or failure of SSF. 
Results of SSF 
A variety of measures will be used when considered SSP's rehabilitative ability. This is 
because, while ideally recidivism would be based solely on reconviction and/or 
reimprisonment rates, this information is not necessarily provided and/or available. 
Therefore, at times alternative means of assessment including reoffending/return to prison 
figures, programme completion/discontinuation rates, and occupancy levels will also be 
considered. It is important to be aware of these shifts because they do impact on the 
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overall consistency of the information being given and the ability to make definitive 
evaluations regarding the overall "success" of SSF throughout its 23-year existence. 
Pre-1986 
It is very difficult to make any assessment of recidivist levels at SSF prior to 1986. 
Before the introduction of the Criminal Justice Act 1985, residents attended SSF on a 
voluntary basis and, hence, came and went as they pleased. Few records were kept so in 
general only fragmentary information was available regarding who attended the 
programme, how long they were there, and whether they 'reoffended'. At this time, those 
responsible for running SSF aspired for the programme to become like DSF, a self-
sufficient organisation that was unaccountable to formal correctional authorities. For the 
founders of DSF, the appeal of self-sufficiency was being able to avoid the restrictions 
accompanying a primary focus on recidivism as a measure of programme success (Silbert 
1997). According to Silbert (1997: 2), "You don't have to gather phony statistics 
(claiming) 98.2 percent success every year". With SSF being based on these same 
principles, it is unsurprising that the data available on residents before 1986 is limited. 
Prior to 1986, most of the information and opmwns available regarding rates of 
recidivism at SSF are, therefore, speculative. There are no figures or statistics available to 
prove or disprove these claims. For instance, it was stated in the Fourth Annual Report 
(1982- 1983) that of the 29 individuals who had been through the programme between 
February 1982 and February 1983, 74 percent had not returned to prison and were staying 
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away from a life of crime. 167 A year later, in 1984, an information brochure claimed that 
"The 'return to prison' rate of our ex-residents is very low (less than 25%)". These bald 
statements are meaningless, however, because no detailed figures are provided to back 
them up. 
In regards to programme attendance, it was asserted in a letter to the Secretary for Justice, 
Mr Ray Bell, in December 1985 that SSF has "helped resettle some 150 ex -inmates over 
the past five years". 168 While the meaning of this claim is unclear, archival material refers 
to a range of programme graduates. Between November 1982 and November 1984, four 
key graduates are mentioned as having completed the two-year programme. These were 
Graham McFelin, Trevor Atkins, Judi Peterson and Kevin Butson, all of whom were 
mentioned during interviews as early "successes" of the programme at SSF. 
Kath Jamieson's Findings: 1 January 1986-9 March 1990 
During his time as Director, Ken Turner often claimed that since 1985 SSF had achieved 
a 60 percent 'success' rate. 169 Again, the significance of this statement is unclear and, in 
fact, little consideration was given to recidivist/reconviction figures within annual reports 
(1986-1989). 170 Turner now admits that he had no definitive material to base this 
assertion on (Turner: personal communication). In fact, in his interview with me, Turner 
seriously questioned SSF' s ability to have any rehabilitative effect. He said, 
167 Fourth Annual Report 1982-1983: 3 
168 Letter to the Secretary for Justice (Mr Ray Bell) from K. Butson and D. Robinson, December 1985. 
169 Letter to Sheryn Elborn from Denise Crowe 10/4/1989 
170 It was only prior to Turner's appointment, while Terry Easthope was Director of SSF, that it was stated 
that between December 1986 and November 1987 thirty-one individuals had been through the programme 
and only two had returned to prison since leaving SSF (Eighth Annual Report 1986-1987: 2) 
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It's a very idealistic thing to think that everybody who's in jail can be rehabilitated or habilitated 
... I don't think places like SSF have the skills or the ability to habilitate people ... [There were 
people] who would be considered successful from that programme ... but in reality, if you look 
back now, they all reoffended. I think you'd be very lucky to find any that haven't reoffended so, 
therefore, if you said that the assessment of success is not reoffending, you'd have to say it is 
totally unsuccessful and is still unsuccessful today. 
In 1991, Kath Jamieson completed the most comprehensive statistical analysis of 
recidivist figures between 1986 and 1990 as part of her research on SSF. While 
personally Jamieson was unable to negotiate direct access to criminal histories held in the 
Wanganui Computer Centre, she arranged Philip Spier, a research officer in the 
Department of Justice Policy and Research Division, to collect data on those who had 
been through SSF between 1 January 1986 and 9 March 1990. The total number of 
individuals involved with SSF during this time was 91, consisting of 84 males and seven 
females. Most were repeat offenders with lengthy criminal histories which often 
incorporated violent crimes and other serious offences (Jamieson 1991). 
According to the figures compiled by Spier, 70.3 percent were not apprehended for any 
criminal offence while in the programme at SSF. Of the 29.7 percent who did reoffend, 
the majority (16%) committed property offences including theft and burglary, while other 
significant convictions were for drug offences (6.1%) and crimes of violence (3.7%). 
Jamieson (1991), however, argued that these statistics were not a fair representation of 
the actual level of criminal involvement by residents living at SSF. She claimed, 
From my observations of informal life at [SSF] during 1989, I am of the opinion that the above 
figures are not an accurate representation of offending by clients while at the Foundation. In 
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many respects, the above statistics say more about the degree of tolerance toward violations at 
[SSF]. Many more residents actually offended while in the programme than is indicated by the 
data, the majority having committed drug related crimes ... Many of these incidents were 
handled by the staff at the organisation, who simply dealt with the offending through internal 
sanctioning or by expelling the resident from the programme, citing 'inability to live within 
rules' as the reason for dismissal. Usually, the only offenders who were referred back to 
Probation Officers or to the courts were those actually discovered and arrested by the police 
(Jamieson 1991: 241). 
According to Jamieson (1991), recidivism rates escalated upon departure from SSF. 171 Of 
the 66 ex-clients who had been through SSF between 1986-1990, and for whom data was 
available, it was found that only 15 (22.7%) had not reoffended by 9 March 1990. 172 Of 
the 51 individuals (77.3%) that had reoffended, the most serious reconviction for 12 
(23.5) was violence. A further 48 were convicted for committing non-violent crimes 
including property offences (25 convictions), drug offences (five convictions), and other 
offences (9 convictions). 173 Many ex-clients received multiple reconvictions. Twenty-two 
ex-residents were convicted of between one and five new crimes, 18 received between 11 
and 50 new convictions, and one ex-client was convicted of between 51 and 100 new 
offences (Jamieson 1991: 243). 
171 According to Jamieson (1991), 'departure' did not necessarily equate to programme completion. This is 
problematic because, as will be seen in future discussion, those who complete the programme are a lot less 
likely to reoffend than those who are dismissed or leave prematurely. 
172 This number excluded 15 residents still in the programme. 
173 These figures, which are quoted directly from Jamieson (1991), are somewhat problematic because they 
do not appear to add up. 
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At the end of her research, Jamieson (1991) came to the conclusion that, in absolute 
terms, SSF had not managed to break the recidivism cycle. She conceded, however, that 
due to the unreliability of official statistics, this summation was a tentative one. 
According to Jamieson ( 1991: 24 7), 
Arrest and conviction rates seldom indicate the true rate of offending and often mask factors 
such as offender self-concept, family background and the reasons behind their offending. In the 
case of [SSF] residents, this may include length of exposure to the Foundation programme, prior 
motivation, exposure to the programme versus active participation in it and so on. The clear 
distinctions between these issues are often obscured by official recidivism statistics. Given these 
difficulties and the fact that there was no real control group, very little can actually be said at this 
stage about the Foundation's effectiveness. 
1990-1995 
From 1990, more comprehensive records of resident statistics were kept than previously. 
Each year in the Foundation's annual report, details were given regarding how many 
individuals had been through both the residential (R) and day (D) programmes. This 
information included those who were still attending SSF, those who had completed the 
programme and been subsequently employed/unemployed, and those who had reoffended 
or been returned to prison. Table 1 provides a summary of the statistics provided in the 
annual reports from 1991 to 1995. It is important to note, however, that these figures are 
incomplete because information was not always given for all residents. They also do not 
clearly differentiate between those who reoffended (1) while on the programme and were 
returned to prison; (2) after leaving the programme early; and (3) subsequent to 
completing the programme. 
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Table 1: Status of Residents 1991 to 1995 
Year ending: Aug91' Aug '92 
R D R D 
No. entering SSF 27 15 26 6 
Still in programme 9 9 8 1 
Returned to prison 5 2 6 1 
Reoffended - - - -
Working 7 1 1 1 
Unemployed 4 0 6 3 
Transfer* 1 2 1 0 
Status Unknown 0 1 3 0 
Other 1 0 1 0 
Aug '93 Feb '94 Aug '95 
R 
16 
4 
0 
-
5 
3 
1 
1 
1 
D R R 
7 15 21 
2 7 3 
1 1# -
- 2 6 
1 - 4 
3 - -
0 - -
0 - 1 
0 - 7 
*To other programme/scheme 
#For a previous offence 
In the twelve months to August 1991, a total of seven out of 42 SSF clients (17%), both 
residential and day programme participants, were returned to prison while at SSF. Of the 
27 who attended the residential programme, four offended while at SSF or soon after 
leaving and one voluntarily returned to prison because he found the programme too 
difficult. According to the Twelfth Annual Report (1990-1991), none of the recidivist 
offenders had completed the programme at SSF or got fully involved with it during their 
stay. The average amount of time spent in the programme for those who reoffended was 
three months compared with nearly ten months for those who did not reoffend and close 
to a year for those who were subsequently gainfully employed. 174 
174 Twelfth Annual Report 1990-1991: 2 
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Between August 1991 and July 1992, seven out of 32 SSF residents were returned to 
prison while attending SSF (22%). Excluding the one day-programme participant, five 
out of six of those who reoffended from the residential programme had remained in the 
programme for less than four months, while the other attended SSF for seven months. 
While not definitively stated, these figures suggest that recidivists were not completing 
the minimum six-month attendance required at the programme at SSF. Additionally, it 
was once again commented that "All recidivists displayed a lack of commitment to 
anything outside of their own personal desires" .175 
According to the Fourteenth Annual Report (1992-1993), in the twelve months leading up 
to August 1993, only one member of the day programme reoffended. This would indicate 
a recidivist rate of just four percent. As with all statistics provided in this analysis, 
however, it is difficult to tell whether this figure is accurate. For instance, in another 
report on SSF (1994) very different recidivist figures were quoted for the 1992 to 1993 
than those given in the Fourteenth Annual Report. 176 
According to the executive summary in the 1994 report, during the 1992-1993 financial 
year, 177 22 individuals attended the residential programme and recidivist details were 
given for 21 of these 22 residents. Ofthese 21, nine completed the programme, five were 
dismissed, three chose to leave, two were returned to prison for previous offences and 
two reoffended while on the programme. 178 These figures indicate a recidivist rate of 19 
175 Meladie Bras, Thirteenth Annual Report 1991-1992: 2 
176 Report on SSF February 1994 
177 It was not stated in which months this financial year began and ended. 
178 Report on SSF February 1994- Executive Summary: 4 
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percent (n=4), rather than the four percent offered by the Fourteenth Annual Report. 
Conflicting figures like these are a continual problem throughout SSF's archival material. 
This is largely because the Director and Chair, who created the reports, were generally 
not experienced academics and had little mathematical expertise or statistical 
competence. The figures offered in the annual reports are, therefore, often vague, 
confusing, ambiguous, incomplete, and unfortunately sometimes just plain wrong. 
The provision of client statistics was altered in 1994 and 1995. Only those involved in the 
residential programme were considered and reoffending, rather than reimprisonment rates 
were given. Less information was also provided regarding what had happened to those 
who had completed the programme including whether they were employed/unemployed. 
According to the Fifteenth Annual Report, 15 individuals were involved in the residential 
programme between March 1993 and February 1994. In February 1994, seven were still 
attending SSF, two had reoffended and one had returned to prison for previous offence. 
This equated to a recidivist rate of 20 percent (n=3). Comparatively, in the twelve months 
leading up to August 1995,179 21 residents attended SSF, six of whom reoffended (29% ). 
Habilitation Centre Phase: 1996-2002 
Department of Corrections: Interim Evaluation Report, 1997 
As mentioned in chapter five, Dr. David Y eboah, a Senior Research Advisor for the 
Department of Corrections, carried out an interim evaluation of SSF following the 
179 The shift in the twelve-month period being considered in 1995, that is September to August rather than 
March to February, is due to the AGM being held later in the year. 
228 
programme's establishment as a habilitation centre. He considered the 20 residents, aged 
between 21 and 43 years, who had attended SSF from April 1996 to the end of March 
1997. Of these 20 residents, 19 were referred to SSF from prison, while only one arrived 
after completing a community-based sentence. 18° For 40 percent of these residents their 
most recent conviction, prior to attending SSF, was for a violent offence. Of the 
remaining clients, 40 percent had most recently served time for dishonesty offences and 
10 percent each for sexual and drug/anti-social offences (Y eboah 1997). 
Y eboah (1997) found that eight of the 11 residents who left SSF during the evaluation 
period re-offended and subsequently recorded convictions. 181 This equated to a recidivist 
rate of 73 percent. Of the eight who were reconvicted, three were returned to prison, three 
received periodic detention (one while still attending SSF), and two got supervision. 
While these results were disappointing, Y eboah claimed they needed to be interpreted 
with care because only a small number of offenders were considered during a short 
period of operation. fu the words of Yeboah (1997: 44), "It is difficult to link the high 
level of re-offending to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the habilitation centre 
programme because of the short period of operation and the small number of offenders". 
The high number of reconvictions correlated with low occupancy and programme 
completion rates. fu December 1996, the occupancy rate was only a daily average of 4.32 
residents, 36 percent of the programme's maximum capacity of 12. By March 1997, this 
figure had improved to 60 percent of capacity, or an average of 7.2 residents, although 
180 The Habilitation Centre Contract specified that 80% of referrals must be parolees. 
181 Yeboah's study included those who were dismissed from SSF or left the programme early. 
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this was still significantly below the level specified in the pilot habilitation centre 
contract. 182 A major reason for the low occupancy levels at SSF was that programme 
completion rates were poor. In fact, of the 11 individuals who were no longer in the 
programme at the end of March 1997, seven (63.6%) had not completed the programme 
in full. This was partly because of the urine-testing requirement of the Department of 
Corrections and their insistence that any failure be removed from the programme. 
Yeboah (1997) argued that improving the overall retention of residents at SSF was a 
crucial issue for the Foundation because, according to Department of Corrections 
statistics, 183 "For those men who do complete the programme, they (sic) have a better 
than 80% chance of not reo.ffending". 184 He suggested that greater motivation was 
required from offenders if they were to complete the programme and change their 
lifestyles. Y eboah conceded, however, that assessing the motivation of potential clients 
was difficult because many residents were using the habilitation centre as a way of 
1 . h . . t 185 eavmg t e pnson envtronmen . 
A large number of dismissals and recalls to prison, resulting from residents breaching the 
conditions of their release, was thus the primary cause of the Foundation's poor 
programme completion rates. According to Yeboah (1997), the high level of serious 
breaches during SSF' s first year of operation as a habilitation centre was an issue that 
182 Contract specifications required an average of eight residents at SSF over a six-month period. 
183 These findings were based on figures which found that of the men who had graduated over the two-year 
period since the Habilitation Pilot Project started, 80% had not reoffended (see Annual Report for SSF 
Annual General Meeting- 8 September 1998: 4) 
184 Director's Report for the Annual General Meeting ofSSF -14 September 1999: 3- emphasis added. 
185 As discussed in chapters four and five, the selection of suitable/motivated residents has been a crucial 
issue throughout the Foundation's history. 
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needed to be urgently addressed. He found that most serious breaches were occurring at 
night and during weekends when the offending residents should be at the Foundation, 
being supervised by SSF staff. Yeboah (1997: 55) claimed that, ''unless adequate steps 
are taken to improve night and weekend supervision, serious breaches will continue to 
occur, and participation and programme completion will be adversely affected". 
Yeboah's findings were reinforced, and added to, by a Department of Corrections News 
Release (12/8/1998). This media release stated that between April 1996 and March 1998 
a total of 39 residents had attended SSF. It also established that although the reoffending 
rate had been 727 per 1000 residents during the Foundation's first year of operation as a 
habilitation centre, this rate had declined to 500 per 1000 by the end of the second 
year. 186 The figures quoted in this news release were based on the findings of the 
Habilitation Centre: Quarterly Reports, which were provided by the centres to the 
Department of Corrections as part of their contract requirements. 
Habilitation Centres: Quarterly Reports 1996- 1997 
Under the provisions of the Habilitation Centre contract, quarterly service performance 
reports were expected from each of the pilot habilitation centres. Initially, these pilot 
programmes consisted of SSF, Aspell House in Plimmerton, and Te Whanau 0 
Waipareira Trust in West Auckland. Information was gathered from each of the facilities 
and culminated into a quarterly report, which compared and evaluated the programmes. 
186 Department of Corrections News Release 12/8/1998 
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Table 2 reviews three key areas considered in these reports: (1) the average daily number 
of residents; (2) occupancy rates; and (3) the average cost per resident per day. 
Table 2: Findings of the Habilitation Centre: Quarterly Reports 1996-1997 
Ave. daily residents Occupancy rate (%) Cost($) per resid./day 
SSF Asp. Wai. SSF Asp. Wai. SSF Asp. Wai. 
30/6/96 5 4.22 0.40 50 42 4 178 241 2,215 
30/9/96 3.2 4.96 6.21 32 49 52 280 203 154 
31/12/96 2.55 0.44 6.24 25 4 52 351 2,349 150 
31/3/97 6.15 0.09 4.41 61 1 37 156 11,796 223 
30/6/97 7.37 1.56 6.37 75 16 54 104 n/a n/a 
30/9/97 8.09 5.66 6.81 83 58 58 98 n/a n/a 
Note: n/a =not available 
As discussed in chapter five and further reflected in Y eboah' s findings, during 1996, 
resident numbers and occupancy rates at SSF were low prior to the resignation of Glenn 
Newman and appointment of David Coom as Director. Unfortunately, specific recidivist 
information was not provided within either the quarterly reports or SSF's annual report. 
According to programme completion figures, however, of the 20 residents who attended 
SSF between March 1996 and March 1997, 10 were removed or failed to complete the 
programme. The reasons behind these dismissals included four for alcohol/drug use, one 
for programme non-compliance, one theft while on programme although no charges were 
laid, and three who committed further offences. There was also one resident who 
absconded from the programme within 12 hours of admission. Of the remaining 
residents, six were still on the programme and four had completed it. 
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In 1997, resident numbers and occupancy rates at SSF improved dramatically and by 
September the Foundation was meeting contract specifications. Between July 1997 and 
June 1998, occupancy rates were above 80 percent for every quarter except the March 
quarter. 187 Also, while specific figures are not available for client outcomes, it was 
indicated that of those who attended SSF during this year, 38 percent had graduated, 37 
percent were still in the programme, 21 percent had been discharged, and four percent 
had been deemed unsuitable.188 These outcomes were markedly different from the other 
habilitation centres, especially Aspell House, where occupancy rates were not being met 
and as a result the cost per resident per day increased, sometimes dramatically. As a result 
of these poor outcomes, and combined with other difficulties, both Aspell House and Te 
Whanau 0 Waipareira Trust were subsequently closed and not replaced. The details of 
these closures will be discussed in chapter eight. 
Service Performance Reports: SSF Trust Habilitation Centre 1998-2001 
At the beginning of 1998, Service Performance Reports replaced Habilitation Centre: 
Quarterly Reports. While this new documentation continued to assess many of the same 
contract specifications as previously, its focus was solely on SSF, rather than offering a 
comparison of all habilitation centres. Table 3 provides a summary of total attendance 
numbers at SSF, between 1998 and 2001, including completion and discontinuation 
figures. 
187 Annual Report for SSF Annual General Meeting- 8 September 1998: 5 
188 Ibid: 6 
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Table 3: Service Performance Report Findings 1998-2001 
Total number of residents 
During quarter End quarter Completing Discontinuing 
1 Jan-31 Mar '98 12 8 2 2 
1 Apr- 30 Jun '98 10 10 1 2 
1 Jul- 30 Sept '98 nla nla nla nla 
1 Oct 31 Dec '98 12 9 1 3 
Total: 1998 34 4 7 
1 Jan- 31 Mar '99 14 9 4 3 
1 Apr- 30 Jun '99 9 6 2 1 
1 Jul- 30 Sept '99 13 10 2 1 
1 Oct- 31 Dec '99 9 8 3 3 
Total: 1999 45 11 8 
1 Jan 31 Mar '00 9 9 2 1 
1 Apr- 30 Jun '00 14 6 1 6 
1 Jul- 30 Sept '00 11 6 3 3 
1 Oct- 31 Dec '00 10 6 0 4 
Total: 2000 44 6 14 
1 Jan-31 Mar '01 12 9 2 1 
Note: nla =not available 
The fmdings of these service performance reports indicated that although some clients 
were completing the programme, high discontinuation rates remained an ongoing 
problem for SSF. According to one report (1 April 30 June 2000), this was largely due 
to drug use, as well as general non-compliance to Foundation rules, such as breaking 
curfew. In spite of this, however, resident numbers at SSF were generally good. During 
1998 and 1999, the Foundation continued to consistently meet contract specifications, 
averaging just below nine residents over the two-year period, and while in 2000, this 
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figure dropped to an average of below seven residents, early indications suggested that in 
2001 this situation would improve. 
Along with these service performance reports, SSF's annual reports continued to review 
the outcomes of those who had attended the programme. In the twelve months ending 30 
June 1999, eight men graduated from SSF, most of whom subsequently moved into work 
or full time education, 11 were discharged mainly for cannabis use, and six were still in 
the programme. 189 These figures remained similar at the end of the following year (30 
June 2000), with seven men having graduated, 14 having been discharged again largely 
due to drug use, and six still in the programme. 190 And, finally, in the twelve months to 
30 June 2001/91 six men graduated all of whom secured employment, and eleven were 
discharged primarily for drug use. 192 
Success of SSF 
Before drawing any conclusions regarding the rehabilitative ability of SSF, the 
limitations of the available statistics must be reiterated. Assessing a programme with a 
23-year history is problematic and, therefore, due to the significant changes that have 
occurred over this period, a long-term analysis is irrelevant. Even since SSF' s 
establishment as a habilitation centre, gaps exist within the figures provided in the 
archival material and the areas of analysis often shift (from reoffending/return to prison 
189 Director's Report for the Annual General Meeting ofSSF --14 September 1999 
190 Director's Report for the Annual Stakeholders Meeting ofSSF 1999-2000: 1 
191 Director's Report to the Annual General Meeting of the SSF- 13 November 2001: 1 
192 When comparing these figures with those given in the service performance reports, it is important to 
remember that in the annual reports the year runs from July to June, rather than January to December. In 
spite of this, however, there are some variations which is a common difficulty when analysing statistics. 
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figures to programme completion/discontinuation rates). Therefore, the four points listed 
below should be treated with care and as general observations rather than definitive 
conclusions. 
1. Due to the unreliability of data, few conclusions can be drawn about SSF prior to 
1996. 
2. Recidivist and programme completion rates have been affected by numerous 
factors, which at times have caused these figures to fluctuate dramatically. 
3. Leadership and management style appears to have a significant impact on the level 
of programme completion and reoffending by SSF residents. 
4. The likelihood of reoffence decreases the longer an individual remains at SSF, 
especially if they complete/graduate from the programme. Therefore, the selection 
of suitable, motivated clients is a crucial to SSF's ability to achieve rehabilitative 
"success". 
While statistics can provide some general indications as to the performance of SSF 
throughout its history, it is essential that they be approached with caution. Along with the 
complexities of the rehabilitative debate and the difficulties with measuring recidivism 
(which have already been discussed), unrealistic expectations are also often placed on 
rehabilitative organisations. In the words of Glenn Newman it is important to remember, 
"We were required by contract to work only with recidivists. The most difficult clients 
you can imagine ... [Recidivist behaviour] is very, very difficult to change. It's very 
obsessive behaviour". Therefore, high defection and dismissal rates are always going to 
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be likely especially considering the strict regulations that SSF has placed on its residents 
throughout the programme's recent history (see chapters four and five). 
In my opinion, a common misconception made about rehabilitative programmes like SSF 
is that they has the ability to transform any offender. In actuality, there has never been 
anything inherent about the programme at SSF which has been able to force or convince 
an offender to change their behaviour. The resident is responsible for altering his own 
lifestyle and it is only once he makes this decision that the range of resources offered by 
SSF can be of any help in his transition back into open society. This is why the selection 
of motivated participants has always been such a crucial issue to the "success" of SSF 
and why the likelihood of reoffending appears to decrease amongst those who complete 
and graduate from the programme. 
The importance of having motivated residents was reinforced by many of those involved 
with SSF, at various times throughout the programme's history. For example, according 
to Geoff Samuels, those most likely to take advantage of the resources provided by SSF 
were "people who'd done several lags and were getting sick of it". Kevin Butson agreed 
with Samuels claim. He argued, 
It's just where people are in life. You get it with lots of programmes: Salvation Army, Bridge 
programmes, if they're desperate enough and at the crossroads of their lives and something like 
SSF is there ... then they pick it up with both hands and say 'hey I'm going to go with it' ... 
and, yeah, it can be an absolutely wonderful growth period and stepping stone ... and yet many 
are reluctant to go there because they don't really want to change their life. 
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By claiming SSF is not inherently able to rehabilitate, I do not suggest the programme 
has no purpose within New Zealand's current correctional environment. SSF, like other 
community-based facilities, continues to play an essential role within the criminal justice 
system. David Coom explains, 
You'll never be able to offer programmes within the prison that will be able to reintegrate 
people, because it's an oxymoron. You have to have [community-based facilities] for the people 
who are heavily institutionalised. You need programmes on the outside that they can slot into. I 
think that a community-based programme means exactly that, that we are not isolated, we are 
part of the community. So part of the resident's time with us is learning all of the different ways 
you can get support or you can support members of the community. 
The provision of community connections and resources is simply something that cannot 
be offered within the confines of a jail. Therefore, although many non-custodial facilities, 
possibly even including SSF, have not been as successful at reducing recidivism as 
hoped, they have been able to contribute services that the prison cannot. 
As well as providing a link between prison and the community, SSF offers support and 
training to individuals with long criminal histories who may lack basic living skills. The 
provision of this range of resources is a necessary part of the transition of highly 
institutionalised individuals back into the community. In the words of Colin Elliott, 
[While] not everyone needed SSF . . . [and] some would have succeeded anyway . . . The 
programme definitely had an impact, stopping some from reoffending ... [providing] access to 
certain resources ... [or] a career path ... I don't think most of them would have necessarily 
succeeded without that time [at SSF]. 
Meladie Bras takes this point a step further, arguing that "to take a 'lifer' and just throw 
them out into the community is inhumane because they will end up offending again . . . 
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you have to teach them how to do everything because for ten years they've been out of 
circulation". Jeff Cooper, a former SSF resident and one of the organisation's success 
stories, said, 
I think it is essential that a progrannne like this exists because it doesn't matter what you learn in 
prison, while it's all good, when you step out that gate it's a different world than prison ... You 
get some guys that come here that have done ten years-plus, and society's changed. Even in five 
years a society can change heaps. And I think they come to a place like this and they can take 
those little steps at a time ... Before I went to prison everything was done for me so I had no 
skills, even cooking. For me coming here was pretty essential. I needed to learn about banking, 
how to budget money and stuff like that . . . If I'd gone back straight back out into the 
connnunity again I would have found things a real struggle. 
Conclusion 
SSF does not, and can not, work for everyone. It would be unrealistic to expect it could. 
As a programme, SSF has never had a peerless ability to transform a resident's attitudes 
and behaviours. Ultimately, the offender has to want to alter his lifestyle before SSF can 
have a significant impact. For those who have been motivated to change, SSF has offered 
a range of resources, throughout much of its history, which has provided assistance in an 
offender's transition from incarceration to life in free society and promoted the 
discontinuation of reoffending behaviour. 
Overall, it is too simplistic and problematic to definitively conclude whether, according 
to the statistics available, SSF has been either a rehabilitative success or failure. The most 
accurate conclusion that can be reached is that SSF has worked sometimes, for certain 
offenders. It is also important to remember that recidivism is not the only valid criterion 
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for assessing rehabilitative programmes. In fact, the "success" and longevity of SSF has 
had more to do with the administration of the programme, than its ability to reform every 
individual whom attends. Therefore, any analysis on the rehabilitative ability of SSF 
needs to be accompanied by a subsequent discussion on the Foundation's, past and 
present, organisational and management practices. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Organisation and Management of SSF 
Introduction 
The organisation and management of any not-for-profit facility (NFP)193 has a maJor 
influence on the overall quality of the programme, whatever its purpose may be. Without 
effective management, a NFP is paralysed. It cannot function efficiently. There are 
numerous issues commonly faced by NFPs. These range from concerns relating to the 
appointment of board members, the role and functions of the board, clarity of 
organisational objectives, and conflicting views and agendas of members. For an 
organisation to be able to achieve its goals and objectives, it must first be able to 
overcome any of these issues by ensuring that clear administrative procedures and 
appropriate managerial personnel are in place. 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the effectiveness of SSF's past and present 
managerial practices. From such an analysis, it is possible to highlight mistakes made, 
and lessons learnt, by SSF in the past as well as considering how the Foundation has 
worked to overcome these difficulties in recent times. As suggested in chapter seven, the 
longevity of SSF has had more to do with the administration of the programme, than with 
its ability to reform every individual who attends. This is essentially because the long-
term "success" of SSF has been due to the ability of staff and board members, throughout 
the Foundation's existence, to face various problems and overcome them. By way of 
193 The terms nonprofit and not-for-profit are used interchangeably. 
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comparison, SSF will be considered alongside New Zealand's four other habilitation 
centres, the majority of which have been plagued with organisational difficulties, have 
largely failed to meet Department of Corrections contract specifications, and have been 
subsequently forced to close. 
What are Nonprofit Organisations? 
Throughout its history, SSF has operated in New Zealand as a not-for-profit organisation. 
Therefore, before considering the results of SSF, it is important to establish what NFPs 
are and how ideally they should operate. Providing a broad definition of what a NFP is 
complex and difficult. This is because internationally, as well as within individual 
countries such as New Zealand, NFPs vary enormously in scope and scale. As Boris 
(1999: 4) explains, "As a group, nonprofits are heterogeneous. They reflect common 
aspirations but sharp differences as well. Their impacts can be positive or negative, 
confrontational or conciliatory, depending on their activities". 
NFPs incorporate a diverse range of organisations. These include religious groups, 
hospitals, universities, environmental groups, museums, youth associations, civil rights 
groups, community development organisations, social clubs, political groups, and labour 
unions, to name a few. These organisations are based upon, and driven by, various goals 
and objectives. While some offer traditional charitable assistance to the needy, others 
undertake manufacturing and advanced research. Their sources of revenue also follow no 
clear pattern, with some receiving grants from traditional donative charities, while others 
are fully government-funded. NFPs range from small community and neighbourhood 
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organisations, with few assets and no employees, to multibillion-dollar foundations, 
universities, and healthcare facilities with thousands of employees. Along with this, their 
modes of governance vary from autocratic rule by a sole trustee to broadly representative 
boards composed of officials elected by either the general public or members of the 
organisation (see Boris and Steuerle (eds.) 1999, Herman (ed.) 1994). 
While significant diversity exists, locally and internationally, between nonprofit 
organisations, some common characteristics can be identified. These main areas of 
similarity will be considered individually and incorporate five main factors. These are 
that typically NFPs: (1) do not distribute profits; (2) play a prominent societal role 
including having important links to government; (3) provide mutual support, service 
delivery, and/or campaigning and research; (4) are self-governing/self-managing; and (5) 
incorporate some level of voluntary participation. 
The primary commonality amongst NFPs is that they usually exist for purposes other than 
profit making and hence, do not distribute profits to those who lead, control or invest in 
them. In the event that any profit is produced by an NFP it is conventionally used to 
enhance the nonprofit facility in terms of its public purpose, rather than benefiting 
particular individuals involved within it. In general, therefore, a large portion of NFPs 
operate as charitable organisations which frequently serve sections of the community that 
are not able to financially contribute to the organisation. Thus, rather than accumulating 
large amounts of profit, they often rely on grants, donations and other forms of monetary 
assistance from a range of governmental and non-governmental sources (Boris 1999). 
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In spite of the fact that nonprofit organisations do not distribute profits, they play a 
prominent role in the social, economic and political sectors of society. In fact, according 
to Gorham (1999: xi), "Non-profit organisations have been called the glue that holds civil 
society together". This is because they exist as service providers, employers and 
community-based advocates, and thus are often responsible for establishing numerous 
relationships and networks between a variety of groups and individuals. Amongst those 
intertwined with the nonprofit sector is government. As well as being influenced by not-
for-profit organisations working on policy issues, government departments across the 
Western world frequently use NFPs as a means of delivering social services. Hence, the 
"interaction between government and nonprofit organizations in civil society is complex, 
but it is also dynamic, ebbing and flowing with shifts in policy, political administrations, 
and social norms" (Boris 1999: 4). 
Nonprofit organisations establish networks and societal links by promoting a specified 
activity or purpose. Although, amid NFPs, a wide range of principles are advocated, 
overall they tend to focus on serving a need or interest which directly benefits the general 
public or specific sections of the public (Gorham 1999). These interests are mainly 
advanced through the provision of mutual support, service delivery, and/or campaigning 
and research (Handy 1988). NFPs centred on mutual support are responsible for putting 
people with similar concerns or enthusiasms together, while campaign-based 
organisations act as a pressure group for a particular interest, and research-focussed 
institutions work towards advancing knowledge in a specified area. The biggest and most 
visible groups of NFPs, however, are service delivery facilities, which provide services 
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and/or resources to those in need. These categories are not distinct and many not-for-
profit organisations fit into all of the areas. SSF provides an example of one such 
organisation which, as discussed in previous chapters, has delivered rehabilitative 
services to ex-offenders for many years, as well as being actively involved in 
research/debate surrounding issues relating to crime, criminal justice, and correctional 
policy in New Zealand. 
Another common feature within most not-for-profit organisations is that they incorporate 
some level of voluntary participation and self-governance/management. Frequently, 
governance is based upon the existence of a Board of Trustees, consisting of a group of 
individuals who are involved with a NFP "for no financial payment, and of their own free 
will" (Jackson and Donovan 1999: xii-xiv). These Boards are responsible for all core 
governance functions including establishing the goals and strategic direction of an NFP, 
making certain these objectives are implemented into policy and practice, and ensuring 
the organisation's overall survival. Along with the predominantly voluntary participation 
of Board members, some staff/other employees may be paid. For those who do receive 
payment/benefits, this only takes the form of a reasonable salary/benefit in return for 
work done as an employee of the organisation. Staff/employees, who are typically 
responsible for the management of an NFP are accountable to the BOT, in order to ensure 
the effective and efficient achievement of the goals established by the Board (Jackson and 
Donovan 1999). 
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Management and Governance in New Zealand's Nonprofit Sector 
In New Zealand, the Institute of Directors, Inc. (2000) sets out the best practice for not-
for-profit organisations. According to this document, the most essential components for 
improving an NFP's performance are professional governance and effective management. 
In order to achieve these objectives, certain procedures and practices need to be adhered 
to. The first and most important step for any nonprofit organisation is to decide whether 
the board is to have only a governance role, or whether some or all of its members will 
also be involved with management. Generally, a key factor in this decision is whether the 
NFP has a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or someone in an equivalent position (such as 
Director in the case of SSF), or not. If the organisation does, then the board should not 
undertake a management role. Instead, the board should concentrate solely on governance 
and monitoring issues, while allowing the CEO to be responsible for the day-to-day 
running of the organisation. Any paid staff, however, including the CEO, should be 
directly responsible to the chair of the board in order to ensure clear lines of 
accountability are kept with those in charge of overseeing the NFP (Institute of Directors 
in New Zealand, Inc. 2000). 
Along with clearly establishing the role of the board, members also need to be aware of 
the legislation that they are subject to. For the New Zealand nonprofit sector, there are 
four legislative possibilities: (1) the Companies Act, if the NFP is a registered company; 
(2) the Charitable Trusts Act; (3) the Incorporated Societies Act; and (4) a specific Act 
applying to that NFP alone. These Acts establish that board members are required to 
"exercise reasonable care, diligence and skill" (Institute of Directors in New Zealand, Inc. 
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2000: 2). In the case of the first two Acts, of which SSF is accountable to the second: the 
Charitable Trusts Act, 194 board members are prohibited from carrying out the NFP's 
business in a manner that may create a substantial risk, or serious loss, to its creditors. 195 
Apart from these statutes, NFP boards are also subject to a range of other legislation 
involving such matters as employment, health and safety, and tax (Institute of Directors 
in New Zealand, Inc. 2000). 196 
Another factor, which is crucial to the effective functioning ofNFPs, is the establishment 
of a clear set of goals and objectives. The board is responsible for developing these 
strategic aims, as well as detailing how the organisation intends to achieve them. It is 
essential that all involved in the governance and management of any NFP have a clear 
understanding of these objectives in order to avoid conflict between members about what 
the organisation expects to accomplish. Also, by having a clear set of goals which 
establish the direction of the organisation, it is possible for frequent evaluations and 
recommendations for improvement to be made. The Institute of Directors in New Zealand 
suggests that assessments should be carried out on a six-to-twelve-monthly basis by an 
experienced facilitator, whenever this is possible (Institute of Directors in New Zealand, 
Inc. 2000). 
194 Review chapter four for the details, and significance, of this Act. 
195 This incorporates a range of issues, legal and illegal, which can ultimately impede the progress of a 
NFP. Some examples of these difficulties will be discussed later in this chapter. 
196 It is unnecessary to go into detail regarding these legislative provisions, as they are largely irrelevant to 
the content of this chapter. 
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Common issues 
Not-for-profit organisations often experience a variety of difficulties. While these vary 
significantly between organisations, there are some common issues faced by NFPs. The 
Institute of Directors in New Zealand, Inc. (2000: 2) clearly outlines ten of these: 
1. The organisation may be large and "unwieldy", especially if there is a desire to 
involve all stakeholders. 
2. Appointment of board members can lead to factionalism, which can ultimately 
result in time wasting and/or the organisation being used for "political" or 
individual gain. 
3. The role of the board has not been clearly outlined to its members and, hence, 
individuals are uncertain of their responsibilities. 
4. Board members are unclear about the overall objectives of the organisation, or the 
NFP lacks a clearly defined strategic direction. 
5. The organisation may have difficulty attracting new board members, which is often 
due to a lack of clarity in the membership skills needed. 
6. Nonprofit organisations often have "political", or similar imperatives, which 
influence their operations. 
7. NFPs tend to be closer to their client group than a commercial entity, thus 
increasing the possibility for board members to become too personally involved in 
the organisation. 
8. The organisation may be driven by the agendas of the staff, rather than the goals 
and objectives established by the board. This is more likely to occur when the board 
sets no clear strategic directions. 
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9. There is frequently philosophical "unhappiness" in NFPs about having a 
professional manager rather than a volunteer. This can potentially lead to board 
members wanting to "manage" rather than "govern" the organisation. 
10. Conflicting views often exist within NFPs about how the organisation should be 
run, especially relating to how business-like it should be. 
When experienced, these difficulties can lead to a range of problems including 
unnecessary costs, inadequate direction for management/staff, poor use of individual 
skills, and, generally, ineffective leadership, all of which are ultimately detrimental to any 
NFP. The factor, however, of the greatest potential significance is the impact that a 
poorly functioning board can have. According to the Institute of Directors in New 
Zealand, Inc. (2000: 2), 
A board that is not working well or does not know what its proper role is, opens the NFP up to a 
variety of risks. These can include a poor use of resources [staff, plant and funds], loss of 
confidence by donors and funding agencies, loss of reputation, and personal exposure for board 
members. 
In order to improve the operation of a NFP, which Is experiencing some of these 
difficulties, solutions need to be found. 
Possible solutions 
Along with the common issues discussed, the Institute of Directors in New Zealand, Inc. 
(2000: 3-4) offers a range of possible solutions in order to overcome these concerns. 
These solutions include: 
1. Reconsidering the size of the board to ensure a breadth of skills, expenence, 
knowledge and enthusiasm of members. 
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2. Establishing a clearly defined set of skills/qualifications/knowledge required by the 
organisation. This will ensure that all prospective board and staff members are able 
to contribute certain skills that are useful to the NFP. 
3. If board members are responsible for the election of new participants, ensuring as 
many as possible exercise their voting rights in order to ensure the most suitable 
prospects are appointed. 
4. Ensuring the organisation's BOT has an experienced Chairperson. 
5. Maintaining the board's "responsibility to ensure that the overall purpose 
('mission') and objectives ('strategies') of the organisation are formulated and 
published ... statements must be 'owned' by the board if they are to be effective". 
6. Ensuring the board establishes short, medium and long-term objectives for the NFP. 
7. Maintaining the board as being ultimately responsible for: the allocation of all 
resources and funding, setting targets to be achieved by the CEO, establishing 
performance indicators and monitoring procedures, and ensuring appropriate 
systems are in place. 
8. Consideration of strategic policies, which should focus on avoiding, or minimising, 
risks to the organisation. 
9. Ensuring there is agreement about how board meetings are conducted. This 
includes the setting of agendas, the nature of papers/presentations required, and 
how minutes are dealt with. 
10. If needed, establishing smaller board committees to consider certain issues in 
greater depth than is possible at a normal board meeting. These committees should 
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not make decisions on behalf of the board and their power should be limited to 
making recommendations to the board only. 
11. Making certain a clear and unambiguous relationship exists between the board and 
management team. In general, operational responsibilities should be delegated from 
the board to the CEO, who has sufficient authority to carry them out. 
12. As the relationship between the chair and the CEO is critical to a NFPs success, 
frequent communication, based on openness, trust and familiarity, needs to occur. 
Lessons from SSF's Past 
When considering SSF, it is quickly apparent that the Foundation has experienced many 
of the issues commonly faced by NFPs. In fact, at various times throughout its history, it 
seems that SSF has deviated from almost every best management principle offered by the 
Institute of Directors in New Zealand, Inc. At times, these difficulties have threatened the 
stability and continuation of the programme. Overall, the administration of, and 
managerial practice at, SSF has been most seriously impeded by inadequacies in four key 
areas. These are: (1) the role of the director; (2) the role of the BOT; (3) relationships 
between Board members and/or staff; and ( 4) a lack of accountability. 
Role of the Director 
As seen in chapter seven, the programme's director has influenced, both positively and 
negatively, the level of programme completion and reoffending by SSF residents. This is 
because the director has been primarily responsible for the day-to-day running of SSF, 
with his/her role incorporating a range of factors including integrating the programme's 
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mtsston, implementing strategy, achieving organisational goals and objectives, and 
accessing funds (Herman and Heimovics 1994). According to Kath Dunstan, 
The director is the key person. They set the tone. They set up the systems and make sure the 
systems and policies and procedures are followed. They are the pivotal person and if you haven't 
got a good director, you're pretty stuck, and the place starts to fall apart pretty smartly ... 
Whereas, under strong leadership the place runs perfectly. 
Drucker adds to this suggesting that the role of an NFP's leader goes beyond these 
practical aspects. He claims, "The leader is visible; he stands for the organization . . . 
Leaders set examples. The leaders have to live up to the expectations regarding their 
behaviour" (Drucker 1990: 35). 
On a number of occasions the appointment of certain types of directors at SSF has proven 
problematic. For instance, during much of SSF's pre-habilitation centre existence, there 
was a heavy reliance on charismatic leadership rather than steady management. This was 
always going to be potentially problematic because, according to Drucker (1990: 3), 
"What matters is not the leader's charisma. What matters is the leader's mission". At 
SSF, many of those involved as leaders were described as charismatic. Genevieve Strang, 
for example, claimed, "This place has had a lot of charismatic people. I mean, I think, 
Ken Turner was definitely charismatic", and Glenn Newman adds, "Dave Robinson was 
a very strong, charismatic figure and the whole place was founded on him". This is not to 
suggest that charismatic figures, such as Robinson and Turner, did not benefit SSF. They 
each brought numerous qualities to the organisation: Robinson with his boundless 
enthusiasm and dedication to the programme, and Turner who was very successful at 
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acquiring fimding. The difficulties with relying on charismatic leadership arose, not when 
the individual was still involved with SSF, but after they left. As Newman explains, 
The old idea of a charismatic leader of the place ... People were pouring in this huge amount of 
energy without any clear idea about what the point was. And then just driving the whole place on 
their own amounts of energy and then falling over and leaving the place and going somewhere 
else. The whole place just collapsed and then reinvented itself with another person ... [SSF] 
shouldn't depend on one personality to make everything happen. 
As a result, during SSF' s early period, there were many swings and shifts in the focus of 
the programme and it was not until the 1990s that some specific, long-term policies and 
procedures began to be put in place. 
Although policies and procedures were implemented during the 1990s, the quick 
succession of directors caused a new set of leadership difficulties for SSF. From 1990 to 
1997, the Foundation had seven different directors, not including interim directors, such 
as Genevieve Strang and Anni Brown, who took on the role for brief periods while a new 
leader was being found. As seen in chapters four and five, this high turnover of directors 
created uncertainty and often caused disruption within the organisation. The BOT and 
staff members were constantly having to re-establish relationships with a new programme 
director. Debate also existed amid board members regarding what characteristics were 
needed for the role of director. This lack of clarity culminated in the appointment and 
subsequent dismissal of Neil Borlase after only two weeks as director. Also, because of 
the difficult and demanding nature of the position, the BOT often struggled to find 
individuals with the long-term energy, direction, and commitment required for the role of 
director. For example, while undoubtedly both Colin Elliott and Glenn Newman arrived 
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at difficult times during SSF's history and Newman was responsible for the inception of 
SSF as a habilitation centre, they largely failed to have a stabilising or motivating effect 
on the organisation. Genevieve Strang explains, 
Colin Elliot was a very nice man but lacked direction and was not a strong manager . . . Then 
came Glenn Newman, who's also a really nice man, but had even less drive than Colin ... For a 
long time, it was like we were just sitting there, no going backwards actually, rather than moving 
forwards down a path that had any sort of theoretical background, or commitment to the bigger 
programme. In these situations, when we had a directionless director, I withdrew a bit and just 
didn't have the same commitment to the programme. 
Another significant leadership issue at SSF concerned the role of ex-residents within the 
programme. 197 While McLaren (1992) accurately suggested that it is important to include 
ex-offender staff within rehabilitative programmes as credible models of how to make a 
successful lifestyle change, at SSF having them as the directors of the organisation 
frequently caused difficulties. Being director of SSF involved a range of responsibilities 
crucial to the efficient operation of the organisation, and former residents, such as Kevin 
Butson, 198 Ken Turner, and the members of the Core Group experiment, simply lacked 
the administrative skills and managerial experience necessary to run the organisation. 
Along with this lack of training, the transition to director also meant that former residents 
had to become authority figures over their peers. Jeff Cooper, an ex-resident who is 
197 The rationale behind employing ex-residents as directors relates back to earlier discussion regarding the 
desire of SSF administrators for the programme to become self-sufficient like DSF. 
198 Kevin Butson would probably be considered the most successful of all ex-resident directors. In many 
regards, this was due to the voluntary nature of the programme and the immense amount of support he 
received from Dave Robinson and programme administrator, Murray Cree. 
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currently a programme supervisor at SSF, describes the difficulties with his transition 
from resident to staff member. He contends, 
[It's] difficult sometimes because I've got a bit of authority. You know, sometimes I need to say 
something, like ask them to do something and that does feel strange because ... I've known 
some of these guys since prison. That can be difficult and I'm not sure how the guys take it ... 
some guys are different. I mean you get some guys that out in prison are ranked [high] up here .. 
. When you get someone like that in the house and you've got to challenge them on their 
behaviour, they can get quite nasty. I mean I've never had any violence but you can see that 
they're angry with you. 
As a result of a culmination of these factors, it seems unsurprising that difficulties 
including poor record keeping, high levels of offending, and misinformation to the BOT 
were experienced when ex-residents, such as Turner and the Core Group, were 
responsible for the day-to-day running of SSF. 
Role of the BOT 
Along with the Programme Director, the BOT has played a critical role in the leadership 
of SSF. An ongoing conflict for SSP's Board has related to its role in the governance, 
versus the management, of the Foundation. According to Jackson and Donovan (1999: 
19), "Board involvement in the day-to-day functions is probably one of the most common 
dysfunctions and one that not only causes severe friction but can be extremely time-
consuming, thus creating inefficiencies in the delivery of services". 
Initially at SSF, a small group of people assumed responsibility for both the governance 
and management of the Foundation. Individuals such as Dave Robinson, Murray Cree 
and Geoff Samuels, all undertook multiple roles within the organisation. They were board 
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members, employees, programme administrators, as well as being responsible for the 
day-to-day running before 1983 when no director existed. At times, this situation proved 
contentious. For example, as discussed in chapter four, when Cree took on the "super 
manager" role as both programme administrator and Chair of the BOT, while it was 
deemed necessary at first, the dual role was quickly reviewed and ended. This was 
because these two roles, one focussed on managerial concerns and the other on 
governance, caused conflicts of interest in regards to what role should receive the greatest 
attention. At this stage, however, especially prior to the appointment of a director and 
while the programme was working to establish itself, SSF simply did not have the 
resources to cater for a variety of positions and therefore the undertaking of multiple roles 
by a small few had to occur. 
The impact of the overlap in management versus governance responsibilities was most 
significantly felt at the end of the 1980s. At this time, SSP's administration was 
experiencing a crisis because board members were becoming too involved with 
management. As discussed in chapter four, board members were frequently taking 
managerial duties, such as the development of the programme's content, rather than 
focusing on crucial governance issues. As a result, important decisions relating to issues 
such as discipline, budgeting and liaison with government heads were being 
compromised. As well as this, throughout much of the mid-to-late 1980s, comprehensive 
financial and participant records were not kept. This meant that large amounts of SSP's 
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resources were unaccounted for and that it was unknown how well the Foundation was 
performing in terms ofrecidivism and programme completion rates. 199 
Although the conflict between governance and management reached a climax at the end 
of the 1980s, it remained an ongoing difficulty into the 1990s. Glenn Newman recollects 
he was constantly struggling with members of the BOT in regards to their differential 
roles. He asserts, 
The Board has got to nm the management side of things, in terms of funding and appointing 
staff. It is the same with schools ... [the Board] has clear roles but they don't deal with 
curriculum, the don't tell the teachers what they have to teach ... My feeling was that they'd 
employed me to say how the programme worked and that I should have some overall impact as 
to how the programme functioned. 
The continual involvement of Board members in the day-to-day running of SSF, was 
partially related to the composition of the BOT and, hence, the appointment of board 
members. As established in chapter five, the acquisition of board members had been an 
ongoing issue for SSF and one which had affected the efficiency of the BOT throughout 
much of the Foundation's history. Prior to 2000/00 board members were elected at an 
AGM from members of the general public. This effectively meant that any person could 
be voted onto SSF's Board and that ultimately the whole BOT could be taken over by a 
lobby group at any time. According to Glenn Newman, "[This made things] tough 
because you never knew who your Board of Trustees was going to be". It also generally 
meant that there were a wide variety of individuals on the BOT, all with very diverse 
199 SSF Special Meeting 10/4/1989 
20° Changes made in 2000 will be discussed later when considering the reasons for SSF's success. 
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reasons for being there and wanting different levels of involvement with the organisation. 
As Greg Newbold explains, 
A lot of crises were caused by the BOT ... You had two types of people on the Board. You had 
professionals, who wanted to get the business done and weren't interested in a hands on 
relationship with SSF. Those who wanted a role of governance only and to let the administrators 
do their thing. Then you also had 'meddling women' ... although it was not a question of men 
versus women but rather employed versus unemployed ... those who were on the Board because 
they had nothing better to do. They wanted to have a hands-on approach, so came in and then 
some started having affairs with residents, which only added to the chaos. 
The appointment of unsuitable board members often led to difficulties relating to a lack 
of professionalism amid those involved with the organisation. For example, many of 
those interviewed for this project referred to personal relationships and affairs between 
board members, residents and/or staff, particularly during the 1980s. Then the BOT, itself 
constrained by its own inadequacies, often lacked the administrative procedures needed 
to competently deal with these sorts of issues. When Newbold first began his 
involvement with the Foundation in 1989, he claims, 
Board meetings were messy affairs. Really disorganised, no agenda, no real minutes - people 
would just note down resolutions, no reading of the minutes. Really people would just take notes, 
they were more like notes than proceedings, and meetings were very informal. 
Along with this, during the 1980s, it was not uncommon for staff also to be involved as 
members of the BOT. Genevieve Strang recalls, 
At one stage I went on the Board. That's how badly dysfunctional the place was, three staff 
members were on the Board. It just seemed like they were the only people interested at the time 
and it had to happen. It was a conflict of interest but everyone did it and I didn't know it wasn't 
right. 
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According to Jackson and Donovan (1999), while it is appropriate, especially in small 
organisations, for staff to be involved in making recommendations to the Board, having 
them participating on the BOT is problematic because it can lead to staff dominance over 
the organisation's governing body. They assert, "Staff dominance can be a danger where 
there are insufficient Board members with expertise related to the service delivery, or 
with available time to give to Board activities" (Jackson and Donovan 1999: 20). 
Relationships between staff and board members 
The complexity of the relationship between staff and board members is an issue, which 
has created confusion and caused disruption at numerous times throughout SSF's history. 
According to Jackson and Donovan (1999: 21, emphasis in original), 
The relationship of staff to the Board is a key factor (if not the factor) in the successful 
functioning of an agency, but difficulties in this area are often 'swept under the carpet' ... The 
one area that is hardly ever mentioned by Boards, or treated as a side issue, is that of the 
relationship between Board and staff. In addition, there is often a wide divergence between the 
perceptions of Board and staff. 
At SSF, these differing perceptions largely resulted from unclear organisational 
objectives and the conflicting opinions and agendas which existed both within the BOT, 
and between Board members and staff. 
The conflicting agendas of staff and/or board members have caused difficulties at SSF 
since the programme's inception. As Glenn Newman explains, 
There were real swings in the focus of the programme and it was made worse by the fact that not 
only was there the personalities of the directors to deal with, there were also the personalities of 
the trustees to deal with. SSF was driven by this group of trustees from the community and they 
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all brought in amazing agendas ... It was very difficult for them to accept that their idea of what 
works often varied from everyone else's idea of what works and that there was some research 
that we could go to and say this is actually what works - not what you think, or you think, or you 
think ... And I had many battles over those kinds of issues. They were saying you must do this, 
when the research was saying this is the stuff which needs to be looked at. 
It could be argued that, during the 1980s, this was largely due to the lack of a policy 
manifesto/programme and management plan, which clearly established the objectives of, 
and roles of those involved with, the Foundation. While this may be partially true, these 
problems did not end following the establishment of this documentation in the early 
1990s. For instance, Genevieve Strang said that between 1994 and 1996, 
We often went back to the mission statement. We tried to do a lot of work around it, to get 
everybody going in one direction but it didn't seem to work. And maybe the staff, the men on the 
staff, were all perhaps looking for their own cause and looking after their own egos, rather than 
looking out for the good of the residents and what we were doing for them. That was my 
interpretation of it anyway. 
On a number of occastons, the conflicting agendas of board and staff members 
contributed to a breakdown in communication between the BOT and the programme 
director. Consequently, while the director and other staff members (via the director) were 
theoretically accountable to the Board at SSF, at various times during the programme's 
past the BOT was not advised or misinformed about what was going on at the 
Foundation. This occurred to the greatest extent when Ken Turner, Skip Crossen, and the 
Core Group were responsible for the day-to-day running of SSF. For example, as seen in 
chapter four, Turner used many informal tactics to control communication channels 
within the Foundation and protect his authority over it. This included the establishment of 
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a prison-style "anti-narking" code at SSF in order to avoid drawing BOT attention to the 
widespread criminal offending that was occurring by residents. 
During these periods of staff dominance, the effectiveness of the BOT in governing SSF 
was clearly compromised by the lack of information being provided by the programme's 
director and staff. This problem was made worse by the fact that many of the board's 
members either had a low level of involvement or lacked the experience and ability to 
foresee or deal with these difficulties. As Greg Newbold argued in chapter four, 
The problem, as is the case for many of these institutions, was that the Board of Trustees were all 
amateurs ... and part-timers, whereas the admin staff were professionals and full-timers, so they 
could very easily pull the wool over the eyes of the BOT if the BOT isn't well-organised and 
doesn't have good systems in place. 
Lack of accountability 
A contributing factor to the lack of organisation at SSF, and the subsequent difficulties it 
caused, was that the Foundation was not directly accountable to a particular funder or 
organisation. According the Jackson and Donovan (1999: 224), "Evaluation is now 
generally recognised as an essential feature of the management of human service 
organisations, whether they be large or small". Prior to SSF's establishment as a 
habilitation centre, however, there was a definite lack of accountability within the 
programme. As established in previous chapters, few records regarding a range of issues 
from programme completion/reoffending rates to the Foundation's financial position 
were kept and any assessments of the programme were infrequent at best. Ultimately, this 
meant that SSF was under no pressure to perform, in terms of either reducing recidivism 
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or following clear administrative and managerial procedures. In effect, as recognised by 
the BOT in 1991, for numerous years SSF had been operating "in an ad hoc fashion that 
was essentially unaccountable and subject to abuse".201 
Reasons for SSF's Success 
In many respects, when closely examining the history of SSF, it is surprising that the 
programme has survived over two decades. For a large majority of the Foundation's 
history, the organisation has seemed to jump from crisis to crisis. This began with its 
early closure in 1981, continued through the 1980s with low resident numbers and a 
leadership/management crisis, and into the 1990s with instabilities relating to leadership, 
funding and the Foundation's premises. What has been crucial to the long-term success of 
SSF, therefore, has not been its ability to avert major difficulties regarding the 
organisation and management of the programme, but rather its ability to overcome them. 
Overall, the majority of the managerial concerns faced by SSF have been effectively dealt 
with since the programme's inception as a habilitation centre. Both prior to, and 
following, 1996, however, SSF's capacity to surmount these issues has largely relied 
upon three key factors. These are: (1) the commitment and professionalism of certain 
board and staff members; (2) the constant revision/improvement of objectives, procedures 
and roles within the organisation; and (3) the ongoing provision of funding. As Glenn 
Newman surmises, 
There has been that charismatic leadership from time to time, not that I think that is a good thing, 
but it's provided energy at that crucial moment to keep the place going. And I think you've got 
201 Twelfth Annual Report 1990-1991 : 2 
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to say that there has been the long-term support of Corrections. Corrections has constantly been 
onboard ... They've provided money, they've provided oversight, they literally provided Terry 
Easthope at a time when that place would have fallen over ... I think by a mixture of good luck, 
good management and good people from time to time it actually has made a difference. 
Pre-habilitation centre 
Prior to its establishment as a habilitation centre, SSF was constantly suffering from 
managerial inadequacies. In spite of this, however, it continued to operate and progress. 
A major reason for this was related to the enthusiasm and commitment of certain board 
and staff members throughout the programme's history. As Geoff Samuels contends, 
"Salisbury Street's been such a long running programme because it's had people with a 
general enthusiasm for the place and an aspiration to see it develop". The primary 
example of this is Dave Robinson, who founded, and was involved with and committed 
to, the programme for over a decade. Jon D' Almeida, while only involved with SSF for a 
relatively short amount of time, also came at a crucial time in the Foundation's history 
and implemented some key policies and procedures (see chapter four). Along with these 
two, many others, such as Anni Brown, Ken Turner, Greg Newbold, Meladie Bras, 
Genevieve Strang and Kath Dunstall, have been involved for extensive periods or at 
crucial times when the programme needed leadership and/or to be reenergised. 
As well as a commitment by many of those involved with SSF, the introduction of the 
Criminal Justice Act in 1985 came at an uncertain time in the programme's history when 
the organisation may otherwise have been forced to close. As seen in chapter four, the 
implementation of this Act had a considerable impact on the organisation of SSF. Rather 
263 
than admissions occurring on a voluntary basis, under the Act, SSF was able to formally 
receive both parolees and those who had not served any period of imprisonment. These 
formal sentencing provisions saw resident numbers increase, with the programme 
consistently operating at its maximum capacity of 12, as well as ensuring a certain level 
of funding from the Department of Justice. 
While at times financial instability has been a key concern for SSF, during other periods 
it has been the ongoing provision of funding which has enabled the organisation to 
survive even amid managerial chaos. This was especially true during Ken Turner's reign 
as director where the programme's continuation was based, not on the overall effective 
management of SSF, but on Ken Turner's ability to attain monetary assistance. As Greg 
Newbold explains, "The thing was it was like a bottomless pit in terms of money. There 
were endless amounts of money; money for everything". Therefore, the programme was 
able to keep operating, in spite of numerous crises, because "the Charitable Trusts kept 
giving us money because [most of what was happening] wasn't public" (Newbold: 
personal communication). 
From the early to mid 1990s, while SSF did not have the financial stability of the late 
1980s, improvements were made to important management documentation surrounding 
the objectives, procedures and roles at the Foundation. As established in chapter four, 
Henry (Skip) Crossen was employed as Director of SSF in 1990 specifically because of 
his business background and ability to introduce the managerial structures that had been 
lacking at SSF for many years. Crossen was successful at improving these aspects, 
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working closely with Greg Newbold as Chair of the BOT, to develop a comprehensive 
Policy Manifesto, and a Management and Programme Plan, which clearly established the 
programme goals and administrative structures crucial to the operation of SSF. 
D 'Almeida, who already possessed a high standard of managerial skills and experience, 
further advanced the work begun by Crossen. Following his appointment, D' Almeida 
reshaped many of the management structures at SSF. He streamlined administrative 
procedures in order to provide clearer guidelines to staff and programme participants, 
introduced urinalysis for all programme participants and staff, and established the 
position of Night Manager for between 5pm- 8pm. D'Almeida also improved SSF's 
position in the private and public sectors by opening up communication lines with 
Christchurch Community Corrections and reintroducing discussion groups to Paparua 
Prison (see chapter four). While the work done by both Crossen and D'Almeida was 
important and improved SSF's administrative procedures, it was following the 
Foundation's establishment as a habilitation centre that the most significant managerial 
changes were made. 
Shift to a habilitation centre 
Although a number of those involved with SSF were against the programme's transition 
to a habilitation centre, I am doubtful that the Foundation would have survived without 
this shift. The programme was in a very vulnerable position prior to its inception as a 
habilitation centre and, in regards to the organisation and management of the programme, 
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SSF's transition to a habilitation facility enabled the Foundation to overcome many of its 
prior difficulties and subsequently gain greater overall stability. As David Coom explains, 
Oh well, quite clearly I would think that Salisbury Street would not be around today if there 
hadn't been some catalyst for it to get very professional and very structured, very quickly ... 
we'd been offered this solid contract ... [and] it formed a really good base for us to expand and 
grow, which we're in the process of doing now. 
Under the specifications of the three-year habilitation centre contract, financial backing 
was assured, objectives and roles at SSF were clearly established, and the level of 
evaluation of the programme increased. At first, the most critical aspect of the transition 
to a habilitation centre was the provision of monetary assistance. As seen in chapters four 
and five, this economic security came at a critical time when those involved with the 
Foundation were finding it increasingly difficult to acquire funding. In order to maintain 
financial stability, however, the Foundation had to meet certain contractual obligations 
established by the Department of Corrections. Ultimately, these necessitated that the 
programme become more structured and professional than it ever had been before. 
The BOT, director, and other members of the staff at SSF have been ultimately 
responsible for SSF's professionalism and its constant ability to meet the contract 
specifications established by Corrections. As Jeff Cooper sums up, 
Since I've been here, just over a year, you look at the success rate and it hasn't been great. There 
have been a lot of guys that have gone back to prison. Maybe [the programme's survived 
because of] how it's run. David's an awesome Director and he does an awesome job, and 
Genevieve too. And I guess it comes down to the Board as well. They must be doing something 
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right to be getting all of the funding from Corrections because without the funding from 
Corrections this place wouldn't have a hope. 
The appointment of David Coom in 1997 was an important part of the enhancement of 
professionalism in the management of SSF. Up until his resignation in February 2003, 
Coom was SSF's longest serving Director who offered managerial stability to the 
programme. Professionally, Coom had previous experience as both a manager and a 
social worker. This provided him with the skills necessary to manage the Foundation 
efficiently while also being able competently to deal with residents and, at times, their 
deceptive and/or destructive behaviour. As well as this, Coom has been very effective at 
public relations and the marketing of SSF to all major stakeholders. He claims, "We have 
worked really hard at networking and public relations with our key stakeholders". This 
has been crucial to SSF in recent years because, as Moyer explains (1994: 251), 
"marketing is a vital life process that links an organisation - corporate and nonprofit -
with key elements its environment. Important exchange partners include donors, 
governments, media, service collaborators, allies in advocacy, and - of special interest -
clients". 
While David Coom's leadership role has been crucial, no director can manage SSF 
independently. Other members of staff are also essential to the overall functioning of the 
organisation. In general, SSF currently has a largely effective mix of staff including ex-
offenders, those experienced in dealing with offenders, and clerical personnel who are 
computer-literate and have the skills required to provide the BOT with clear financial 
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accounts. According to Sturgeon (1994: 555), getting this mix of staff right is essential. 
She claims, 
Selecting people for one's organization is probably the most important function any manager 
has. From the perspective at the top of the organization, it is clear that success depends on 
melding the energies and talents of many different kinds of people. 
In relation to the governance of SSF, in 2000, the section of SSF's constitution relating to 
the powers of its BOT was amended. As discussed in chapter five, the aim of these 
revisions was to overcome prior difficulties surrounding board membership by restricting 
who could be appointed. Now, rather than being elected by the general public, new 
members are co-opted by those already on the BOT. As a result, Board members are 
generally professionals, who offer specific qualities to SSF. According to David Coom, 
''Now when we look for a replacement firstly we look at what skills are missing from the 
Board and then we go out and find someone who can match those skills". Along with 
coopting its members as required, the BOT now has the power to vote off any individual 
who proves unsuitable and/or instigates any conflict amongst Board members.202 These 
provisions have improved the efficiency of the Board by creating greater long-term 
stability in Board membership because individuals are co-opted only when the BOT 
deems it necessary. 
Another factor which has been central to improvements in the organisation and 
management of SSF, is that following its transition to a habilitation centre it became 
ultimately accountable to the Department of Corrections. This has resulted in more 
202 SSF Trust: Constitution and Rules 2000 
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frequent evaluations of the programme and an expectation that comprehensive records 
will be kept by the BOT and staff. These two areas, which were previously managerial 
weaknesses at SSF, are crucial to the successful functioning of any NFP (see Jackson and 
Donovan 1999: 201-226, Thomas 1994: 342-366). As seen in chapter five, under the 
habilitation centre contract specifications, SSF is expected to adhere to all protocols and 
procedures established by the Department of Corrections, and to be able to measure them 
in a "reliable and transparent way".203 These constant assessments, such as the provision 
of quarterly service performance reports, are hugely beneficial to SSF, providing the 
programme's BOT and administrators with a clear idea about where the programme is 
flourishing and what areas need further improvement. 
Lessons from other Habilitation Centres 
Along with SSF, there have been four other programmes established as pilot habilitation 
centres. These were: (1) Aspell House; (2) Higher Ground Rehabilitation Trust; (3) Te 
Whanau 0 Waipareira habilitation centre; and ( 4) Te Ihi Tu of Roopu Tane Taranaki. Of 
these five programmes initially established as habilitation centres, only SSF and Te Ihi 
Tu continue to operate today (renamed in 2002 as "Residential Community Centres") 
(Ministerial Briefings 2002). The overall ineffectiveness of the other three facilities was 
one of the reasons that habilitation centres were deleted in the Parole Act and Sentencing 
Act 2002. Hence, it is interesting to consider why these programmes failed. 
Unfortunately, as is the case with SSF, there is almost no published material on these 
203 Report to Patterson and SSF BOT from Anne McCormack, October 1996 
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organisations and therefore the following discussion is limited to what 1s little 
information is available.204 
Before analysing why three out of five of the pilot habilitation centres failed, it is 
important to consider each of the other programmes, including their location, resident 
profile, and overall intentions. Te Ihi Tu of Roopu Tane Taranaki, the only other centre 
still operating, was established in New Plymouth in 1996, after initially having problems 
getting resource consent for a suitable site. These early difficulties were due to opposition 
from local residents, who believed that a habilitation centre in their community would 
mean lower house prices and lead to more crime. Once set up, Te Ihi Tu provided a 12-
week Maori kaupapa programme for up to eight Maori male offenders.205 The programme 
was, and remains, based on a combination of interventions including Stop Violence, drug 
and alcohol counselling, Maori language and culture, and budgeting and life skills. In the 
Habilitation Centre Quarterly Report (September 1997), it was noted that Te lhi Tu had 
shown a good initial programme completion rate with all of the three men who had been 
involved in the centre's first intake completing the programme.206 
Aspell House, situated in Plimmerton, near Wellington, and operated by the National 
Society on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence (NSAD), was established as a treatment 
programme for female offenders with drug and alcohol problems. The facility ran for six 
204 Almost no information is available for the Higher Ground Drug Rehabilitation Trust. For this reason, the 
majority of the discussion will focus on the difficulties faced by Aspell House and Te Whanau 0 
Waipareira. 
205 Te Thi Tu' s maximum resident capacity has since increased to ten. 
206 Although still operating, Te Thi Tu is currently experiencing some difficulties (Newbold: personal 
communication). Details of these concerns, however, are largely unavailable. 
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months, depending on the individual needs of each resident, and had room for up to 10 
women, who arrived either on parole or after being sentenced by the courts to a 
community-based programme. The programme offered a range of treatment modules 
including relapse prevention, anger management, parenting skills, stress management, 
employment preparation, effective communication, budgeting and recreation, all of which 
focused on addressing the causes of, and preventing further, offending. 207 
The Higher Ground Drug Rehabilitation Trust, situated in Parnell, Auckland, existed as 
an 18-week residential rehabilitation programme for up to five males and/or females with 
severe drug or alcohol dependency. The programme was based on a 12-step approach to 
recovery, which aimed to teach the basic skills necessary to maintain a drug and alcohol-
free existence while also involving friends and family in the recovery process. Little 
information is available on this facility. However, it appears that in August 1998 the 
Department of Corrections was planning to replace the Higher Ground Rehabilitation 
Trust with Challenge Trust.208 According to the Department of Corrections leaflet (1998), 
Challenge Trust was located in South Auckland and had become a registered Charitable 
Trust in 1995. It provided residential and community support services to people with 
psychological and psychiatric needs.209 From the end of 1998, it was to deliver a 10-week 
violence prevention programme aimed at male offenders, with a history of violent and/or 
aggressive behaviour, who were motivated to change their lives. After this point, 
207 Department of Corrections: News Release 5/3/1997 
208 Department of Corrections: Habilitation Centres- Information Leaflet, August 13 1998 
209 Ibid. 
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however, Challenge Trust is not mentioned in any of the habilitation centre 
documentation, so no conclusions or analysis can be drawn regarding this programme. 
The history of the Te Whanau 0 Waipareira Trust dates back to 1953 when it first 
unofficially began operating as an Urban Maori Authority in West Auckland's Maori 
community. During the 1970s, the Trust constructed an urban marae as a location for 
social and cultural performances and other services. fu 1984, it became registered as an 
NFP under the Charitable Trusts Act 1957 (Jones 1993). Throughout its history, Te 
Whanau 0 Waipareira Trust offered a wide range of outreach services to Maori living in 
West Auckland. This included the provision of a habilitation centre, which offered a six-
month Maori kaupapa programme for up to 12 male residents. The programme focused 
on involving the families of Maori offenders in order to reduce reoffending. fudividual 
programmes were developed for each parolee based on their needs and included a range 
of courses related to drug and alcohol addiction, anger management, counseling, as well 
as cultural and recreational activities?10 
Due to the difficulties mentioned with accessmg information on the fate of these 
habilitation centres, the following discussion will be limited to just a brief consideration 
ofTe Whanau 0 Waipareira and Aspell House. 
Following its inception as a habilitation centre in 1996, Te Whanau 0 Waipareira 
struggled with various difficulties. For instance, during its first quarter, the programme 
210 Department of Corrections: Habilitation Centres- Information Leaflet, August 13 1998 
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had only one resident who did not even remain at the facility until the end of the 
quarter.211 While resident numbers subsequently improved,212 the programme struggled 
with issues of non-compliance and serious incidents, which resulted in numerous 
dismissals. In the quarter ending September 1996, for example, eight serious incidents, 
including threatening and aggressive behaviour, were reported, as were concerns 
regarding non-attendance at core counselling programmes.213 These difficulties continued 
throughout 1997 with high levels of serious incidents, mainly related to drug/alcohol 
consumption and threatening/criminal behaviour, and subsequent dismissals being 
reported in most of the habilitation centre quarterly reports. In June 1997, it was 
suggested that these problems were related to a lack of staff available at crucial times 
during the evening and the lack of a counsellor/therapist.214 Even more detrimental than 
the high rate of serious incidents and discharges, however, was the emergence of 
financial difficulties at Te Whanau 0 Waipareira. In December 1996, the programme 
reported a deficit following a substantial increase in expenses for the previous quarter 
including repairs, sundry expenses, and accommodation.215 From this time, the facilities 
financial stability was uncertain and in late 1997 information on the programme became 
unavailable within the habilitation centre quarterly reports.216 
211 Habilitation Centre: Quarterly Report 30/6/1996 
212 From September 1996 to September 1997, the occupancy rates hovered at approximately 50 percent. 
While this was an improvement from its initial quarter, the level was still well below maximum capacity. 
213 Habilitation Centre: Quarterly Report 30/9/1996 
214 Habilitation Centre: Quarterly Report 30/6/1997 
215 Habilitation Centre: Quarterly Report 31/12/1996 
216 I was unable to gain specific information relating to the exact timing of the conclusion of the Te Whanau 
0 W aipareira habilitation centre. 
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Aspell House encountered many of the same difficulties as those faced by Te Whanau 0 
Waipareira. At best, occupancy rates reached 58 percent,217 although usually they were 
considerably below this. In the last quarter of 1996 and the first quarter of 1997, for 
example, the occupancy rates at Aspell House were four and one percent respectively.218 
As a result of these low resident numbers, the cost per resident per day increased, 
sometimes dramatically, to an extreme of $11,796 in the quarter ending March 1997.219 
Along with poor occupancy levels, Y eboah (2000) found that completion rates at Aspell 
House were only 35 percent during the programme's first two and a half years of 
operation. He also stated that, while no reoffending rates had been officially calculated 
due to the use of temporary releasees from Arohata Prison, during the period of 
evaluation many women had been returned to prison even following the completion of 
the programme because they were unable to obtain parole (Y eboah 2000). 
In response to the lack of residents at Aspell House, the NSAD and Department of 
Corrections, completed a review of the programme between November 1996 and 
February 1997.220 During the period of analysis, there were no residents at the centre. 
Staff were still working, however, towards further developing the programme, its 
manuals, while also training and working at other NSAD sites.221 Once completed, the 
report offered a series of recommendations. It found that not enough referrals were being 
217 Habilitation Centre: Quarterly Report 30/9/1997 
218 See table 2 in chapter seven. 
219 Habilitation Centre: Quarterly Report 31/3/1997 
220 Department of Corrections, Operational Audit Report: Aspell House Review, Friday 7 March 1997 
221 Department of Corrections, 'Aspell House set for new intake of residents', News Release 5/3/1997 
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made by the Department to fill places in the pilot habilitation centre and hence it was 
necessary to review the role of Corrections in the way that women were referred to Aspell 
House. Along with this, it was suggested that the content of the programme needed to be 
revised and a handbook developed around a range of issues including the rules and 
requirements of the House and the procedures for inmates, NSAD and the Department in 
addressing grievances.222 While initially this review improved the conditions at Aspell 
House, the same difficulties were quick to resurface. Consequently, Aspell House was 
closed early in 1999 and not replaced. Instead, NSAD, in conjunction with the 
Department of Corrections, established a Drug Free Unit within Arohata Women's Prison 
soon after the habilitation centres closure. 223 
Along with the difficulties already described, there is another critical difference between 
SSF and the other habilitation centres. While the other programmes were new and created 
specifically as a result of the availability of money for pilot habilitation centres, SSF had 
been operating for almost 17 years prior to obtaining its 1996 contract. This meant that 
SSF had been able to iron out many of the managerial difficulties commonly faced by 
NFPs prior to its establishment as a habilitation centre. The other programmes, however, 
had not had this opportunity and therefore, once implemented, lacked the organisational 
and managerial experience/skills needed to operate effectively. 
222 Department of Corrections, Operational Audit Report: Aspell House Review, Friday 7 March 1997 
223 
'Intervention Needed With Youth- Drug Agency', Press Release, Tuesday, 23 November 1999. 
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Conclusion 
Currently, SSF has a comprehensive set of administrative policy and procedures that 
clearly outline the roles of Board members, the programme director, and other staff. In 
recent years, crucial changes have been made in each of these three areas, all of which 
have ultimately improved the overall efficiency of the organisation. First, there is greater 
long-term stability amongst BOT, which now co-opts its own members, so consists of 
professionals who have specific knowledge and/or qualities to offer the organisation. 
Second, up until very recently, David Coom provided SSF with a long-term director who 
was equipped with the professional, small organisation management skills needed to 
effectively run the programme. Third, SSF now has a diversely qualified staff group, 
consisting of ex-residents, those who are experienced in dealing with offenders, and 
others who are computer-literate and capable of supplying clear financial accounts to the 
BOT. Along with these three factors, SSF's transition to a habilitation centre and more 
recently a residential community centre, which is run according to contract provisions 
established by the Department of Corrections, has assured the Foundation more effective 
monitoring, auditing, and assessments than ever previously. 
Overall, it can be concluded that the pnmary reason for SSF's success is due to 
governance, administrative and managerial practices not recidivist statistics. While the 
Foundation has made many mistakes and wrestled with numerous difficulties in the past 
in regards to these areas, due to the commitment and professionalism of certain Board 
members and staff, the review of managerial policies and procedures, and the ongoing 
support of Corrections, SSF has largely managed to overcome these issues. Therefore, 
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when concluding whether SSF has been successful, it would have to be said that it has, at 
least more so than most other similar organisations. After all, how many rehabilitative 
programmes, initially established in the 1970s, are still operating and expanding in New 
Zealand today? 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Conclusion 
Introduction 
This thesis began with two key objectives. This first was to compile a comprehensive 
history of SSF from its introduction in 1979 through to the present day. The second 
purpose was to analyse the role and impact of SSF in relation to rehabilitation, and to 
organisation and management. These goals were pursued through an investigation of 
archival material and other written documentation, and the completion of 13 unstructured 
interviews with individuals who had been involved with SSF throughout its history. The 
information from these two sources allowed the development of a detailed 
historiographical account of the programme, as well as opening the organisation up for 
subsequent analysis. 
HISTORY OF SSF 
The history of SSF has been driven by five key factors: (1) the personalities and influence 
of the programme's directors; (2) the operational philosophies and strategies responsible 
for driving the organisation; (3) the role of the BOT; ( 4) the effect of legislative changes; 
and ( 5) the impact of critical events. Due to the overlapping nature of these principles, the 
following discussion is incorporated under three headings: (1) operational philosophies; 
(2) role of the director and the BOT; and (3) impact of legislative changes and critical 
events. 
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Operational Philosophies 
Since its initial inception in 1979, SSF has undergone many developments and changes. 
Throughout, however, the broad philosophies upon which the programme was based, 
namely reintegration and (re )habilitation, have remained. These principles have 
ultimately controlled how the programme has been administered as well as maintaining 
its overall focus on reducing reoffending and reestablishing offenders in the 
community. 224 
Regarding its founding philosophies, SSP's most significant development has been its 
movement away from the Delancey Street model upon which it was based. DSF, a self-
help residential facility established in San Francisco in 1971, has maintained its financial 
independence for over 30 years. Unlike DSF, SSF never managed to become self-
sufficient. SSF has always relied heavily on funding, especially from government 
sources. 
In April 1996, SSF' s transition to a habilitation centre marked the most substantial shift 
away from the DSF model. After 17 years of existing as an entity which, for the most 
part, was separate from formal correctional authorities, SSF became ultimately 
accountable to the Department of Corrections. This change, while argued by some to 
have undermined SSP's founding principles by allowing itself to be dictated to by 
Corrections, undoubtedly improved the stability of the Foundation. 
224 Along with this, the main components of the programme, namely educational and vocational training, 
work and life skills, counselling, recreational and community work, have also stayed largely the same 
(although at times one aspect has received greater attention than the others). 
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Role of the Director and the BOT 
The roles of the director and the BOT have been critical to the development of SSF. fu 
fact, throughout much of the Foundation's history, the philosophies and beliefs of the 
programme's director and the BOT have directed it. This was especially true prior to 
SSF's establishment as a habilitation centre, when organisational expectations and 
objectives lacked clarity. Consequently, during SSF's pre-habilitation phase, as 
leadership changed so did the feature/s of the programme which received the greatest 
attention. Thus, its focus shifted from psychotherapy, to encounter recreation, then to the 
beginnings of a more comprehensive approach. 
Since SSF's establishment as a habilitation centre in April 1996, these huge swings in 
philosophy, caused by changes in leadership, have disappeared. The reasons are twofold. 
First, SSF now operates according to a clearly defined set of specifications as set out by 
the contract-provider, the Department of Corrections. These provisions restrict the 
implementation of any sudden changes to programme content without the approval of 
Corrections. Second, in recent years there have been a lot fewer changes in leadership 
than previously. This managerial stability has limited the likelihood of alterations being 
made to the programme's methodology. 
Impact of legislative changes and critical events 
Since SSF's inception, three key legislative changes have had a significant impact on it. 
The first was the Criminal Justice Act 1985, which rescued SSF at a time when resident 
numbers were so low that it was on the verge of closing. This Act altered the drafting of 
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residents by enabling them to arrive on a statutory rather than a voluntary basis. While 
improving numbers, the Act also effectively changed the organisation's praxis. Instead of 
individuals choosing to become involved for up to two years, the programme was 
shortened to six-months to one-year and also provided an opportunity for inmates to get 
out of prison early. 
The second statutory provision which dramatically altered the direction of SSF, was the 
introduction of habilitation centres in the Criminal Justice Amendment Act 1993. Once 
again, the implementation of this legislation, and the subsequent establishment of the 
Foundation as a pilot habilitation programme, carne at a time when it was experiencing a 
period of chronic uncertainty. As we have seen, this shift provided SSF with a degree of 
financial stability. Freed of fundraising obligations, it allowed management to focus on 
the programme itself. It also made the SSF ultimately accountable to the Department of 
Corrections, which was beneficial because it forced the organisation to become more 
professional than it had been in the past. 
The most recent legislative change carne with the deletion of habilitation centres in the 
Parole Act 2002 and the Sentencing Act 2002. Since this time, SSF has been renamed a 
"Residential Community Centre". Although it is too soon to say what impact this will 
have, it is likely to be less influential than the previous two statutory modifications. The 
change is only nominal and, thus far, the substance of the programme and the contract 
with Corrections has been largely unaffected. 
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Along with these legislative changes, other critical events have also impacted on the 
evolution of SSF. These incidents have frequently involved two key areas: funding, and 
offending by residents (and to a lesser extent, staff). During SSF's pre-habilitation centre 
phase, these were a continual concern to programme administrators and took up much of 
their time. For example, fundraising obligations were particularly time consuming and 
often limited the attention given by management to other areas. 
In addition to financial difficulties, high levels of resident offending frequently impeded 
SSF's development during its pre-habilitation centre existence. Breaches of programme 
regulations commonly led to dismissals and consequent reductions in resident numbers. 
This restricted the overall effectiveness of the programme because it was often dealing 
with a small, select number of ex-offenders. Moreover, offending was not restricted to 
SSF residents. During the late-1980s to the early-1990s, staff dishonesty and/or offending 
also hindered management and diverted the attention of the BOT away from the 
programme. 
Since April 1996, funding has been less of a concern for SSF because of the financial 
provisions included under the pilot habilitation centre contract. Reoffending by residents, 
however, continues to occur. As was seen in the case of the alleged rape by a SSF 
resident in 1999, though, much better systems are now in place to deal with resident 
offending. 
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ANALYSIS OF.SSF 
It has been apparent that SSF's success and longevity have had more to do with its 
organisation and management, than with its rehabilitative ability. As seen in chapter 
eight, nonprofit facilities such as SSF rely upon efficient administrative procedures in 
order to achieve their goals and objectives. In the case of SSF, it can be seen why these 
factors are so important because the programme has struggled when management and 
governance have been weak. The importance of conclusions regarding rehabilitation, 
therefore, are only secondary to those relating to managerial practices. 
Rehabilitation at SSF 
Considered in isolation, the recidivist figures available for SSF mean very little. At best, 
they can provide some vague indications as to the performance of the programme. As we 
have seen, however, they tend to be incomplete and inconsistent, with recidivist 
information often shifting from reoffending/return to prison figures, to programme 
completion/discontinuation rates. While record-keeping improved considerably after 
SSF's transition to a habilitation centre, gaps still exist and a number of other limiting 
factors remain. 
The unreliability of the recidivist data is only one impediment to an analysis of SSF's 
rehabilitative success. Unrealistic expectations generally exist regarding the efficacy of 
rehabilitative programmes such as SSF. It needs to be remembered that reconviction rates 
for offenders in New Zealand hover at approximately 80 percent. Therefore, high 
defection/dismissal rates are always going to be likely at SSF, especially given the strict 
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compliance regulations placed on residents. In addition, there is nothing inherent about 
the programme at SSF that can force an offender to change his behaviour. The resident is 
ultimately responsible for making the decision to alter his own lifestyle. It is only then 
that SSF can offer resources to assist an his transition back into the community. This is 
why the selection of motivated residents has been such a critical issue to the "success" of 
SSF and why the likelihood of reoffending decreases so much amongst those who 
graduate from the programme, relative to those who defect from it. 
Management 
As noted, those responsible for the organisation and management of SSF have been the 
most significant contributors to its success. Recidivist rates clearly show that leadership 
and management style have had a considerable impact on the level of programme 
completion and reoffending by residents. This is because SSF's ability to achieve its 
goals and objectives has relied primarily upon effective and professional management, 
and when this has not been strong the programme has suffered. 
When analysing SSF's history, numerous managerial and administrative errors are 
apparent. In total, there are eight key areas where the Foundation got it wrong: 
1. For much of SSF's early period, the programme relied on charismatic leadership 
rather than a clearly set agenda. 
2. A number of ex-residents were appointed as directors, who simply did not have the 
skills necessary for this task. 
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3. During the early-to-mid-1990s, the BOT made poor selection choices regarding the 
appointment of directors and as a result, the programme suffered from a quick 
succession of leaders. This caused uncertainty and instability because the 
managerial strategies being employed changed and the BOT, staff and residents 
were constantly having to re-establish relationships with a new director. 
4. Many Board members became too involved in the management of SSF rather than 
focussing on their governance role. 
5. Up until 2000, the appointment of Board members occurred at a public forum 
where anybody was eligible to join, irrespective of whether they had any specific 
skills to offer. 
6. At times the ability of the programme to achieve its goals was impeded by a 
breakdown in communication, particularly between the director and the BOT. 
7. Conflicting agendas frequently existed between different Board and/or staff 
members. This was often the result of a lack of clarity regarding the organisation's 
goals and objectives. 
8. Prior to SSF's establishment as a habilitation centre, a lack of accountability existed 
because there was no requirement for the programme to keep proper records 
detailing its performance. 
While it is clear that SSF has not always been efficiently managed, it has been its ability 
to survive these tumultuous periods and recover from them which has enabled it to 
survive in the long-term. As a result of past mistakes, SSF has reviewed and developed 
many of its policies and procedures. Now, the organisation's objectives and the 
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roles/expectations of board members, the programme director, and other staff are clearly 
outlined and some important changes have been made in order to improve overall 
efficiency. 
Of perhaps the greatest significance is that the BOT now co-opts its own members. This 
has improved the long-term stability of the BOT, as well as ensuring that members are 
professionals who have specific knowledge and/or qualities to offer. Stability on the BOT 
has also been complemented by a long-term director, diversely qualified staff group, and 
effective monitoring, auditing, and assessments. These factors have all been crucial to 
SSF's recent success as a habilitation centre, especially when compared to the other 
programmes. 
When SSF became a habilitation centre in 1996, it was advantaged by its longevity. Thus, 
it had already encountered, and overcome, many of the difficulties that the other newly 
established programmes were coming across. As a result, the administrators and board 
members currently at SSF have a much clearer understanding of their roles and the future 
direction of the organisation. In the future, the lessons learnt, and experience gained, from 
the previous 23-years will continue to benefit and help strengthen SSF. 
Concluding Comments 
As a community-based organisation, SSF occupies an important space in New Zealand's 
correctional environment. It provides a link between prison and the community and offers 
support and training to individuals with long criminal histories who may lack basic living 
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and social skills. The provision of the resources offered by SSF is a necessary part of the 
transition of highly institutionalised individuals back into the community. 
As a not-for-profit organisation, SSF has succeeded where many others have failed. It has 
survived for over 23 years, managing to overcome numerous difficulties. At various 
times these problems, which have ranged from poor leadership, low resident numbers, 
inadequate record-keeping, insufficient funding, and weaknesses on the BOT, have 
severely impeded SSF, sometimes threatening its continuation. In overcoming them, SSF 
provides valuable lessons for other rehabilitative programmes in New Zealand relating to 
how to deal with difficulties when they arise. In recent times, as a result of its transition 
to a habilitation centre, SSF has experienced its most sustained period of stability. The 
management formula currently employed has improved its overall success, with the 
organisation now being driven by a clear set of expectations and held accountable by 
frequent evaluations. In this respect, SSF is an instructive example of what works, and 
what does not, in the management of nonprofit organisations. 
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Appendix A 
Letter of Consent: Historical Information 
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Salisbury Street Foundation 
·P.O. Box 36174 • 15 St. Albans St. Christchurch • Telephone 355 9189 • Fax 355 9123 
21st December 2001 
Head Archivist 
McMillan Library 
University of Canterbury 
CHRISTCHURCH 
Attention: Mr Geoff Palmer 
Dear Mr Palmer 
Re: Re Salisbury Street Foundation Records 
Firstly, apologies if I have spelt your name incorrectly- it was given to me over the phone. 
I write to give the bearer of this letter, Ms Donna Hough, our permission to use historical 
records for the Foundation held by the McMillan Library on our behalf. Please can you 
arrange access for her. 
She is using her research for a Masters thesis on the Salisbury Street Foundation. 
Please ring me or David Coom if you have any queries with regard to this. 
Yours sincerely 
Fran Horsley 
Administration Executive 
Salisbury Street Foundation 
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SSF Interview Questions 
A Personal role/involvement 
1. When and how did you become involved with SSF? 
2. What has your role/roles been within the organisation? 
3. What are some of the key principles and/or philosophies that you believe are essential 
to the successful functioning of an organisation like SSF? 
Ex-residents 
4. How would you describe your experience as a resident of SSF? 
5. What parts of the programme did you find most beneficial? 
6. How did you find the transition from resident to staff? 
B Organisation and management 
7. Which directors have you worked with? How have their personalities been similar 
and/ or different? 
8. How does SSF's existence as a non-profit organisation impact on how the programme 
is run and maintained? 
9. During your involvement, how important has the BOT been in the running of SSF? 
C Programme content/Residents 
10. What do you believe are the key aspects of the programme? How do these help in the 
habilitation of ex-inmates? 
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11. What are your expectations of the residents? What is their role in the functioning of 
the organisation? What is required for them to be able to graduate from the 
programme? 
12. Has the resident profile changed during your involvement? 
D Key events and legislative changes 
13. What are some of the key events or legislative changes that have occurred during 
your involvement with SSF? 
14. What impact did the Roper Report have on the running of SSF? 
15. What was involved in the transition to a habilitation centre? What had to change? 
16. What has been the significance of the transition to a habilitation centre? How have 
things changed? 
17. How do you think the Government (and associated departments) perceives SSF? Has 
this changed? 
E Areas of concern 
18. Since your involvement with SSF when has it been at its most vulnerable? What were 
the reasons for this? 
19. Are there any aspects of the organisation and/or its programme content that you 
would like to see changed? 
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F Positive aspects 
20. What do you see as the most valuable aspects of a community-based organisation 
such as SSF? 
21. What do you think has been key to the longevity of SSF? Why has it remained when a 
number of similar organisations have collapsed? 
G The future of SSF 
22. What do you see in the future for SSF? 
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